Kyrgyzstan and Turkey: Has a New Level of Relations Begun? With the strengthening of the positions of the new government in Kyrgyzstan, more and more questions are raised about the rapprochement of Kyrgyzstan with Turkey. If these arguments are valid, what triggered these changes? How did official Bishkek begin to view relations with Turkey? Why Ankara is ready to restore the Batken region and how it is connected with geopolitics, this and other issues are discussed in the article, written by Adinay Kurmanbekova, a participant of the CABAR.asia School of Analytics Follow us on LinkedIn Photo: http://president.kg/ The recent visit of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sadyr Japarov to Turkey, mutual visits of the foreign ministers of the two countries and statements of support demonstrate Kyrgyzstan and Turkey: Has a New Level of Relations Begun? both the renewed interest of Turkey in Kyrgyzstan and the rethinking of the importance of Turkey for the official Bishkek. After the October events, over the course of several months, the authorities of the two countries held meetings at different levels. President Sadyr Japarov expressed a focus on increasing turnover of commodities between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Turkey to 1 billion USD per year,[1] and official Ankara, in turn, expressed its readiness to assist in the restoration of houses in the border areas affected by the armed conflict in the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. To top it all off, in an interview with Turkish TV channel, Sadyr Japarov shared his intention to resume relations between the two countries and pointed out the mistakes of the previous government.[2] These events contrast with the previously politically “cold” period, when the rather harsh statements of the Turkish authorities, and no less harsh statements of the former President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev in 2015 about the downed Russian plane, and then about the educational network “Sebat” (now “Sapat”) had temporarily spoiled the relationship between the two states.[3] There were also conflicts between the diplomats of the two countries,[4] and ultimatums of the Turkish authorities about “choosing a side”. During the leadership of Sooronbay Jeenbekov, although political relations did not intensify, they did not deteriorate, and the FETO factor remained a stumbling block. As one can see, the current government has decided to go the other way. It is symbolic that this restructuring of relations is taking place on the threshold of the anniversary – 30 years of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey, which became the first state to recognize the sovereignty of the Kyrgyz Republic. The intertwining of history, the similarity of culture and language have always worked to bring the two countries closer together, and long-term cooperation only strengthened the influence of official Ankara not only in the vastness of Kyrgyzstan, but throughout Central Asia. Economic component Turkey is among the 5 main export and import destinations of Kyrgyzstan. If in 2019 the inflow of foreign direct investment from Turkey amounted to 94,565.5 thousand US dollars,[5] in 2020 this amount decreased to 22,827 thousand US dollars. The external debt of Kyrgyzstan to the government of the Republic of Turkey as of March 2020 was 93.27 million US dollars[6] (bilateral concessional loans), which is more than 2% of the total external debt of the country. The share of Turkish enterprises in Kyrgyzstan – with full participation of foreign capital – from 2014 to 2019 ranks around 300 enterprises, along with China, Russia, and Kazakhstan.[7] And in 2020, turnover of commodities with Turkey decreased by 13.9%.[8] Kyrgyzstan and Turkey: Has a New Level of Relations Begun? As one can see, in recent years, the economic relations between the countries have noticeably decreased, which was obviously influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic and, as a result, closed borders. Consequently, attempts to regulate economic indicators from the Kyrgyz side are not surprising: it was proposed to create a Kyrgyz-Turkish investment fund,[9] and in July 2021, it is planned to hold a Kyrgyz-Turkish business forum with the participation of Turkish businessmen.[10] As for Turkey, it has an economic interest in the Central Asian space, including Kyrgyzstan, which has human capital, growing opportunities for the supply of Turkish goods, as well as opportunities for the “Middle Corridor”. During the working visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic to Turkey, the ministers of the two countries also “agreed to take concrete steps for cooperation within the framework of the initiative of the Trans- Caspian Middle East-West Corridor.”