CALIFORNIA STATE LINIVERSITY SAN MARCOS THESIS SIGNATURE PAGE THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE MASTEROF ARTS IN LITERATURE AND WRITING STUDIES rHESrs rrrlE: Translation & Analysis of Two Fragments by Pietro Pomponazzi AUTHoR: Jay C. Greene DATE OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE: 19 April,2013 THE THESIS HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE THESIS COMMITTEE IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FORTHE DEGREE OF MASTEROF ARTS Oliver Berghof, Ph.D. 't /'t,\/ zc 13 THESIS COMMITTEE CHAIR DATE Heidi Breuer, Ph.D. ultlttltT wl,c THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER Eliot Wirshbo, Ph.D. w4.*d* /g THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER SIGNATURE California State University San Marcos Translation and Analyis of Two Fragments by Pietro Pomponazzi: Utrum definitio animae sit bene assignata & Utrum anima rationalis sit forma substantialis Jay C. Greene Spring 2013 Prefatory Remark At times throughout this project, the word “man” is used to refer to humankind, as in the chapter which includes a discussion of “the Renaissance Philosophy of Man.” The usage of the word “man” in this way can carry a gendered, potentially sexist, connotation, especially in the 21st century. I use this term here, fully conscious of the potential implications, yet by no means with a sexist intention, attempting to draw upon the traditional usage and terminology inherent to the centuries-old historical and philosophical conversation into which I am entering. Generally speaking, I have restricted the use of the word “man” to only include reference to the species as a whole (as in “man’s destiny”), while avoiding its use in cases where the entirely gendered pronouns “he” or “his” would also be used (as in “man and his destiny”), favoring instead a more gender-neutral term like “humanity.” Kristine – Your unfailing support and encouragement in this undertaking, as in life, is more than I can describe in any language. Subsidium et hortatus perpetuus quod dedisti per hoc inceptum, atque per vitam, plus quam possum dicere in ulla lingua. Table of Contents Introduction 1 I – Humanism, Scholasticsm, & the Renaissance Philosophy of Man 9 II – The Aristotelian Tradition 27 Translator’s Note 63 III – Translation of Fragments Utrum definitio animae sit bene assignata? 66 Utrum anima rationalis sit forma substantialis? 76 IV – Explication and Analysis 94 Glossary 114 Works Cited 116 1 Introduction In 1516, at the height of the Italian Renaissance, Pietro Pomponazzi, Professor of Natural Philosophy at Bologna, published a bold, concise work entitled Tractatus de immortalitate animae [Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul]. In it, he argued that Aristotle, logic, and experience all demonstrate the absolute mortality of the human soul. Its publication caused a firestorm of controversy; copies of his treatise were even burned in Venice as heretical. The specific reason for this controversy, which I will examine at length in a subsequent chapter, is the key to understanding the historical and philosophical importance of Pietro Pomponazzi. His name is perhaps not as much a household name as some of the other key figures of the Renaissance period (i.e. da Vinci, Petrarch, Montaigne, Erasmus, Copernicus), but the transitional role he plays in the progression of philosophical thought is by no means minor. Andrew Halliday Douglass says it well when he notes that “Pomponazzi may be called one of the earliest of the moderns; but it is even more instructive to observe that he was one of the last of the [scholastics].”1 Pomponazzi’s argument about the soul’s mortality, while meticulous, complex, and saddled with the sometimes bewildering technical jargon inherited from centuries of Aristotelian medieval scholasticism, can be somewhat simply stated. Aristotle and the Peripatetics who follow his teachings consider the soul to be the governing principal of animal life—the force animating, uniting, and bringing into actuality all the various powers of the physical body.2 In Aristotle’s words, “The soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of 1 Andrew Halliday Douglas, The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi, p. 4. 2 “...the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life.” Aristotle, De anima, I.i.420a. 2 life,” by which he means one “furnished with organs.”3 Of the soul’s three distinct grades or functions—the vegetative (that which allows an organism to take in nutriment and reproduce), the sensitive (that which allows an organism to sense its environment and to react to it), and the rational (that which separates humans from other creatures, bestowing the capacity for intellection)—there is universal agreement that the first two grades, the vegetative and sensitive, are purely physical in nature and hence mortal, perishing with the death of the organs and bodily functions of which they are the actualities.4 Modern philosopher Mortimer J. Adler summarizes the matter quite succinctly: ...the word 'soul' was