,. .v -· > ;,;c6'i163162 SEGRE11/NOFORN//X1 ··~ .... i.· . On the·Front Lines The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002 (U) · Withheld under statutory authority ofthe H_enry A. Crumpton D Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO U.S.C., section 3S07) Editor's Note: The following. cities had fallen to US and allied essay refiects the perspective ofa tribal forces and surviving enemy veteran officer ofthe Clandestine forces were on the run. A core of Service who led the CMs cam­ OcIA and0USArmy Spe­ paign in Afghanistan from cial Forces (SF) ersonnel, . 20 September 2001until28 June 2002. As Chiefofthe Counter­ 1,i~~l.YS terror(st Center's Special Opera·. · ...airp~':--o-w_e_r-=-h-a-.d"'"'d.-e_,st,...ro"'"y-'ed ~e Tali!. ,tions, he participated directly in ban regime and disrupted·al­ In the aftermath ofthe unfolding events, from the White Qaida, with approximately 25 House to the front l~nes. Given percent ofthe enemy's leaders 11 September'' 2001 the brevity ofthis overview and killed or captured. More than 20 terrorist attacks ••• the author's singular optic, much al·Qaida training camps and · remains to be told. Nevertheless, sanctuaries had. been seemed, President••• calledfor the narrative is designed to con· unilateral CIA covert tribute to the critical dialogue on . how the United States should IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) I action, operationswith wage counterterrorism wars in liaison services, and .the future. <;5/fNF) Some "-::-.,,..,,.,,....,-~~=-~..,--;- support to the US in the aftermath ofthe l1 Sep·. 5,000 to 10,000 eneiny had been military's effort in the tember 2001 terrorist attack~ i~ killed, while US casualties Afghanistan theater. New York and Washington, the . remained low. 1 And, .finally, more President ofthe United States . than 5,000 prisoners had been ordered the Director ofCentral rounded up, some ofintelligence lntelligel).ce cocn to launch a " value. '$/INF) covert action war against the al.:. Qaida terrorist organization and its Taliban supporters in Afghan­ Although the global war against '' istan. This order, in response to i:.I~Qa,i.~ remains unfin~l%hed, the initial military campaign in · Withheld under statutory authority of the a proposal submitted to the Pres­ ident by the head ofthe DCI's. Afghanistan sit.cceeded. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO collapse ofthe Taliban enabled U .S.C., section 3S07) Counterterrorist Center four . days after the attacks, called for · the Afghan people oo begin unilateral CIA covert action, · Henry A. Crumpton serves in operations with liaison services, the CIA Directorate of 1 One CIA officer and one Special Forces , and support to the US military's soldier detailed to the CIA died in combat, Operations. effort in the Afghanistan.the­ both casualties oftreachery-the fmat was killedby revolting prisoners; thesecond by ater. (j3//NF) · an Afghan teen~r manning a local road­ block. The US military suffered fewer than 100 casualties, the majority the By the second week ofDecember, tra!!!c result offriendly fire or transport acc1denta. Northern Alliance and other three months after the Presiden­ allied tribal forces' l<>sses were in the low · tial directive, all major Afghan hundreds.)!iJf/NF) DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, 6ECRET//NOFORN/IX1 1 E.0.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-041, document no. 1 I ~ DECLASSIFICA~ION DATE: May 6, 2019 I . ~' C01163162 Sc6FlcTt'/NOFORN/JX1 . Afghanistan . '°\ and were managed? Ana how can we apply these lessons to counterteITOrism (CT) warfare in the future? kB/INF) Authority, Responsibility, and Leadership (U) Clarity ofpurpose, clarity ofcom­ . mand, and accountability are critical in.war. At the outset of the Afghan war, the President conveyed unique and specific authOJ;ities to the CIA,,via a Presidential Finding. He rein­ forced this directive with a visit to Headquarters on 26 Septem­ ber 2002. :His message to the CIA leadership and those in CTC given responsibility for execut­ ing his orders resonated clearly: Destroy al-Qaida. Ilis detenni~ - lmlmdottttliatnlt11 --·-Plot!.... ­ nation, which translated as raw * -"'111'11 political will and strong leader­ • - ..pl!al ~flll'f\'lld ship, set the tone. Froni the· President, via the DCI, the Dep· ·-""-­• l!O .,._ uty Director ofOperations ....'~-~·,,,., a. -­ Cr>DO); and the Director of CTC, UNCLA88IFIED directly down to me, as Chiefof CTC's Sped.al Operations reclaiming their country, and leadership. "External elements," (CTC/SO), the authorities and provided the US with an pres~nting both challenges and responsibilities were clearly opportunity to build a opportunities, included geogra­ defmed. CBf/NF} · partnership with an emerging phy, weather, history, tribal government. f$/fNF) alliances, deployment ofenemy The White House and CIA lead­ forces, enemy tactics, regional ership declared the major What were the elements ofwar politics, Afghan culture, and objectives, set broad parameters, -in Afghanistan and how were world opinion. Often these expe¢ted results, and remained they combined to produce such a elements complemented