[11] Photo: https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/ In turn, this initiative will effectively link Turkey to China through Central Asia and allow Turkey to receive economic benefits from Europe’s investment and trade with Beijing. In addition, the Turkish side announced the need to sign a free trade protocol with Kyrgyzstan, which will make it much easier to export goods from Turkey to Kyrgyzstan but can also negatively affect the development of the national economy of the Kyrgyz Republic, in which imports significantly exceed the country’s exports. The “Gülenist” Factor in Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan and Turkey: Has a New Level of Relations Begun? Since 2016, Kyrgyzstan has been the target of pressure from Turkey over the educational institutions of the former Sebat. The attempt, according to the Turkish leadership, of a military coup in Turkey was reflected in Kyrgyzstan as well. The Turkish authorities blamed their former ally, religious preacher Fethullah Gülen, for these events, whose name is associated with educational institutions “Sebat” in Kyrgyzstan and beyond. Ankara demanded that immediate action be taken: to close the institutions and expel Gulen’s supporters. Thus, educational cooperation between countries very quickly turned into issues of political significance. Turkey tirelessly reminded of the possible threat of FETO to the stability of Kyrgyzstan, and sometimes did not neglect both ultimatums and blackmail. As a reaction to the current situation, a memorandum was signed between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic and the state educational foundation Türkiye Maarif Vakfı (“Maarif”), and the network of “Sebat” lyceums continued its work by renaming the international educational institution (IEI) “Sapat”, which also included the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic. In November 2020, Agreements were signed between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Turkish Maarif Foundation on the opening and operation of private educational organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic,[12] which is the reaction of the Turkish authorities to the refusal of the Kyrgyz side to close the educational institutions of Sapat. It is worth noting that opponents of the Turkish authorities criticize Maarif, being concerned that it is associated with the ideology of political Islam and represents Erdogan’s Trojan horse.[13] Education has long been considered one of the effective instruments of “soft power”, due to which certain states delicately convey their norms and values. In the new 2021 academic year in Bishkek, it is already planned to open the first secondary school of the Maarif Foundation, which positions its mission in “the implementation of comprehensive educational activities around the world, based on the common values ​​of humanity and the wise traditions of Anatolia ”.[14] At the same time, the foundation can manage not only general education schools, but also kindergartens and universities. A joint statement by the Kyrgyz foreign ministers and Turkey in November 2020 reported that the parties agreed “to combat all forms of terrorism and extremism”: “Taking into account the detailed information and specific examples provided by the Turkish side of the terrorist organization FETO, they agreed to work close cooperation between the two countries in the fight against all types of terrorist activities … “.[15] Although the Kyrgyz leadership has not yet officially announced its position on this issue, on June 9, after negotiations with Sadyr Japarov, the Turkish President said: “We are in solidarity with my dear brother that FETO poses a threat to the national security of both countries. Recent political issues have exposed the dark, bloody and unpleasant face of FETO. God willing, we Kyrgyzstan and Turkey: Has a New Level of Relations Begun? will overcome this together, by supporting each other … ”.[16] With the disappearance of the president of the Sapat school network, Orhan Inandi, in May 2021, the delicate issue with FETO has regained its relevance. This caused a violent reaction from the public and was the reason for rallies demanding to find Mr. Inandi. Orhan Inandi’s wife stated that he was being held at the Turkish embassy in Kyrgyzstan.[17] In turn, the publication “Sabakh” announces the arrest of Inandi by the State Committee for National Security of Kyrgyzstan.The Turkish diplomatic mission does not comment on these accusations in any way, and President Erdogan replies that “he does not know him and does not want to hear anything about FETO supporters”.[18] Geopolitics or just “new vector” rhetoric? The new government of Kyrgyzstan has faced with a number of problems, including a pandemic, economic hardship and, in addition, a bloody conflict on the border with Tajikistan in April 2021. Turkey was one of the first countries to declare its readiness to assist in the restoration of infrastructure in the Batken region, and the Public Union of the Turkic people of Kyrgyzstan provided humanitarian assistance to the affected region. It is possible to single out a geopolitical subtext in this, since the events that took place forced both parties to the conflict to seek support in the international arena. Some experts saw in these events Russia’s loyalty to Tajikistan and a noticeable revival of relations between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey.