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On the·Front Lines The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002 (U) · Withheld under statutory authority ofthe H_enry A. Crumpton D Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO U.S.C., section 3S07)
Editor's Note: The following. cities had fallen to US and allied essay refiects the perspective ofa tribal forces and surviving enemy veteran officer ofthe Clandestine forces were on the run. A core of Service who led the CMs cam OcIA and0USArmy Spe paign in Afghanistan from cial Forces (SF) ersonnel, . 20 September 2001until28 June 2002. As Chiefofthe Counter 1,i~~l.YS terror(st Center's Special Opera·. · ...airp~':--o-w_e_r-=-h-a-.d"'"'d.-e_,st,...ro"'"y-'ed ~e Tali!. ,tions, he participated directly in ban regime and disrupted·al In the aftermath ofthe unfolding events, from the White Qaida, with approximately 25 House to the front l~nes. Given percent ofthe enemy's leaders 11 September'' 2001 the brevity ofthis overview and killed or captured. More than 20 terrorist attacks ••• the author's singular optic, much al·Qaida training camps and · remains to be told. Nevertheless, sanctuaries had. been seemed, President••• calledfor the narrative is designed to con· unilateral CIA covert tribute to the critical dialogue on . how the United States should IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) I action, operationswith wage counterterrorism wars in liaison services, and .the future. <;5/fNF) Some "-::-.,,..,,.,,....,-~~=-~..,--;- support to the US in the aftermath ofthe l1 Sep·. 5,000 to 10,000 eneiny had been military's effort in the tember 2001 terrorist attack~ i~ killed, while US casualties Afghanistan theater. New York and Washington, the . remained low. 1 And, .finally, more President ofthe United States . than 5,000 prisoners had been ordered the Director ofCentral rounded up, some ofintelligence lntelligel).ce cocn to launch a " value. '$/INF) covert action war against the al.:. Qaida terrorist organization and its Taliban supporters in Afghan Although the global war against '' istan. This order, in response to i:.I~Qa,i.~ remains unfin~l%hed, the initial military campaign in · Withheld under statutory authority of the a proposal submitted to the Pres ident by the head ofthe DCI's. Afghanistan sit.cceeded. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO collapse ofthe Taliban enabled U .S.C., section 3S07) Counterterrorist Center four . days after the attacks, called for · the Afghan people oo begin unilateral CIA covert action, · Henry A. Crumpton serves in operations with liaison services, the CIA Directorate of 1 One CIA officer and one Special Forces , and support to the US military's soldier detailed to the CIA died in combat, Operations. effort in the Afghanistan.the both casualties oftreachery-the fmat was killedby revolting prisoners; thesecond by ater. (j3//NF) · an Afghan teen~r manning a local road block. The US military suffered fewer than 100 casualties, the majority the By the second week ofDecember, tra!!!c result offriendly fire or transport acc1denta. Northern Alliance and other three months after the Presiden allied tribal forces' l<>sses were in the low · tial directive, all major Afghan hundreds.)!iJf/NF)
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, 6ECRET//NOFORN/IX1 1 E.0.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-041, document no. 1
I ~ DECLASSIFICA~ION DATE: May 6, 2019 I . ~' C01163162 Sc6FlcTt'/NOFORN/JX1 . Afghanistan
. '°\ and were managed? Ana how can we apply these lessons to counterteITOrism (CT) warfare in the future? kB/INF)
Authority, Responsibility, and Leadership (U)
