THE PARADOX THAT IS PAKISTAN: BOTH ALLY AND ENEMY OF TERRORISM By Isaac Kfir* Th is article explores the paradox of Pakistan as a country encouraging Islamist militancy while, at the same time, being a key player in the war against terrorism. It surveys the challenges facing President Pervez Musharraf. It argues that having a “strongman” in Pakistan is not necessarily a bad thing given this difficult situation, but that Musharraf needs to move away from supporting the Islamist parties and needs to forge ties with the more secular political parties if he is both to survive and to be effective against terrorism. This article reviews Pakistan’s military Furthermore, the government has also efforts against al-Qa’ida and the Taliban introduced legislation aimed at reining in while emphasizing the inherent paradox in the spread of Islamist radicalism by Pakistani domestic policy, which oscillates controlling the proliferation of madrasas. 4 between supporting Islamic radicalism and As the President himself noted, Pakistanis embracing modernization. Simply put, are religious-minded people who have successive Pakistani governments have on allowed themselves to Both Ally and the one hand fostered Islamic radicalism to Enemy of Terrorism be swayed by militant further their ambitions in Afghanistan and preachers because of low literacy rates. 5 Indian-ruled Kashmir , while, at the same Yet, President Musharraf via his political time, seeking to curtail radical Islamism in party has been forging alliances with Pakistan’s own politics. Decades of Pakistani-based Islamic militant groups in Islamization coupled with increased order to cement his rule, even though these sectarianism have left a tremendous imprint groups foment sectarianism.6 Of equal on the Pakistani psyche and have been a concern is the ability of banned groups like factor undermining the country’s stability. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (now Jamaat ud Da’wa) The current challenge faced by the to continue to operate in the country against Pakistani government is to return the the regime.7 Islamist genie to the bottle. This is made an even more significant challenge because of PAKISTAN’S ROLE IN THE WAR ON Pakistan’s nuclear capability 1 and fragile TERROR domestic environment. There is little doubt that Pakistan plays a The Pakistani government is currently major role in the global campaign against engaged in a number of costly and intricate al-Qa’ida, especially as its own Inter - military campaigns in the unruly areas of Services Intelligence (ISI) helped to create the country such as Waziristan and the the Taliban and promote Islamist jihad. At Northwest Province with the clear aim of the same time , though, this sponsorship rooting out Islamist radicals. At the same gives the ISI tremendous experience and time, it has had to de al with sectarian and insider knowledge as to al-Qa’ida’s tribal violence ,2 coupled with increasing working and thinking. Almost immediately demands for devolution of power.3 after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the 74 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) The Paradox That Is Pakistan: Both Ally and Enemy United States gave Pakistan $50 million in Taliban, and similar groups within assistance , because President George W. Pakistan.12 Bush is determined that Pakistan is central In December 2005, seminary students to U.S. security interests regarding the operating in North Waziristan calling counter-terrorist issue.8 This was a themselves the Taliban released a list of substantial shift in U.S. policy which saw 200 rival tribesmen whom they wished to sanctions impos ed on Pakistan at the kill.13 The appeal of the region as a base to beginning and towards the end of the 1990s, al-Qa’ida and jihadists is easy to following growing concerns over Pakistan’s understand. As one Western journalist put nuclear program.9 it, “Every house is a castle, a vast The American-led international compound ringed by a towering mud wall, campaign against al-Qa’ida and all of its medieval battlements and fronted by a affiliates and associates has forced Pakistan giant, thick door.”14 An example of to make an awkward turnaround, silently Waziristan’s role as an international moving away from supporting Islamist terrorism capital is the belief by militancy toward a campaign largely investigators that at a March 2004 al-Qa’ida demanding its eradication. As President summit held there , a list of bombing targets Musharraf himself said when interviewed for the movement was drawn up, including about the change of policy, albeit with the London subway operation.15 considerable understatement, “It was in our To those who have visited Waziristan, national interest because I knew what the province appears locked in a time would happen now in Afghanistan…. Our capsule. The region is administered as it diplomatic association with the Taliban was was a century ago, when the British Empire going to become meaningless, as obviously controlled the country. Power rests in the they were going to be