6122_04_p144-157 3/31/06 10:30 AM Page 144 ELECTION LAW JOURNAL Volume 5, Number 2, 2006 © Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. Is It Time to Draw the Line?: The Impact of Redistricting on Competition in State House Elections DAVID LUBLIN and MICHAEL P. MCDONALD LECTION OBSERVERS of the House of Repre- factors explain declining competition in con- Esentatives have decried the decline of com- gressional elections, their presence should also petition for U.S. House seats. Sam Hirsch notes be associated with lower levels of competition that the number of incumbents reelected by in state legislative elections. Moreover, redis- over 20 points in the post-reapportionment tricting arguably has even greater conse- election of 2002 was much higher than the av- quences in state legislative elections. Congres- erage of other recent post-reapportionment sional redistricting occurs on a state-by-state elections.1 Noted political scientists Bernard basis so no single redistricting authority con- Grofman and Gary Jacobson agree with this as- trols the national process. But power over re- sessment. They show that the number of com- districting at the state level influences the shape petitive seats has declined over the past 40 of the entire state legislature. The potential im- years when measured by the number of seats pact of partisan gerrymandering is therefore won by less than either ten or twenty percent. much greater at the state than the federal level. Like Hirsch, they note that congressional com- This paper takes a first cut at examining com- petition in 2002 was exceptionally low for a petition outside of the congressional election post-reapportionment election. Grofman and arena by exploring the aggregate level of com- Jacobson suggest competition will reach record petition in lower chamber state legislative elec- lows later in the decade if the pattern of de- tions in 37 states in 2000 and 2004. While this clining competition post-redistricting in the study is only a first step toward exploring com- 1980s and 1990s is followed.2 Much of the petition in state legislative races, it should be blame for the decline in congressional compe- highly useful to illuminate the level of compe- tition has been attached to the partisan and in- tition in state legislative elections, and see cumbent-protection redistricting processes and whether theories of the impact of redistricting racial redistricting.3 on electoral competition appear to hold water The focus on congressional elections is nat- outside of the congressional arena from which ural due to the importance of the federal legis- they were abstracted. Before turning to the sta- lature but scholars ought to study competition in state legislative elections more closely. Par- tisan and incumbent protection gerrymander- ing and racial redistricting also occur during 1 Sam Hirsch, “The United States House of Unrepresen- the redrawing of state legislative maps. If these tatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Con- gressional Redistricting,” Election Law Journal 2: 2(2003): 182–4 2 Bernard Grofman and Gary Jacobson, Vieth v. Jubelirer, Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, No. 02- David Lublin is Associate Professor of Government in the 1580 (August 2003). School of Public Affairs at American University (dlublin@ 3 The claim that redistricting has reduced competitive american.edu). Michael P. McDonald is Assistant Profes- elections appears in editorial pages across the political sor of Public and International Affairs at George Mason spectrum (e.g., The Wall Street Journal. 2004. “No Contest.” University and Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institu- Nov. 12, 2004. The Washington Post. 2003. “The Partisan tion ([email protected]). Fix” September 14, 2003: B06.) 144 6122_04_p144-157 3/31/06 10:30 AM Page 145 REDISTRICTING AND COMPETITION IN STATE HOUSE ELECTIONS 145 tistical analysis of the level of competition in the efforts of GOP mapmakers to secure a safe state legislative elections and explanations for majority of seats for their party. Forty percent variations among the states, the article briefly of Indiana’s fifty congressional races between explores how partisan gerrymandering and 1982 and 1990 were won with less than 60 per- racial redistricting may undermine competi- cent of the vote and 26 percent were won by tion. less than 55 percent.5 Democrats may miscalculate when they draw redistricting plans, too. Prior to the 2002 PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING, elections, Democrats hoped to win seven out of RACIAL REDISTRICTING, AND thirteen seats in Georgia’s newly expanded ELECTORAL COMPETITION congressional delegation. However, Georgia Republicans increased their support in 2002, Much of the blame for the decline in compe- winning the governor’s mansion for the first tition in congressional elections has been time since Reconstruction. Republicans man- placed on the highly political process used to aged to edge out Democrats in two of the conduct redistricting