Clarity ofpurpose, clarity ofcom . mand, and accountability are critical in.war. At the outset of the Afghan war, the President conveyed unique and specific authOJ;ities to the CIA,,via a Presidential Finding. He rein forced this directive with a visit to Headquarters on 26 Septem ber 2002. :His message to the CIA leadership and those in CTC given responsibility for execut ing his orders resonated clearly: Destroy al-Qaida. Ilis detenni~ - lmlmdottttliatnlt11 --·-Plot!.... nation, which translated as raw * -"'111'11 political will and strong leader • - ..pl!al ~flll'f\'lld ship, set the tone. Froni the· President, via the DCI, the Dep· ·-""-• l!O .,._ uty Director ofOperations ....'~-~·,,,., a. - Cr>DO); and the Director of CTC, UNCLA88IFIED directly down to me, as Chiefof CTC's Sped.al Operations reclaiming their country, and leadership. "External elements," (CTC/SO), the authorities and provided the US with an pres~nting both challenges and responsibilities were clearly opportunity to build a opportunities, included geogra defmed. CBf/NF} · partnership with an emerging phy, weather, history, tribal government. f$/fNF) alliances, deployment ofenemy The White House and CIA lead forces, enemy tactics, regional ership declared the major What were the elements ofwar politics, Afghan culture, and objectives, set broad parameters, -in Afghanistan and how were world opinion. Often these expe¢ted results, and remained they combined to produce such a elements complemented one intensely engaged with hard . dramatic. outcome? "Internal another, producing synergy and questions"md some deep con elements":..._those within the pur· positive momentum. At other cerns-yet they refrai;ned from view ofthe US government times, however, combinations of micro-management. The QCI included intelligence collection, elements created stress and provided daily brief:mgs to the combat capabilities, covert internal conflict. What did we President and senior officials at action, communications, learn in Afghanistan about how the NSC. To reinforce the link bureaucracy, technology, strat internal and external elements of between policy and operations, egy, politics, logistics, and warfare influenced each other the DCI asked that I accompany
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To their credit, CIA leaders demonstrated him for these briefings on more , · political courage and than 20 occasions during the war.. leadership by aI.lowing I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) (The White House, of course, also tinprecedented received daily updates from thEl operational leeway. US military.) r$/!NF) .___ _, The first insertion of an intelligence team to meet with Northern Alliance Commander To their credit, the DCI and other Ahmed Shah Masood occurred in CIA leaders, especially the Dire'c May 1997. ~/INF) tor ofCTC, demonstrated political · HUMINT at the'' Core (U) coilrage and leadership by allow The al-Qaida attacks against US ing unprecedented operational The US government's political e~bassies in East Africa in · leeway, within a clear, complemen strategic understanding of the August 1998 led to a limited tary policy context that demanded region, tactic9.J. military opera Presidential Finding and a accountability. Daily briefings tions, and lethal covert action White. House demand for . throughtext,graphs,maps,and programs all depended on increased intelligence collection HUMINT. Rooted deeply in oral presentations kept them focused on al-Qaida com cov~rt action operations against informed and provided the stimu mand/control/communications the USSR and its puppet govern · (03) in Afghanistan. Liaison lus for constructive dialogue and ment in Afghanistan from 1980 guidance. Understanding the need with the Northern: Alliance to 1992, GIA intelligence net im roved for timely operational decision works were expanded making on the ground in Afghanistan, the CIA encomaged E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) operators to operate. Not once did I 2 The Northern Alliance, a loose network ofcompetitive tribal forces, Included CIA leaders order OTC/SO to scrub. TajikS, as the majority, but also Uzbeks, a mission; but the same CIA lead Hazaras, and others. (U) ers probed deeply prior to any major operation. Other leaders, less confident and more risk adverse, might have second guessed. operational decisions and tactical. moves, or distanced them selves from responsibility--ejther I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) action could have pulled the war effort into political/bureaucratic gridlock. Avoiding a repetition of errors made in Vietnam and Soma Withheld under statutory authority of the lia, the White House and CIA Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 leadership unleashed operational U.S.C., section 3507) · forces. Inso doing, they facilitated. the application of innovative and unconventional tactics, which led to victory, and, in the process, help~d to forge a CT war congru ent with broad US policy objectives. JJ!/INF)
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IE.0. 13526, section 1.4(c) This agent inventory expanded'' exponentially after 9111 when.CIA offieers started recruitillg tribal armies. Intelligence, the bulk from HUMlNT, provided the means to measure a number of the exter nal elements of war-including the stre~gths of allies and ene mies~wliicn formed the basis for '' US government internal decision ~akillg-on policy, strategy; and I covert action (including psycho logical operations). HUMINT afforded the CIA considerabl.e influence over ~trategic plan ning, with a .covert action war at I its center, which in turn led to i \The pace more resources and more intelli of operational activity again gence. ~/NF} accelerated after the al-Qaida attack on the'USS COLE in Yemen in October 2000. ~/NF)
(
s. With ll() US Embassy in Kabul and the activities ofal-Qaida spanning the globe, intelligence operations ~inst Usama bin Laaen (UBL) were ban ed by a Chiefof IThe Pakistanis wres Station (COS) heading a virtual ~tion at ....,,.-=-~'.'"" CIA Headquarters (OTC/UBL). INF) tled with their fears of a new
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) I .•4 5&CRET//NOFORN//X1 ·'--'-.,.,__-"'_ C01163162 6EGRETNNOFORNJIX1 Afghanistan
I E.O. 13526, section l.4(c) Electro.Die mappi.Dg te_chnology,'' an Afghanif;!tan beyond their influ intimate partnership special targeting uni ence, but. eventually succwnbed with the US.nµlifaey, to US.pressure and played an and fast· offen,siye 're.ctly linked with eight other important ·supporting role. US government entities, most action turned out to be importantly NSA and CE;NT the .k~y t;;· t~rgeting.- COM. 5 The CIA's Office of Military Affairs also played an '1 important role. r J ' ,;=
..______.I In the final anltlysis, the CIA unilateral HUMINT net works developed over the last two d~cE!-des -provided botnthe \. !:' InAfghanistan, HUMINT was critical intelligence reporting and i. 1 critical. SIGINT the muscle for covert action in i Afghanistan. ~//NF) ~ .______.played an important role, as did imagery Targeting (U) .from NRO_ satellites. US milit!!n7 I aircraft.and drones,l / CIA targeting support played a I . crucial role in deconflicting tar Nonethel~ss, it was the fusion of get proposals, facilitating precise .technicai collection with air and ground attacks, and sus HUMINT that proved to be the taining the overall intelligence formula fo~ success. A dynamic cycle of collection/fusiolllta:raet- _ system ofchecking and retask ing/operations. Afghans have - ing multiple assets-human and long b~n,expert at targfiting, as_ technical"-proved highly effec · British arid Soviet invaders could tive. For example, when a source attest. AI-Qaida also excels at reported the coordinates of an ambushe_s against fixed sites out- · ene~y cari>.p using GPS (global side combat zc;mes, rather than positioning technology)~ the infor large-scale military engage mation would be forwarded to the ments. The CIA and the US I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a) Intelligence Community (IC) for military needed to target and evaluation and, ifdeemed credi destroy such adept enemies ble, redirection ofsatellites, -before they could acquire a bead planes, and other collection sys on our positions. $/NF} · tems to corroborate the report. New data on the site would lead A revolutionary targeting sys ·to refined t.l'!aeisk~i~n~fi~liilw.u..1.1:.1.:..... ~ tem using electronic mapping nal source. technology, an intimate partner 6 The US military Central Command ship with the US military, and based in Tampa, Florida, was under the command of Gen. Tonuny Franks. CENT fast offensive action turned out to COM oversees all military oferations in be the key. CTC/SO created a the Middle East and Centra Asia. '(U)
