Observing the 2011 Referendum on the Self-Determination of Southern Sudan Final Report Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope. Map of Sudan Observing the 2011 Referendum on the Self-Determination of Southern Sudan Final Report One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5188 Fax (404) 420-5196 www.cartercenter.org The Carter Center Contents Foreword ..................................1 Post-Referendum Developments .............35 Executive Summary .........................4 Counting and Reconciliation .................35 Tabulation .............................36 Overview of the Carter Center Observation Mission . 6 Referendum Dispute Resolution ..............37 Overview of Sudan at the Referendum ..........6 Out-of-Country Voting .....................39 History and Political Background..............8 Administration ...........................39 Voter Education .........................40 Legal Framework of the Security ................................41 Southern Sudan Referendum . 10 Conclusion .............................41 Referendum Management ...................13 Abyei and Other Special Topics . 42 Structure of Referendum Bodies ..............13 Abyei ..................................42 Referendum Administration .................13 Migratory Populations .....................43 Public Information and Communications .......14 Conflict and Insecurity .....................43 Consideration Committees and Appeals ........14 Blue Nile/South Kordofan Protocol ............44 Voter Registration and the Recommendations and Conclusions . .45 Pre-referendum Period . .15 To the Governments of South Sudan and Sudan ..45 Voter Registration .........................15 To Future Election Management Turnout in Northern Sudan .................19 Authorities in South Sudan and Sudan .........47 Conclusion ..............................20 Conclusions .............................51 Political Party and Domestic Observers .........21 Participation of Women ....................21 Appendix A: Acknowledgments . 52 Voter Education ..........................21 Appendix B: List of Delegation and Staff ......54 Campaign and Political Parties ...............23 Appendix C: Terms and Abbreviations ........58 The Media .............................24 Appendix D: The Carter Center in Sudan .....59 Civil Society and Domestic Observation ........25 Intimidation .............................25 Appendix E: Carter Center Statements on the Southern Sudan Referendum . 61 Armed Attacks ...........................26 The Referendum Period ....................27 Appendix F: Carter Center Observer Deployment Plan .........................135 Preparations .............................27 Polling .................................28 Appendix G: Observer Checklists ...........137 Turnout in Northern Sudan ................29 Appendix H: Invitation to The Carter Unauthorized Assisted Center from the Southern Sudan Voting/Secrecy of the Vote ..................29 Referendum Commission...................146 Security Forces and Intimidation .............30 The Carter Center at a Glance ..............147 Consideration Committees ..................31 Inaccuracies in the Voter Registry .............32 Poll Closing .............................33 The Carter Center Foreword By Jimmy Carter it represented the culmination of a longer struggle Former U.S. President and Carter Center Founder in Southern Sudan, one that frequently spilled over into armed conflict. That struggle stemmed from n July 9, 2011, the state of South Sudan was grievances of economic and political marginalization, formed following a decisive and peaceful vote with power concentrated in Khartoum at the expense Ofor secession from Sudan in January 2011. of other areas of Sudan, and economic develop- Several million Southern Sudanese, casting ballots in ment centered in the capital. Marginalization was all 25 states of Sudan and eight other countries, voted particularly acute in the South and, when coupled nearly unanimously for separation in the referendum with periodic campaigns of for the self-determination of Islamization by Northern Southern Sudan mandated governments, led to politi- by the 2005 Comprehensive cal and armed resistance. Peace Agreement (CPA). Several million Southern Sudanese, casting ballots in all 25 states of Sudan The South’s call for The Sudanese as a whole self-determination began as delivered another powerful and eight other countries, voted nearly early as 1947 and persisted message at the same time, unanimously for separation in the through the next 64 years, one that was unexpected for referendum for the self-determination of through two civil wars many, that the South and between the Government North could work together Southern Sudan mandated by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). of Sudan and rebels in the to organize a vote across the South. Though the stated huge country that defied goal of the Sudan People’s tight deadlines, limited Liberation Movement resources, and daunting logistical challenges to hold a (SPLM) was a united Sudan, many of its members credible referendum that respected the genuine will of supported secession. During the CPA negotiation the people. As South Sudan embarks on its first steps process in Naivasha, Kenya, the right for the South as an independent country, it is worth recalling the to hold a referendum on self-determination was a lessons learned from the referendum, the promise that key demand of the SPLM. Following the agreement’s it demonstrated for the soon-to-be new country, and signing, the referendum remained the driving logic the challenges that must still be overcome. behind close cooperation between the National As the largest country in Africa, Sudan included Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM, even as con- a rich cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity. The flict ignited in other areas of Sudan, particularly in country was viewed as a bridge between religions and Darfur and Eastern Sudan. While remaining a key cultures, and a link between the peoples of sub-Saha- goal for the South and a concern for the North in ran Africa and those of North Africa and the Middle terms of its impact on stability, preparations for the East. The referendum posed the question of whether referendum vote were continuously delayed. these linkages could be maintained despite deep Although the referendum was ultimately credible divisions. Expectations weighed heavily on the coun- for Southern Sudan and showed the great potential try — since independence in 1956, peace in Sudan of the future country, it is important to recall that was the exception rather than the rule. Although even six months before January 2011, its success the referendum for Southern secession was peaceful, was far from assured. At the beginning of August 1 The Carter Center 2011 Referendum on Southern Sudan Self-Determination Deborah Hakes President Carter observes the submission of a voter's ballot. 2010, preparations stood at a standstill: the State Act) was significantly shortened to meet the tight High Referendum Committees (SHRCs) had not yet time line. been formed, preparations for a voter registry had The referendum showed that Southern Sudanese scarcely begun, and the offices of the Southern Sudan could utilize the resources at hand and achieve tan- Referendum Commission (SSRC) and Southern gible results even in the face of hardships. The vast Sudan Referendum Bureau (SSRB) were not yet oper- majority of voter registration and polling staff worked ational. Forecasts for the referendum’s success were tirelessly and selflessly to administer the process, dire, and it appeared doubtful the vote would be held despite not receiving salaries for extended periods. under credible conditions that both North and South Referendum staff worked together to implement a could accept — whatever the vote’s outcome. credible process. Most importantly, the Government And yet the Government of Sudan and of Sudan acknowledged the outcome of the referen- Government of Southern Sudan worked together with dum and recognized the statehood of South Sudan on the assistance of international partners to July 9, 2011. implement the steps needed to plan the referendum. While the January 2011 referendum was a credible Some corners were cut — most notably during the representation of the will of Southern Sudanese, it is voter registration process, when the three-month important that the institutions and citizens in both period between the publication of the voter rolls and South Sudan and Sudan apply lessons learned from the start of polling (as stipulated by the Referendum the vote to future electoral processes. Despite the 2 The Carter Center 2011 Referendum on Southern Sudan Self-Determination successes achieved, there were a number of worrying Sudan is facing its own challenges following the practices that should not be repeated in future elec- secession of the South. The ruling NCP should tions or referenda. Chief amongst these was the data use this opportunity to widen the political space in center procedure of quarantining and reviewing only Sudan. Further repression risks exacerbating griev- polling station results that reported more than 105 ances in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and other percent of cast ballots. Future electoral officials in areas of the marginalized periphery. Sudan and in South Sudan As both nations transi- must avoid the practice of tion to a new reality, they reviewing just the most egre- should be measured against gious results, or they risk