used to signify whatever it was in living organisms that made them alive… In addition to endowing man with all the vital powers possessed by plants and other animals, the human soul gives man his distinctive power—that of the intellect… The word 'soul' and the word 'mind' are not coextensive in their connotations. According to [Aristotelian] doctrine, all living organisms had souls, but not all have minds.5 Given the accepted mortality of the vegetative and sensitive souls, the question of immortality, then, boils down exclusively to the question of the nature of the intellect, or rational soul—the anima rationalis—which Aristotle asserts is not the act [actus], or form [forma], of any particular matter [materia], and is thus separable and by extension potentially imperishable.6 Pomponazzi, with characteristic incisiveness, reduces a complex metaphysical conundrum to a simple set of conditions: “[I enquire] whether the soul be mortal or no; and it first must be asked 3 Ibid., II.i.412b. 4 “The soul...cannot be separated from the body, for there are cases where actuality belongs to the parts themselves. There is, however, no reason why some parts [of the soul] should not be separated, if they are not the actualities of any body whatever.” Aristotle, De anima, II.i.413a. 5 Intellect: Mind Over Matter, p.10. 6 De anima, I.iv.408b and III.iv.429b. 3 whether it be material; for if it be material, it is mortal; if it be immaterial, it is immortal.”7 In other words, if it can be shown that the anima rationalis is organic, or at the very least dependent on or united to organic functions, then the mortality of the soul can be rationally demonstrated. This materiality or immateriality of the soul—particularly the rational soul—is the crux of the immortality question. Even the 20th century Adler, discussing the conditions for any hope of the soul’s immortality, argues that, “if there is any philosophical argument to lend some credibility to the dogma of the immortality of the soul, it lies in the spirituality—that is, the immateriality— of the intellect."8 The overarching contention of Pomponazzi’s argument, and in sum, his very historical significance, is precisely an attempt to prove the mortality of the human soul, logically derived from the empirical, observable nature of the intellect. This methodology would be expected from a natural philosopher like Pomponazzi, since, as Clarence Schute states, “concrete, particular, whole things are the starting point for the investigations of the natural philosopher,”9 however because of the sometimes wild metaphysical speculation that had become the fashion under the reigning Averroistic interpretation of Aristotelianism, Pomponazzi’s return to the basics appeared nothing short of revolutionary. More specifically, Douglas maintains that “Pomponazzi, largely neglecting baseless speculations, concerned himself with intelligence as it exists in man. Abandoning the search after ‘separate substances,’ at least so far as man is concerned, he examined intelligence as it is actually manifested in 10 nature.” 7 “Quaerit Pomponatius utrum anima sit mortalis, vel non; et primum quarendum est utrum sit materialis; si enim est materialis est mortalis, si est immaterialis est immortalis.” Pomponazzi, Commentary on the De Anima, f. 130 r (as qtd. in Douglas, p. 98.) 8Adler, p. 4. 9 Clarence Shute, The Psychology of Aristotle, p. 4. 10 Douglas, p. 5. 4 At this point, I feel it would be instructive to introduce the intent and trajectory of my own particular project. Being not only Pomponazzi’s chief work, but also one of the more interesting philosophical doctrines to come out of the Italian Renaissance, the Tractatus de immortalitate animae has been translated into English and has received some (though certainly not sufficient) scholarly attention, particularly from Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, Martin Pine, Paul Richard Blum, and John Herman Randall Jr. However, what appears to be the only book ever written in English about Pomponazzi specifically, The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi, was written originally in 1910 by Andrew Halliday Douglas, yet was never formally published due to its author’s untimely death. Published posthumously in 1962, Douglas’ work remains today the only extant English-language full-length work dedicated to the thought of Pomponazzi. However, there exists a vast body of work by Pietro Pomponazzi that remains untranslated, and thus unexamined, by modern scholars. Douglas had this to say on the material: "His most elaborate philosophical and psychological work remained undiscovered until 1876, and it is still practically unknown. It is his Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle. [...] This work of Pomponazzi undoubtedly deserves somewhat fuller examination than it has yet received. It does not appear to have been considered in any of even the more recent accounts of Renaissance Aristotelianism, or of Pomponazzi himself."11 Though this was written in 1910, little to nothing has changed in the last 100 years.