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) SEORETNNOFORNl/X1 5 C01·163162 e111bK11111NOFORN//X1 Afilhanlstan ·
Within 1.6 days of the attacks on'' US soil, the The CTC/80 targeting unit !fis· eight-person Northern network so that they could seriµil.ated its product to. the field, Alliance Liaison Team resi:>ond to widely varying geo directly assisting US pilots and graphic, tribal, and tactical CIA/andtrS .military forces to w:as inSide conditions. Each collected local outmaneuver and engage:the Afghanistan. informti~on, received bro~d all enemy. Importantly, the saine sow;ce intelli~nce from OTC/SO, :fu,sfi!d, all~ource intelligence.that assessedi}.s own situations, made enabled dynamic 'targeti:t~g. also deciBions, coordinated with Head E.O. 13526, section l.4(c) benefited HUl\IIINT collection, I 1. qutirters to gauge strategic psychologi!lal programs, and I I'The chief ofreports, a · ·consequences, and, most ofall,· covert'action-operations. 181/NF) 25-year veter1µ1,,'' marsliall~d ·a executed it.a core mission, which small cadre ofspecialists to man was to find and use all means to age and disseminate the destroy al-Qaida. A centralized . The Right·People · (U) HUMINT. Senior analysts CIA command element inside brought a wealth ofknowledge, Argbatiistan, or, worse, based in · The right people, bringing their including practical experience the United States, would have imperfe~ miX Qf experience, tra · counternarcotics tar i.riipeded the·better-informed, dis. pride, emotions, .and instincts, gets. p,ersed teams on the ground. ..-. were the cotoerstone ofUS sue CTC/SO's immediate aim, there ~ ceas in Afghanistan. On 11 fore, was to deploy and support . ~ September 20011 the CIA'bad no teams and encourage their tacti § cpmponent, no staff; and no sup 'Militarj liaison Officers included cal autonomy within a str,ategic ·• port mechanism structured to a S cial Forces (SF) colonel, a plan congruent with US g~vern ~· ~ launch and mana e this uni ue commander, and ment policy objectives. (1211/NF) ~ war against a terrorist army hid- analysts-all r;:i· Ql.g. in a·fractured,land on the far '------~super , proven performers. They These teams blended diverse tal ::l side oftb,e globe. Fortunately, were given complete access to .e~ts and b~ted highly • the CIA-especially CTC and the CTC/SO information and imme experi~nced leaders who excelled ~ DO's Sp~cia,l Activities Division . diately assumed·mvaluable, fully in misaioriB demanding indepen (S~)-had de;v;elo,l>.~cl,~e 1:1xper integr~~~J'f'l~+ (/f/ltff') dence and in,itiative: Despite the tise.over the.years 9> briild such erosion of'CIA paramilitary (PM) an organization. ''Ii/INF) capabilities since the end ofthe Cold War, CIA had managed to Within days of9/11, the Director IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) retain·a core ofPM officers in · ofCTC reciilled me from a for· . SAD. ' i eign assigru:n'ent to establish and mos onn~r y rom e I leadfCTC/SO; My deputy was a '---"".""-----,...J.The Head "-;u~.,.....pe...,.cial Operations commu Nayal Academy graduate with 26. quarters component focused on nity, SAD nonetheless provided years ,of gov~en.t service, "Who strategic goals, linked :Policy and the backbone for .CIA teams ha.d WQrked QT targets in South operations, assembled and dis deploying irito Afghanistan. -Asia. CTC/80 included a covert seminated intelligence;. and Many of these PM officers were action ops ·o:fii~ a former coordinated support for the van cross-trained and experienced Mari:Q. guards ofthe war: the CIA o erations/intelli ence officers. teams deployed into Afghani• stan. 1,8//NF) IE.O. 13526, section l.4(c) In Afghanistan, the. CIA teams e same time, CIA operations operated semi-autonomously as a officers with these requisite
