Why did the Algerian civil war 1989- 1999 descend into what has been called a “savage war”? Explaining the nature of the Algerian civil war Cato Stensland Master thesis, (60sp,MØNA 4590) “Midtøsten og Nord- afrikastudier” Institutt for kulturstudier og orientalske språk UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring 2015 © Author Cato Stensland Year 2015 Why did the Algerian civil war 1989-1999 descend into what has been called a “savage war”? Author Cato Stensland http://www.duo.uio.no/ Print: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo II Abstract This paper tries to answer some perplexing questions surrounding the Algerian civil war of the 1990‟s. The country went through a civil war that descended into a bloody chaos that few can reconcile with. It is this “decent” that is explored in the paper. By relying on a set of categories and rules for these interactions set forth in the selectorate theory the negligence of the people at large by the government is sought to be explained. Particular actions like the massacres, assassinations, bombings, killings and sabotage are put into a context that however grisly it may be portrays a rationale making sense of the violence. It discusses the rationale behind the massacres that took place from 1995 and the inaction to prevent these. To find this rational it is necessary to start the paper with a political analysis that can identify the key players and to link the political happenings as an extension of politics to acts of war. Therefore the first part of the paper is primarily concerned with the reasons behind the conflict, aligning the different parties of it and describing their primary motives. It then goes on discussing in what way their inherent structure manifested in strategies and methods applied throughout the war. What has been coined as the “Let them Rot” strategy is widely discussed in this framework that can explain a strategy that became detrimental to the regimes survival and to the misery of the population. The paper does the same for the insurgents, identifying their main strategies to clearer understand the results of the two. The main finding of the paper is that due to a weak link between the actual leadership - the army whose main concern is to stay in power - of the country and the institutional leadership - the president - of the country creates a dynamic that prompts the institutional leader whatever his intentions are to challenge the position of the actual leadership by strengthening his own position. In the case of the civil war in Algeria this happened twice, first with President Chadli and then with President Zeroual and this is unequivocally the main reason for Algeria‟s civil war and the political effects of the dynamic spurred by this weakness is the reason for the way in which the civil war was fought. III Preface This project has been hard work. The work has resulted in what you now have before you, but it has by no means been only my own. For the results herein I must thank my outstandingly patient, curly heard welsh friend Robin Philips Jones for his invaluable proof reading as well as his ever precise comments. My supervisor at the University of Oslo Brynjar Lia deserves special thanks as his comments and critiques no matter how harsh have done nothing but improve my work. I would also like to thank my good friend Lt. Rev. Ola Aasland Vold for sharing his own experiences of the writing process and how to traverse the obstacles in it, as well as his razor sharp mind. My wife Rebecca T. Stensland has been and still is the sexiest wife out there, something that has encouraged my writing every single day, thanks for all the support my love. Beirut, 24th January 2015 Cato Stensland IV V Content 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Choice of Theory ......................................................................................................... 3 1.2 Review of sources........................................................................................................ 7 2 Where did it all begin? ..................................................................................................... 12 2.1 Establishing a point of departure ............................................................................... 12 2.2 The Algerian powerhouse.......................................................................................... 14 2.2.1 Identifying the winning coalition ....................................................................... 15 2.2.2 Who were the leadership? .................................................................................. 16 2.3 How did President Chadli Challenge the status quo?................................................ 18 3 In what way did the army respond, and why?.................................................................. 22 3.1 What was the leadership‟s initial reaction? ............................................................... 24 3.2 Why did the leadership feel threatened? ................................................................... 25 3.3 A point of no return? ................................................................................................. 28 4 War, the continuation of politics ...................................................................................... 36 4.1 Who sided with whom? ............................................................................................. 38 4.2 Who made up the new winning coalition? ................................................................ 41 4.3 The divide .................................................................................................................. 44 4.3.1 What was the opposition‟s reaction to the coupe? ............................................. 44 4.3.2 Contested selectorates ........................................................................................ 45 4.3.3 What did this entail?........................................................................................... 47 5 Why the “Let them rot” strategy? .................................................................................... 51 5.1 COIN- Algerian civil war: ......................................................................................... 51 5.1.1 Capacities: .......................................................................................................... 52 5.1.2 Geographical: ..................................................................................................... 54 5.1.3 Methodical:......................................................................................................... 55 5.2 What were the origins of the hard-line stance? ......................................................... 59 5.3 How did the FIS go about making their coalition the winning coalition? ................. 62 5.4 How did the army respond in force and why?........................................................... 64 5.4.1 Was there a logical rational behind the tactics deployed by the army? ............. 68 5.5 Retaining the divide in two parts ............................................................................... 71 6 The Wild Card, how it came to be and what part it played.............................................. 74 VI 6.1 What were the consequences of the “Let them rot” strategy? ................................... 75 6.1.1 What were the goals and actions of GIA in the theatre? .................................... 77 6.2 In what way were the GIA relevant with this perspective on the civil war? ............. 82 7 The descent into a “Savage War”..................................................................................... 85 7.1 Why the proliferation of violence? ............................................................................ 85 7.2 Two reasons for escalating violence in the abandoned areas .................................... 90 7.3 What can the massacres tell us? ................................................................................ 93 8 The money game, a matter of priorities?.......................................................................... 99 8.1 What‟s the importance of private goods? ................................................................ 100 8.2 How did the leadership overcome a shrinking resources pool? .............................. 102 8.2.1 How did they utilize the influx of goods available from 1994?....................... 105 8.2.2 How was the army in a position to ignore the Sant Egidio meeting? .............. 106 9 Did the sway on power hold? ......................................................................................... 107 9.1 How did Zeroual challenge the army?..................................................................... 107 9.2 What were the motivations behind the civil defence groups? ................................. 112 9.3 How did the army respond to the threat President Zeroual had become? ............... 115 9.4 Was there an end to it all? ....................................................................................... 117 10 Conclusion:..................................................................................................................... 120 Literature ................................................................................................................................ 123 VII 1 Introduction The topic I have chosen to approach in this question concerns Algeria, a north-