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Libya Weekly Operational Preview August 08, 2021 Prepared by: Risk Analysis Team, Libya Proprietary © 2021 GardaWorld Proprietary GardaWorld GardaWorld 1 202 1 © Table of Contents Outlook .................................................................................................. 3 Short Term Outlook .............................................................................................................................. 3 Medium to Long Term Outlook ............................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................... 3 Political Developments ......................................................................................................................... 3 Military Developments .......................................................................................................................... 4 Security Developments ......................................................................................................................... 4 Coronavirus .......................................................................................................................................... 4 Oil & Gas Developments ...................................................................................................................... 5 Threat Matrix .......................................................................................... 5 Key Dates .............................................................................................. 5 Assessment ........................................................................................... 6 Political Developments ......................................................................................................................... 6 Military Developments .......................................................................................................................... 6 Security Developments ......................................................................................................................... 6 Coronavirus .......................................................................................................................................... 7 Coronavirus .......................................................................................................................................... 7 Regional Assessment ............................................................................ 7 Tripolitania Region ................................................................................................................................ 7 Cyrenaica Region ................................................................................................................................. 8 Fezzan Region ..................................................................................................................................... 9 Offshore .............................................................................................................................................. 10 Acronym List ........................................................................................ 11 GardaWorld .......................................................................................... 12 Information Services ........................................................................................................................... 12 Global Leader in Comprehensive Security and Risk Management.................................................... 12 This is an abridged version of the GardaWorld Weekly Libya Operational report. To subscribe to our full report or to request a quote for security services in Libya please contact Nicholas Bennett, Regional Director, Libya. Proprietary GardaWorld GardaWorld 1 202 2 © Outlook Short Term Outlook ▪ Political progress is slowing as enduring divisions surface within the Libyan political scene. The proposed December elections are looking increasingly at risk after the LPDF failed to come to a consensus at the start of July. The UN-backed process is beginning to show signs of fracturing as the pressure builds. With tensions flaring, efforts to find a consensus have become more difficult. ▪ Cases of COVID-19 have begun increasing significantly in Libya, likely driven by the introduction of the Delta variant. As a result, the border with Tunisia has been closed and curfews and lockdowns are now in use. Medical infrastructure in Tripolitania and Fezzan are coming under increasing strain as the number of cases increase. Efforts to accelerate the vaccine campaign in areas with higher caseloads are ongoing while additional oxygen supplies have been secured to create a national stockpile. ▪ Crime (including carjackings, armed robberies, murders, and kidnappings) remains common in many areas of the country with perpetrators exploiting local gaps in security to carry out attacks. Crime reporting remains high across all regions. Medium to Long Term Outlook ▪ Enduring divisions are resurfacing, threatening the progress seen in the first half of 2021 when a new united government was installed. The UN process and Berlin outcomes are beginning to unravel which is leaving space for other external actors to increase their influence, furthering their own agendas. The UN is likely to come under increasing pressure to get the political process back on track in a bid to keep the December elections a realistic prospect however, various compromises will be needed. ▪ Islamic State continues to suffer attrition in Libya and remains mostly dormant from an operational perspective. However, political fragility will continue to present conditions in which the group could begin to reconstitute some of its capability, and it retains a presence in the country. Increasing political unity could prove a motivating factor for the group to try and destabilize Libya as it tries to move towards scheduled elections in December. Other terrorist factions also remain active with some representing a kidnap threat, especially in more remote areas, while some have exploited the last conflict with the LNA to embed themselves within security forces in Tripoli. Executive Summary Political Developments ▪ The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) Bridging Proposals Committee (BPC) has been unable to progress the issue of the constitution after four meetings. They have submitted the four proposals back to the full LPDF which is now expected to meet and vote on August 11. The issue of the constitution had been passed to the LPDF which was supposed to act as a “fail-safe” after the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS) were unable to come to a consensus. ▪ This week, the HoR failed to vote on the election law drafted by one of their committees in Rome at the end of July. The issue has been postponed until the next HoR session where the issue will be debated again. The HoR has threatened to take a unilateral decision on the issue, excluding the HCS. This is a parallel track that emerged mid-July as the LPDF process began to lose traction and unravel. ▪ The budget remains unapproved, however, there is some optimism growing around the issue after the Government of National Unity (GNU) resubmitted a new draft which included a substantial sum for the Libyan National Army (LNA). Although it also had large sums for some of the Tripoli militia Proprietary groups which have already caused tensions with the east. In another positive development, the GardaWorld GardaWorld 1 202 3 © speaker of the HoR, Aquila Saleh, instructed the prime minister to use the 1/12 method of the budget law, freeing up some funding for the government. ▪ The High National Elections Commission (HNEC) has extended voter registration until August 17 after the process began to gain traction after a slow start. The Libyan diaspora will be able to start registering from August 18 via a link on the HNEC website. Over 2.7 million people out of around 4.4 million eligible voters have been registered so far. ▪ Prime Minister (GNU) Abdulhamid Dbeibah conducted another high-level visit to Istanbul this week meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Reports indicate that President Erdoğan is now planning on visiting Tripoli in October. The last visit by Erdoğan took place in 2011 when the National Transition Council was in power and clashes were ongoing with Gadhafi loyalists. He was on a regional tour at the time which took him to Tunisia and Egypt, both countries where political Islam was taking hold. His visit in October will find a notably different set of dynamics in Libya, as well its neighbours, Tunisia, and Egypt. Military Developments ▪ The Presidential Council (PC) has ordered all military units across Libya to follow its orders as the “Chief Commander of the Libyan Army.” The statement appears to be a direct response to decisions by the LNA General Command over this last week and could result in tensions between the council and the LNA. ▪ The US special envoy to Libya, Richard Norland, stated this week that while Moscow and Ankara have indicated they are willing to withdraw Syrian mercenaries from Libya, the withdrawal of other forces “remains a challenge.” This came as the media office of Operation Volcano of Rage claimed there had been 112 Cham Wings flights transporting Syrian mercenaries to the LNA between October 2020 when the ceasefire was signed and August 05. ▪ An anonymous military