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IE.O. 13526, section l.4(c) qui;di:f;icatiq~s .had 1.ittle ifany militax:y ~Pe~nce or·trainU,1.g; other thrul'baaic CIA weapons , fai:riiliariZatian:· Yet, the right combina#on ofpersQnnel with the righ,t t(jam Ieadership p,roved sufficient for the mission. E.O. 13526, section l.4(c) I, )$/INF) I "'
In all types·ofweather and com bat oonditi9ns, s.ADI I . al~mg With the us military air. Withheld under statutory authority of the infrastructure, served as the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 -umbilical cord for the CIAteams. l SAD ·pilots fie:W: helicopters (Rus• U.S.C., section 3507) sian )fi-178) and, fixed 'wing aircraft into Mghamstan. 1$/fNF) . j
Of the seven CIA teall1s c!.eployed·in the first wave of insertions from 27 September ' until 19 Nov!lmber, the North ern Alliance Liaison Team · . (NALT) led.theway into the Paaj~hir Valley. :'Within 16 days selves. at will with US military ments at the time ofinaertion. Many members performed I of the .attacks 0n-iUS soil, this uni~ on the ground as specific team l mi~sion requirements evolved. remarkable tasks, like the medic l : team.was inside·Arghanistan. ~ ' Chief/NALT, !!- veteran opera ('87/NF) who amputated the leg ofan tions officer, spoke Farsi/Dari Afghan soldier using only a a:ng. knew many of the key The remaining six teams, Alpha Leatherman tool. Team.Delta Afghan political players. His through Foxtrot, averaged eight members and SF forces captured . deputy, aJormer Special Forces members, all experienced in a senior Taliban intelligence offi .soldier a.:pd veteran PM opera Third World crises. Each cial, deep inhostile territory• tions offic,:er, provided included multiple officers with Team Alpha directed a. Northern compl~ri>,entary military exper foreign language capabilities, Alliance element to·rescue two 1;ise. (!l'rom ~he Pentagon's including Farsi/Dari Uzbek Rus· US journalists, lost and trapped l perspective, this would be the · sian, and Arabic' by fighting near Konduz. NALT 1 equiv!illent of generals leading I · Im Pakistan, an A-team-sized'unit into the All but one team tracked Western hostages and heart of the fight.) The eight ...,._e_e_r_s-po_e...... some loCal lan supported their rescue and memJ;ie~ team included opera guage or dialect. Two team extraction from Afghanistan. I Some teams led Afghan forces i . tio~.-Qffi~ers, PM officers, a leaders- wollld receive the Intelli ~- medic, and ~-communications genc~ ~ss for supreme valor on into combat. }kW/NF) ~ specia}ist•. They averaged.45 the battlefield. These ~ams, like years:off:l,ge and.25 years pfpro . the NAJ;:r, combined with the US The CIA and IC effort encom- ~ i fessional experience. Members military for specific missions. passed scores of components and ofth,eNAI..T recombined them· Some teams included SF ele· thousands of people making criti I 1 E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
8ECAETUNOFOAN//X1 7 C01163162 &liiQRfffl/NOFORN/JX,1 Afghsn/$tan
J E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) '. ! ' · The lel'ffi -teams .and support ·1 · .branChes were able .to move I "<1uickly and nimDiy aronnd ' ·bureaucratic barrlera within the 1 Agency and the IC-strong I i' Withheld under statutory authority of the ~ency: leadershiQ !llld Iq.sup Central Inteµigence Agency Act of 1949 (50 port.~Q. fa~t.a~d·this. I l U.S.C., section 3507) . Jin tly, Afghan.allies d such·smalM:ee.ms as cou, .J . rageolU\ partners rather than an i'nvadirig army.. )iJ/lNF) ·1 I ·\ Money and Supplies (U) \_ i! Fundingflowed in a torrent. The ' CIA teiµnsJiterally slept on.mil lions·orus. dollars. The financial incentive fkassets and tribBI '------' armycommruidets to c0opei:ate cal ·contributions. CIA logistics qualified personnel. The CIA was substantiM and immediate. ofli9ers a~
IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) 8 .SE$R&+llNOF.0RN//X1 i,w ~: C01163162 8ECRETHNOFORN//X1 t Afghanistan
