The London School of Economics and Political Science Clientelism and Cartelization in Post-communist Europe: The Case of Romania Clara Volintiru A thesis submitted to the Government Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy, London, October 2016 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of < 92,610> words. 2 Statement of inclusion of previous work I can confirm that subsections from Chapter 3, and Chapter 6 were the result of previous study (for a PhD in Political Economy) I undertook at the Bucharest University of Economic Studies (ASE). I can confirm that parts of Chapter 2, and Chapter 4 were published as: Volintiru, C. (2015). The exploitative function of party patronage: does it serve the party's interest?. East European Politics, 31(1), 39-55. I can confirm that parts of Chapter 3 were published as: Volintiru, C. (2012). Clientelism: electoral forms and functions in the Romanian case study. Romanian Journal of Political Science, 12(1), 35. Volintiru, C. (2012). The Institutionalisation of the Romanian Party System. Sfera Politicii, 20(6), 134. I can confirm that parts of Chapter 6 were published as: Gherghina, S., & Volintiru, C. (2015). A NEW MODEL OF CLIENTELISM: Political Parties, Public Resources, and Private Contributors. European Political Science Review, (forthcoming) Published online: 18 September 2015 Volintiru, C. (2013). How Public Spending is Fuelling Electoral Strategies in Romania. Südosteuropa, 61, 268-289. 3 Acknowledgements This thesis is the product of the most patient and sage guidance I received from my supervisors: Vesselin Dimitrov and Jonathan Hopkin. My gratitude towards them is immense! I am also extremely grateful for their invaluable advices and support to Prof. James Hughes, Prof. Sven Steinmo, Sergiu Gherghina, James Gledhill and Prof. Petr Kopecky. The foundations of my arguments have been strengthened by the generous input of Timothy Haughton and Sean Hanley. My fellow PhD colleagues have been a true source of inspiration, and I am proud to have stood alongside them: Rikke Wagner, Gauthier Marchais, Neil Ketchley, Ellie Knott, Jurgen Braunstein and Mona Morgan-Collins. I have to humbly acknowledge the permanent support and encouragement of my family, to whom I owe everything. The thesis is dedicated to my father. 4 Abstract The present thesis makes a twofold contribution to the existing literature. Firstly, it shows that clientelism complements cartelization, providing parties with stability in condition of weak mass mobilization. Secondly, it traces the specific mechanisms through which cartel parties channel public resources, within the institutional setting of the post-communist Europe. It provides an important extension to the cartel party literature in the context of new democracies. The main finding of this project is that cartel parties can survive and achieve stability through clientelistic distribution of benefits, both within, and outside their organisations. Furthermore, I find that cartelization generates a new model of clientelism, as public resources (e.g. procurement contracts) are also used to finance the party organisations, not only the clients. Through the in-depth case study of Romania, we can see that when political parties have little time to develop territorial networks and mobilization capacity, clientelism becomes an effective tool for establishing roots in society. The context of post-communist countries presents distinctive conditions for clientelistic linkages and the cartelization process. Multi-party systems in these countries have reappeared simultaneously with the institutions of the democratic state. Consequently, party-state interpenetration has been more profound, building upon previous legacies, as well as the permissive transitional circumstances. The present thesis analyses the following sequences of clientelistic exchanges: (1) internal party selection – patrons within the party organisations, (2) party patronage – political interference in public institutions, (3) politicization—political appointments in key positions of the Central Government (i.e. Senior Civil Servants), and finally (4) preferential resource allocation—public funding channelled through party networks. In addition to the chapters devoted to each of these clientelistic mechanisms, the thesis also contains a comparative chapter overseeing the challenges and opportunities for clientelism and cartelization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 5 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 12 CONCEPTS, THEORY AND RESEARCH QUESTION ....................................................................................... 12 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................................... 16 CASE SELECTION ............................................................................................................................................. 23 RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH .................................................................................................................... 27 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS .......................................................................................................................... 31 CHAPTER 1. CLIENTELISM – THE MISSING INGREDIENT OF THE CARTELIZATION MODEL IN NEW DEMOCRACIES ................................................................................................ 37 1.1. PARTY MODELS, EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES AND CARTELIZATION ......................................... 38 1.1.1. Transitional Challenges in New Democracies ................................................................... 47 1.1.2. Challenges to the Survival of the Established Political Cartels ............................. 53 1.2. CLIENTELISM IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: FROM DYADIC BONDS TO STATE CAPTURE .................. 57 1.2.1. Clientelism—A Political Phenomenon Driven by Party Organizations? ........... 59 1.2.2. Clientelism—A Political Practice Embedded in Society? ......................................... 61 1.2.3. Clientelism and State Capture ............................................................................................. 62 1.3. INTERCONNECTED PHENOMENA: CLIENTELISM, PARTY PATRONAGE, AND POLITICIZATION . 64 CHAPTER 2. CLIENTELISM AND CARTELIZATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................ 70 2.1. INSTITUTIONAL AND CONTEXTUAL SETTING ................................................................................ 72 2.1.1. Political Parties as Employers of Informal Linkages ................................................. 73 2.1.2. Legal Provisions as a Framework of Deployment ....................................................... 77 2.1.3. Governmental Structures as a Target of Politicization ............................................ 83 2.2. CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN PATTERNS OF PARTY PATRONAGE ....................................... 89 2.3. CARTELIZATION AND CLIENTELISTIC LINKAGES IN CEE ............................................................ 96 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 107 CHAPTER 3. CLIENTELISTIC LINKAGES AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES’ ORGANIZATIONS IN ROMANIA .............................................................................................. 109 3.1. Political Parties Formation and Evolution in Romania ............................................. 110 3.2. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER BETWEEN THE CENTRE AND THE PERIPHERY ........................... 119 3.2.1. Party Leader Selection .......................................................................................................... 121 3.2.2. Party in Central Office: Representation in Party Leadership Forums .............. 124 3.2.3. Electoral Candidate Selection ............................................................................................ 129 3.2.4. Party Switching ........................................................................................................................ 134 3.3. CHANGING ROLES: FROM LOCAL BROKERS TO POLITICAL PATRONS IN THE ROMANIAN CLIENTELISTIC NETWORKS ........................................................................................................................ 139 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 144 CHAPTER 4. PARTY PATRONAGE AND POLITICIZATION: CIVIL SERVANTS AS THE LINCHPIN OF CLIENTELISTIC LINKAGES ...........................................................................