osloFORUM Background papers The rocky path from elections to a new constitution in Tunisia: Mechanisms for consensus-building and inclusive decision-making Christopher Thornton About the Oslo Forum Background Papers: This Background Paper was initially published as part of the Oslo Forum Briefing Pack, which was distributed to participants ahead of the Oslo Forum 2014. Co-hosted by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), the Oslo Forum annually convenes senior conflict mediators, high level decision-makers and key peace process actors in an informal and discreet retreat to share their experiences, identify challenges and reflect on mediation practice. It is widely regarded as the leading international network of armed conflict mediation practitioners. About the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) is a private diplomacy organisation founded on the principles of humanity, impartiality and independence. Its mission is to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict through dialogue and mediation. Disclaimer: The following background paper was drafted specifically for the Oslo Forum 2014 and reflects events of the time. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue or the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. © 2016 - Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue Reproduction of all or part of this publication may be authorised only with written consent and acknowledgment of the source. Oslo Forum Background Paper 3 The rocky path from elections to a new constitution in Tunisia: Mechanisms for consensus-building and inclusive decision-making1 Christopher Thornton 2014 In a landmark moment in the Tunisian democratic and-a-half years, it looked likely that the elected NCA transition process, the National Constituent Assembly would be dissolved before completing its primary task (NCA) adopted the new Tunisian Constitution on 26 of drafting the new Tunisian Constitution. To many, a January 2014. The Constitution’s adoption by 200 “hard” or “soft” coup overthrowing the government votes against 12 (with 4 abstentions2) was not a triumph was the most likely end to the democratic experiment for one particular party or bloc, but the outcome of a in Tunisia. long and difficult search for political consensus and compromise. The Many in the secular opposition Constitution’s adoption paved were categorically opposed to the way for a successful vote of any cooperation or compromise confidence on 28 January 2014 for with the Islamic political party the new technocratic government Like in many other Ennahda. Many within Ennahda, of Mehdi Jomaâ, itself the result of countries undergoing confident in their popular a national dialogue process between support, believed that it would political parties. This caretaker democratic transitions, be better to match opposition government is destined to lead protests in the street or call a Tunisia until its next democratic political polarisation in popular referendum to renew elections by the end of 2014. their democratic mandate, Tunisia has periodically rather than make too many Like in many other countries concessions to the secular undergoing democratic transitions, translated into violent opposition and risk alienating political polarisation in Tunisia has their conservative Muslim base. periodically translated into violent and crippling protests, Nevertheless, although not and crippling protests, which have which have had serious accepted by all, the search for had serious political repercussions. consensus and compromise At several points, notably following political repercussions. has characterised Tunisian post- the assassinations in 2013 of revolutionary politics. opposition politicians Chokri Belaïd and Mohammed Brahmi, it looked This paper outlines some of possible that the democratic the innovative mechanisms for transition would be derailed. Both assassinations consensus-building and inclusive decision-making catalysed widespread protests and both resulted in deployed in Tunisia since the 2011 elections.3 Much the resignation of the Prime Minister and reforming of interest has been generated by the Yemeni national the government. At some points during the last two- dialogue, with countries from Libya to Myanmar looking 1. The author would like to thank Omeyya Seddik for his useful inputs into the first draft of this paper and for the long and illuminating discussions which provided much of the material for this work. The authors would also like to thank Katia Papagianni, Andrew Ladley and Paul Dziatkowiec for their comments on the first draft. 2. One deputy, Mohamed Allouche, tragically died a few days before the vote in the NCA. 3. Due to space constraints, this paper does not discuss the dialogue process under Yadh Ben Ashour which resulted in the “Declaration on the Transition Process” and helped ensure that the 2011 elections could take place. 4 The rocky path from elections to a new constitution in Tunisia to develop similar processes. Tunisia also used national Ennahda viewed the elections as only the first step dialogue to seek consensus and compromise during towards the irreversible creation of a political system its transition process. However, the national dialogue in which it had the right to compete. processes in Tunisia took a radically different form from that in Yemen or most other countries. Moreover, Initially, Ennahda believed cross-ideological alliances national dialogue was only one mechanism used to of revolutionary forces would enable the far-reaching broaden consensus and find compromises during the reforms it deemed necessary. Later, it realised that the transition process. As we will see, other mechanisms, support of forces associated with the former regime including different types of coalition governments and would also be needed to realise this transformation. mechanisms rooted in existing legislative institutions, More cynically, one could suggest that Ennahda was were also used. (and is) aware of the challenges which the transition period would present and preferred to spread the This paper touches upon the role of the international responsibility for governing during this turbulent time. community, the somewhat ambiguous role of Tunisian civil society organisations in the transition process, In the elections of 23 October 2011, Ennahda won 37% and briefly considers the role of popular protests in of the popular vote and 89 seats in the 217-seat NCA, pushing for greater inclusiveness in political decision- far ahead of the party in second place. Ennahda then making: points which deserve further consideration and made good on its promises and opened negotiations for more detailed treatment. Finally, a coalition government with several it considers whether these other parties. Ennahda was split mechanisms can be deployed over whether to seek a coalition with the third-placed Popular Petition4 – in other contexts, instead of a controversial populist party with more traditional power-sharing socially conservative values – or to mechanisms. Although not accepted stick to the more difficult strategy by all, the search of forming a coalition across ideological divides. Post-electoral for consensus and coalition Ultimately, the more challenging compromise has but inclusive approach won out: a government coalition was negotiated with the characterised Tunisian Congress for the Republic (CPR), By mid-2011, it was evident a nationalist, centre-left party, and that the Islamic political party post-revolutionary Ettakatol, Tunisia’s largest social Ennahda would not seek to politics. democratic party. With 8.7% and govern alone following Tunisia’s 7% of the popular vote respectively, first democratic elections. CPR and Ettakatol were the second Ennahda’s president, Rachid and fourth largest parties in the Ghannouchi, and other NCA. prominent figures in the party stated that Tunisia’s ongoing transition demanded the formation of a coalition In what became known as the Troïka system, it was government. They insisted that, even if Ennahda agreed that each coalition partner would hold one of the secured a majority at the ballot-box, they would not three so-called “presidencies”: until late February 2012, govern alone and, despite some opposition within the Hamadi Jebali from Ennahda held the post of Prime party, would build a coalition across ideological divides, Minister; Moncef Marzouki of CPR was President of rather than seeking to align exclusively with like-minded the Republic; and Mustapha Ben Jaafar from Ettakatol parties. became President of the NCA. Other ministerial posts were mostly distributed between these three parties, Ennahda identified social and political polarisation as or given to an ostensibly apolitical technocrat. a serious threat to the transition process. Initially, calls for a broad, ideologically diverse coalition were cast in Further efforts to broaden the coalition were terms of revolutionary forces uniting against the former unsuccessful. Ghannouchi recently stated that the failure regime. Some figures within Ennahda and other parties to bring more parties into the coalition and establish a saw the fierce division between secular and Islamist “Government of National Unity” was Ennahda’s biggest parties as a hangover from the divide-and-rule tactics mistake following the 2011 elections. Nevertheless, which allowed Ben Ali to remain in power for so long. the decision to enter into coalition with two secular 4. The