This is a repository copy of Public Transport Procurement in Britain. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/159839/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Nash, C and Smith, A orcid.org/0000-0003-3668-5593 (2020) Public Transport Procurement in Britain. Research in Transportation Economics. ISSN 0739-8859 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2020.100847 © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc- nd/4.0/). Reuse This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Public Transport Procurement in Britain Chris Nash and Andrew Smith Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds Key words Bus; rail; franchising; competitive tendering; competition JEL classification R41 Abstract Britain is one of the countries with the most experience of alternative ways of procuring public transport services. From a situation where most public transport services were provided by publicly owned companies, it has moved to a situation where most are private. Long distance bus services, most local bus services outside London and a small number of rail services are left to commercial operators to provide without regulation on a purely commercial basis. Most rail services, bus services in London and subsidised bus services elsewhere are competitively tendered by central or local government. In the bus industry, both forms of competition have substantially reduced costs, but competitive tendering of services planned by local authorities has been the more successful in boosting patronage. On the other hand, on the rail system, whilst competitive tendering has again gone hand in hand with a large rise in usage, it has also been accompanied by a large rise in costs. Some possible reasons for this difference are considered, but it does appear that caution should be exercised when transferring lessons from one mode to the other. 1. Introduction Public transport has often been viewed as a natural monopoly, subject to economies of scale and with strong public interest arguments for public intervention, because transport is seen as a social necessity for everyone, and because by attracting passengers from using the private car it reduced externalities of congestion and pollution. Thus, it has often been provided by a public sector monopoly. Where competition has been introduced, building on the work of Demsetz (1968), it is frequently considered that competition for the market (or ex ante competition) is a more appropriate means of introducing competition in public transport than competition in the market (or “on-road / on-track” competition). Under this model, the government can specify what it wants to provide and then invite the market to bid for the exclusive right to provide these services on a given route or routes. In this way, it is thought that efficient production can be ensured, whilst leaving the public sector to specify service levels and fares. Competitive tendering has been introduced for public transport in many countries, with the result generally of significant cost savings (Hensher and Wallis, 2005), although variable with circumstances (such as whether the incumbent was publicly or privately owned). What has been observed, however, is that usually competitive tendering after the initial round does not produce more cost savings, and indeed often some of those from the first round are lost. Competitive tendering has been less used for rail than for bus but a number of countries have done so and again the result has generally been to reduce costs (Nash et al 2019). By contrast, competition in the market is relatively scarce, partly because public transport is generally subsidised so profitable opportunities are rare. Where it does exist, it is generally for long distance bus, and in a few cases rail services. It appears that competition in the market typically leads to improved services and lower fares in these long distance markets. Britain is a particularly interesting case study in that both forms of competition exist in both bus (including local bus) and rail services. Britain is the country in Europe which has gone furthest in moving away from the public sector monopoly model of public transport procurement, having completely deregulated and largely privatised the provision of bus services under the 1985 Transport Act, and completely privatised rail passenger services under the Railways Act of 1993 (rail infrastructure was also privatised but reverted to public ownership following the failure of Railtrack). Moreover, Britain has made use of a combination of competition for the market (by means of competitive tendering) and competition in the market (with competing companies offering services on the same route). Bus services outside London were deregulated on the basis of competition in the market, except where subsidy was needed. Bus services in London and rail services were privatised largely on the basis of competition for the market, with local or central government respectively still tightly specifying the services to be provided. Thus, British experience should be a good test of which form of competition works best. We consider in turn the experiences of the bus and rail sectors before seeking to reach conclusions. 2. Bus deregulation Already in 1980, the British government had deregulated long distance bus services, permitting any operator to run whatever services they wished and to charge whatever fares they wished (White and Robbins, 2012). Prior to this such services had been regulated to limit competition both between rival bus companies and with rail. They were mainly provided by the National Express subsidiary of the state owned National Bus Company. Immediately upon deregulation, a consortium of private coach operators (British Coachways) opened rival services on the key inter city routes, operating mainly from stops on the streets close to main railway stations and charging much lower fares than National Express. National Express retaliated, turning many of their services into limited stop motorway services at much lower fares than they had previously charged. In the following battle for passengers, National Express emerged the winner, and British Coachways soon ceased operating. It was argued that National Express had strong advantages from its position as the known operator and its ownership of a network of coach stations. In the meantime, the monopoly rail operator, British Rail, also retaliated with new cheap off peak fares including a little later advance purchase tickets. By 1985, long distance bus patronage had increased by 67% since deregulation, but then fell back although remaining above pre deregulation levels. Following privatisation, National Express remained the dominant operator despite the opening up of the coach stations to rival operators. Much later, Stagecoach entered the market with its Megabus network of services based on the low cost airline model, with sales on the internet using yield management methods, and again operating from curbside stops mainly outside railway stations. But neither they nor First, with similar services, achieved a major market share. Overall coach services seemed to reach something of an equilibrium with lower fares and faster services than pre deregulation, but with some smaller towns losing out by diversion of services to motorways. They gained a strong market share in trips to airports, where they offered through services, and in the student and elderly persons markets. But their impact on the position of rail services was limited, partly because congestion both in cities and on the motorway network itself made bus journey times slow and unreliable. Perceiving the deregulation of coach services as a success, the government adopted a similar policy towards local buses outside London. From 1986, commercial operators were permitted to operate whatever services they wished at whatever fares they chose. Local authorities could only subsidise services where they believed that there were gaps in terms of route coverage or times of day, and then they had to go out to competitive tender to fill the gaps. The government owned National Bus Company was split up into many small companies and sold to the private sector, whilst the limited ability in the new legal framework for local authorities to direct or subsidise their own companies encouraged many to do the same. The immediate effect of the changes was major changes to service, and instability as operators tried different approaches to services in the new environment, and as competition came and went (Nash, 1993). But some 80% of routes were able to operate without subsidy. There was some intense on street competition with rivals matching each other’s schedules and racing to reach the next stop first. But such competition was rarely sustained; usually one