sorted out.”10 hands of a centrally appointed political agent. The political agent has the power to The Military Challenge of Countering the jail anyone for life without trial, impose “Terrorists” collective punishments on villages, convene The Pakistani Province of Waziristan, courts, etc. 16 Literacy throughout the which borders Afghanistan and allegedly is province is low while poverty is rife. the hiding place of the al-Qa’ida leader, Virtually all the men are armed, usually Usama Bin Ladin, has increasingly become with modern automatic weapons. Such a focal issue in the war against terrorism. conditions tend to bring about general The murder in 2005 of Faridallah Khan, a discontentment and disenchantment, which Wazir tribal leader engaged in fighting al- Islamic militants take advantage of in order Qa’ida, intensified the fear of many locals to recruit new members.17 who liv e in an area partly controlled by al- Waziristan has a rich history of Qa’ida, which assassinates those who fomenting opposition to the Pakistani oppose them.11 Khan is one of fifty tribal government. During the 1980s, the province leaders who have died in Wazirista n became the center for those Muslims because of his opposition to al-Qa’ida, the partaking in the jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Pakistani Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) 75 Issac Kfir intelligence agency, ISI, supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia , poured THE CHALLENGES billions of dollars into the campaign. The The Military Campaign against Islamic ISI set up and run dozens of schools that Militancy radicalized young Muslims and prepared The difficulty faced by the United States them for the battle. The southern part of the and its allies in their Afghan and anti- region--especially around Wana and Shikai- Taliban campaign is their inability to -became the largest al-Qa’ida training camp convince large sections of the Afghani and around the spring of 2004; at least 15 camps Pakistani population to support their efforts sprang up around the province , protected by to apprehend Bin Ladin and his associates. the Wazir tribe.18 The allies ’ efforts suffer because of the inhospitable terrain around the Afghan- The Role of Legislation in the Post-9/11 Pakistani border coupled with a tribal World mentality that abhors informing to or even UN Security Council Resolution 1373, cooperating with the central government, adopted as a response to 9/11, demanded considering it betrayal. Concern over cross - that countries submit annual reports to its border infiltration has led President Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) Musharraf to suggest the building of a fence whose principal function is to monitor each to hinder border movement. Moreover, state’s compliance with Resolution 1373. there is also anger towards the policies of The significance of Resolution 1373 was the Pakistani Army, which uses the Frontier that it amounted to a declaration by the Crimes Regulation to impose heavy international community to combat financia l sanctions and sets afire homes of international terrorism. suspected al-Qa’ida members and Due to its proximity to Afghanistan, sympathizers.20 The American destruction Pakistan, Bin Ladin’s main base of of various homes in the region, and operation (at least until Operation Endure especially in Makin, intensified anger Freedom forced him to flee), has sought to towards the United States, which, people embrace these demands to demonstrate its feel, acts indiscriminately.21 commitment to counter-terrorism. Pakistan Pakistan has attempted to deal with has submitted five reports to the CTC Afghanistan, with whom it shares a 2450km highlighting its domestic legislative border, by also establishing a Joint commitment to countering the threat of Interrogative Teams (JIT) and Standing international terrorism. At the heart of its Operating Procedures. The measures are counter-terrorism program is the Anti- designed to arrest and detain criminals Terrorism Act of 1997, as amended in wanted under national and international August 2001, whose aim is to prevent law. The Home Departments of the terrorist acts and sectarian violence in and Northwest Frontier (WFP ) and Baluchistan out of Pakistan. Section 11 of the Act provinces maintain records of all foreigners prohibits organizations involved in terrorist as well as Pakistanis who arrive from activities and bars membership and support Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan has to such organizations.19 deployed regular troops along the Pakistan- Afghanistan border and it carries out air surveillance to prevent the entry of any terrorist from Afghanistan into Pakistan.22 76 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) The Paradox That Is Pakistan: Both Ally and Enemy The realization that the area is infested elders and Islamic clerics in the hope of with al-Qa’ida militants, some of whom encouraging them to cooperate with the plotted the assassination of President government in maintaining security.