one intensely engaged with hard . dramatic. outcome? "Internal another, producing synergy and questions"md some deep con­ elements":..._those within the pur· positive momentum. At other cerns-yet they refrai;ned from view ofthe US government­ times, however, combinations of micro-management. The QCI included intelligence collection, elements created stress and provided daily brief:mgs to the combat capabilities, covert internal conflict. What did we President and senior officials at action, communications, learn in Afghanistan about how the NSC. To reinforce the link bureaucracy, technology, strat­ internal and external elements of between policy and operations, egy, politics, logistics, and warfare influenced each other the DCI asked that I accompany 2 SECRET//NOFORN//X1 ."' ·· cOi163162 SEGRETNNOFORN//X1 Afghanistan To their credit, CIA leaders demonstrated him for these briefings on more , · political courage and than 20 occasions during the war.. leadership by aI.lowing I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) (The White House, of course, also tinprecedented received daily updates from thEl operational leeway. US military.) r$/!NF) .___ _, The first insertion of an intelligence team to meet with Northern Alliance Commander To their credit, the DCI and other Ahmed Shah Masood occurred in CIA leaders, especially the Dire'c­ May 1997. ~/INF) tor ofCTC, demonstrated political · HUMINT at the'' Core (U) coilrage and leadership by allow­ The al-Qaida attacks against US ing unprecedented operational The US government's political­ e~bassies in East Africa in · leeway, within a clear, complemen­ strategic understanding of the August 1998 led to a limited tary policy context that demanded region, tactic9.J. military opera­ Presidential Finding and a accountability. Daily briefings tions, and lethal covert action White. House demand for . throughtext,graphs,maps,and programs all depended on increased intelligence collection HUMINT. Rooted deeply in oral presentations kept them focused on al-Qaida com­ cov~rt action operations against informed and provided the stimu­ mand/control/communications the USSR and its puppet govern­ · (03) in Afghanistan. Liaison lus for constructive dialogue and ment in Afghanistan from 1980 guidance. Understanding the need with the Northern: Alliance to 1992, GIA intelligence net­ im roved for timely operational decision­ works were expanded making on the ground in Afghanistan, the CIA encomaged E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) operators to operate. Not once did I 2 The Northern Alliance, a loose network ofcompetitive tribal forces, Included CIA leaders order OTC/SO to scrub. TajikS, as the majority, but also Uzbeks, a mission; but the same CIA lead­ Hazaras, and others. (U) ers probed deeply prior to any major operation. Other leaders, less confident and more risk adverse, might have second­ guessed. operational decisions and tactical. moves, or distanced them­ selves from responsibility--ejther I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) action could have pulled the war effort into political/bureaucratic gridlock. Avoiding a repetition of errors made in Vietnam and Soma­ Withheld under statutory authority of the lia, the White House and CIA Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 leadership unleashed operational U.S.C., section 3507) · forces. Inso doing, they facilitated. the application of innovative and unconventional tactics, which led to victory, and, in the process, help~d to forge a CT war congru­ ent with broad US policy objectives. JJ!/INF) S!CRET//N9FORN//X1 3 ; •' .f ;.· C01163162 SEO.RE"f//NOFORN//X1 Afghanistan IE.0. 13526, section 1.4(c) This agent inventory expanded'' exponentially after 9111 when.CIA offieers started recruitillg tribal armies. Intelligence, the bulk from HUMlNT, provided the means to measure a number of the exter­ nal elements of war-including the stre~gths of allies and ene­ mies~wliicn formed the basis for '' US government internal decision­ ~akillg-on policy, strategy; and I covert action (including psycho­ logical operations). HUMINT afforded the CIA considerabl.e influence over ~trategic plan­ ning, with a .covert action war at I its center, which in turn led to i \The pace more resources and more intelli­ of operational activity again gence. ~/NF} accelerated after the al-Qaida attack on the'USS COLE in Yemen in October 2000. ~/NF) ( s. With ll() US Embassy in Kabul and the activities ofal-Qaida spanning the globe, intelligence operations ~inst Usama bin Laaen (UBL) were ban ed by a Chiefof IThe Pakistanis wres­ Station (COS) heading a virtual ~tion at ....,,.-=-~'.'"" CIA Headquarters (OTC/UBL). INF) tled with their fears of a new IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) I .•4 5&CRET//NOFORN//X1 ·'--'-.,.,__-"'_ C01163162 6EGRETNNOFORNJIX1 Afghanistan I E.O. 13526, section l.4(c) Electro.Die mappi.Dg te_chnology,'' an Afghanif;!tan beyond their influ­ intimate partnership special targeting uni ence, but. eventually succwnbed with the US.nµlifaey, to US.pressure and played an and fast· offen,siye 're.ctly linked with eight other important ·supporting role.