UC Irvine Law Review Volume 10 Issue 4 Article 5 6-2020 A Unified Approach to Erie Analysis for Federal Statutes, Rules, and Common Law Allan Erbsen Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr Part of the Civil Procedure Commons Recommended Citation Allan Erbsen, A Unified Approach to Erie Analysis for Federal Statutes, Rules, and Common Law, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1101 (2020). Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol10/iss4/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons. First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20 7:28 AM A Unified Approach to Erie Analysis for Federal Statutes, Rules, and Common Law Allan Erbsen* Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1103 I. Situating the Relative Priority of Federal and State Law in the Broader Context of Erie Jurisprudence ....................................................................... 1106 A. Overview of the Erie Doctrine’s Four Discrete Inquiries: Creation (Whether the Federal Law is Valid), Interpretation (What the Federal Law Means), Prioritization (How the Federal Law Interacts with State Law), and Adoption (Potential Sources of Non-Federal Law) ............................................................................. 1108 B. Relationship Between the Interpretation Inquiry (What a Federal Law Means) and the Prioritization Inquiry (How the Federal Law Interacts with State Law) .............................................................. 1110 II. Framework for Understanding the Erie Doctrine’s Approach to the Relative Priority of Federal and State Law .................................................. 1116 A. Sources of Confusion About Prioritization ........................................ 1116 1. Blurring of Erie’s Four Inquiries, Especially Regarding the Substance/Procedure Distinction ................................................. 1116 2. Fragmented Doctrinal Evolution Across Contexts and over Time ................................................................................................... 1119 3. Failure to Reconcile Erie with Preemption Jurisprudence ........ 1120 B. Current Applications of Erie’s Prioritization Inquiry ....................... 1122 1. The Constitution Has Priority over State Law ............................ 1123 2. Federal Statutes and Treaties Have Priority over State Law ..... 1123 3. Federal Rules and Regulations Promulgated Through a Statutorily Approved Process Have Priority over State Law .... 1126 4. The Priority of Federal Common Law Currently Depends on Several Loosely Related Standards .......................................... 1132 * Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Steve Burbank, Kevin Clermont, Zach Clopton, Myriam Gilles, Craig Green, Jill Hasday, and participants in the Stanford Law School Civil Procedure Workshop, Loyola University Chicago School of Law Constitutional Law Colloquium, and University of Minnesota Law School Faculty Workshop for helpful comments. 1101 First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20 7:28 AM 1102 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1101 a. Reasons Why the Prioritization Inquiry Is Difficult in Cases Involving Federal Common Law ............................... 1132 b. Reconstructing the Hanna Line of Case Law to Explain How Prioritization Currently Addresses Federal Common Law ........................................................................... 1137 c. Hanna’s Approach to Priority Cannot Rely on the Rules of Decision Act ........................................................................ 1141 III. Current Prioritization Jurisprudence Relies on an Unsustainable Distinction Between Federal Common Law and Other Categories of Federal Law ...................................................................................................... 1147 A. In the Rules Enabling Act Context, There Is No Bright Line Between Common Law and Statutorily Authorized Rules .............. 1148 1. The “Any Manner” Clauses: Justification for a Broad Interpretation of Judicial Authority to Create Procedural Common Law ................................................................................... 1149 2. The Any Manner Clauses Authorize Preemption of State Law ..................................................................................................... 1155 3. The Any Manner Clauses Erase the Line Between Formal Rules and Common Law Animating the Current Prioritization Inquiry ....................................................................... 1164 B. Outside the Enabling Act Context, Relying on a Distinction Between Federal Common Law and Other Sources of Federal Law Marginalizes Salient Policy Questions About Federal Common Law’s Validity, Scope, and Effect ...................................... 1167 1. Example: Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine .............................. 1167 2. Extrapolating Beyond Forum Non Conveniens ......................... 1170 IV. Recognizing the Flawed Assumptions Underlying Current Prioritization Doctrine Can Lead to a More Refined Application of Erie that Highlights Salient Concerns About Federalism and Separation of Powers ...................................................................................... 1170 A. The Prioritization Inquiry Should Implement the Supremacy Clause Rather than the “Twin Aims” Test and Therefore Will Be Relatively Simple in Most Cases ........................................................... 1171 B. Deemphasizing the Prioritization Inquiry Would Highlight Important Questions Under the Creation and Interpretation Inquiries About the Validity and Scope of Federal Law .................. 1172 1. Hanna Obscures Policy Questions About Preemption that the Creation and Interpretation Inquiries Directly Address ..... 1172 2. Spotlighting the Creation and Interpretation Inquiries Illuminates Problems Underlying Several Ostensibly Distinct Literatures ......................................................................................... 1174 a. Substantive Canons ................................................................. 1174 b. Lawmaking versus Interpretation .......................................... 1175 First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20 7:28 AM 2020] UNIFIED APPROACH 1103 c. The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law ........................... 1178 d. Substance versus Procedure ................................................... 1178 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 1180 INTRODUCTION This Article proposes toppling one of the Erie doctrine’s most prominent pillars.1 The relevant line of Erie jurisprudence governs a frequently recurring question in federal litigation: When federal and state law appear to conflict, which law should a court apply? An abstract example illustrates the question’s significance and difficulty. Suppose that the parties in a federal diversity action dispute whether the court should apply federal law or state law to resolve a particular issue. The court’s choice would end the case. One party would prevail under federal law, while the other would prevail under state law. The court’s choice of law would also have ramifications beyond determining the case’s outcome. Applying the wrong law would impair the spurned lawmaker’s regulatory interests, raising federalism and separation of powers concerns. Yet both options may seem wrong. State law is often incongruous in federal court, while federal law can be gratuitous in a diversity action that does not involve a federal claim. So how should the court decide which law applies? And how does that choice of law implicate related issues, such as the boundary between interpretation and lawmaking and the legitimacy of federal common law? Civil procedure students learn two answers to the choice-of-law puzzle. They start with a soothing formal rule and then drift into the turbulence of a balancing test. Students first learn that federal courts apply federal procedural law and state substantive law. This tidy bifurcation seems plausible until someone asks: “What’s the difference?” Students then learn that courts do not really enforce a strict substance/procedure distinction. Instead, courts apply a two-pronged choice-of-law rule cobbled together from several Supreme Court decisions. The first prong gives automatic priority to most types of federal law, such as statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The second prong subjects the remaining type of federal law—judge-made common law—to a multi-factored “twin aims” test announced in Hanna v. Plumer.2 Even the Supreme Court concedes that the twin aims test is “relatively unguided.”3 The Court’s unguided inquiry across slippery terrain produces disorientation. But the Court nevertheless believes that the current two-pronged method is an appropriate manifestation of policies animating Erie and its progeny. The unguided approach to choice of law in federal court is misguided for several reasons that this Article explores in depth. Current jurisprudence governing 1. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 2. 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 3. Id. at 471. First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20 7:28 AM 1104 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1101 vertical choice of law suffers