in most states. Partisan “Democratic” seats. Democrats won only five gerrymanders, such as those enacted by Demo- seats and one of their five winners gained his crats in Maryland and Republicans in Penn- seat by only a one percent margin over his Re- sylvania, attempt to pack many minority party publican opponent.6 voters into a few districts and to limit concen- Due to failed partisan gerrymanders, like trations of minority party voters outside these those in Indiana and Georgia, some believe districts to make it possible for the majority partisan gerrymandering increases electoral party to win the remaining districts as easily as competition. Burham argues that: “ . parti- possible. The ideal partisan gerrymander packs san gerrymandering is the best producer of as many minority party voters into as few dis- competitive districts”7 because parties may act tricts as possible while guaranteeing the ma- sub-optimally in their quest to maximize seats, jority party a solid, but not overwhelming, ma- inadvertently shave their margins too close, jority in the other districts. The majority party and thereby create competitive districts. Burn- must be careful to balance the distribution of ham offers the unsuccessful Republican gerry- voters most efficiently against the desire to as- mander of New York’s congressional seats in sure that their candidate can carry the district 1961 as an example. However, Burnham notes solidly even if there is an electoral swing that “ . comparable efforts have been re- against the party.4 soundingly successful,”8 and provides analysis If the majority party spreads its voters too of successful partisan gerrymanders in eight thinly, overestimates it support, or if there is other states. an electoral swing against it, the plan may not work as intended. For example, Indiana Re- publicans crafted a plan designed to give their 4 Guillermo Owen and Bernard Grofman, “Optimal Par- party a majority of the state’s congressional tisan Gerrymandering.” Political Geography Quarterly, 7: 1(1988) 5–22; Bruce E. Cain, The Reapportionment Puzzle seats throughout the 1980s. The plan worked (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984). reasonably well at first. The Indiana congres- 5 Congressional Elections: 1946–1996 (Washington: Con- sional delegation went from 6-5 Democratic in gressional Quarterly, 1998): 283, 288, 293, 298, 304. 6 Democrats defeated one Republican incumbent in 2004. 1980 to 6-4 Republican in 1982. However, Indi- See Brian Nutting and H. Amy Stern, eds., CQ’s Politics ana Democrats ran strong candidates and in America 2002: The 107th Congress (Washington: Con- gained support over the decade. By 1990, the gressional Quarterly, 2001): 254–81; David Hawkings and Brian Nutting, eds., CQ’s Politics in America 2004: The delegation was 8-2 Democratic—hardly the in- 108th Congress (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, tent of the Republicans who pushed the plan. 2003): 265–92. The failure of the partisan gerrymander had 7 Walter Dean Burham, “Congressional Representation: positive consequences for electoral competi- Theory and Practice of Drawing the Districts” in Reap- portionment in the 1970s. ed, Nelson W. Polsby (Berkeley, tion. Indiana saw a number of congressional CA: University of California Press, 1971): 277. seats change hands during the 1980s despite 8 Id. at 276. 6122_04_p144-157 3/31/06 10:30 AM Page 146 146 LUBLIN AND MCDONALD Both Democrats and Republicans have often California also adopted incumbent protec- augmented their number of seats through par- tion gerrymanders for the state legislature.12 tisan gerrymandering and limited electoral The share of competitive seats dropped, though competition in the process. Arizona Republi- not by as much as the share of marginal con- cans corralled Democrats into a single district gressional seats. In 2000, 20 percent of the 80 in the 1980s by linking the Democratic portions Assembly seats were won by less than 20 of Phoenix and Tucson with Yuma across hun- points, and 10 percent were won by less than dreds of miles of empty desert. Except for one 10 points.13 The share of seats won by less than narrow victory in 1982, Democrats failed to win 20 points fell to 11 percent in 2002 before ris- any congressional elections outside of Ari- ing again to 16 percent in 2004. The share of zona’s Second District from 1982 through 1990. districts where the winner had a 10-point mar- In all but three of the 25 elections held during gin of victory dropped to 5 percent in 2002 and this period, the winner’s margin of victory ex- 6 percent in 2004. ceeded 20 percent.9 The presence of two chambers in all state leg- Maryland Democrats managed to shift the islatures, except Nebraska, makes possible the partisan makeup of their state’s congressional adoption of a different sort of incumbent pro- delegation from a 4-4 even split in 2000 to 6-2 tection gerrymander, where a party cedes con- Democratic in 2002 by manipulating the trol over redistricting in one chamber in ex- boundaries of the state’s districts.