.\ The CIA tea~s literally slE~pt on millions'' ofUS ------"\ .../, supplies within days of the dollars. re uest. .,, I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
Portable hospitals '"---~-.J were purchasecf. and shipped. ·~or~d vests, medical packs, Korans, foi;id, binoctilars, toys, kii.ives, :Piclru trucks· ·enades, saddles, and "phi.a !!Un.dr~ds ofother ~tems were pushed.to the field. OTC/SO-never rejected any tacti cal-supply: request from one ofits teams. )81/NF)
.. J I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
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;• I,. / E ~ IE.o: 1~526, sectionl.4(c) e. Friction1·-''was inevitable ,. ( ...DQD/J2 qu~stion~d - .. " - ' ~ - . rH every.m&Jor Talibanleaderehip allies. The Tai- · -geostrategfo obje~tive iban as a :fighting force presented merelya secondary target, an 'I ofthe CWCENTCOM . l obstaele towal'.d"the ulti;tnate qbjeo · , :Oespite these Wa!lbington-b~ed .:Pl~. tive.· ($1/NF) ,\.. I -i.ssuea, tiie CIA forged a solid . artnerahip wjth_Q~NTCOM, The CIA launched an intensive f andi:us ru.r Components. ....Whil~--.~e-'·the debate with the Penta and compri!h~n!!Jive ·psyc;hological gon cen~ on power'and ' operation tO capitalize on tlie ofswitching control,.tlte dialog witli CENT,. .the eqd; oommon sense, fortified,: Afgh~· tracli~~ I '' sides as liattles'evolve and.induce C.OJ.tbuiii others !oeusea ~ore on by ov:envhelfuirig mutual comm.it 'defections.through cash P.lilY · . how to·achi~ye victory. The ,CIA ip.ent t<>. tM ~issio~, outweighed· lI provicJed.,HUMINT, psY'chological bweaucl'.atic;and doctrinatcon ments, food, supplies,Jincf:.threats . I .·(especiaUY.effectjve backed t . operatj.~n.S eii)erienee, cash, straints. f$f/NF) ,, when i by precisiop bombing).'. T)le PsY· I lethalco:Vert'action capabilities, l i · ·I land enti:ee to 'tribal chological operations offered potep.tial allies in the Tulib'an allies.(p~us.t~e politicalguidance Strategy (U) I reqmrecfiQleverage and coordi · ranks choices ofsul'.Vival, means !' nate·iMse·.Afghrui·allies). In 'The Afghan campaign involved to enhooce prestig~, ~ope, and turn, tiie'.US n:iili.tary offered . combinins.tlie-,iii.tern~· eleme~ts personal gain. The center or· combat'expertise, awesome fire ofwar managed by the US gov graVity rested in the minds of pbwer,· Iog:istics and ernment with key' external tribalcommooderswho fusd' . com1nunications architecture, fact;or~primarily the nature of aligned with the Taliban as a matter ofpolitical IM1N'l; and"SIGINT. .In some the enemy and hi~ ~rrain-into advantag~. ¢ases, 'the personal relati~nahips an inter:d(!pendent, -flexible pla.p The CIA operations sought'to b.etwej!n CIA:.and JJS,~litary f
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wage a fast-paced war on the CWSF teams would provide The pi:actical application of US ground. ¢/NF) timely, specific geographic coordi strategic thinking evolved into a nates, using hand-held GPS three-phase war plan: The next question: ''How to gain devices, laser designators, and lethal access to the _target?" The real-time communications. US First, unconventional ground answer crune in two parts: Qual forces would define geographic · w~are and conventional air ity intelligence collectors and location in exact terms, and, with power would defeat any cQvert action forces, calling upon uncompromised speed, strike massed al-Qaida and '11aliban unilateral assets and tribal allies, enemy forces with quality psy forces that did not defect or would serve as the.first compo chological operations, lethal . flee. n.ent; Special Operations Forces, covert action, unconventional directing precise airstrikes, ground attacks, and ultramodern Second, US and allied forces would be the-second. These two munitions from all quarters. would locate· and eradicate partners, CIA and. ~F, would ' 1~ 6ECRET//NOFORN//X1 f . I ! I '· .c:oi :t;63162 &EGRET//NOFORN//X1 Afghanistan .. __ · ~ CJAP"lll'IOlll'lel t MJl!tery"~ ~ i'ftl'lftllly held bJ 'talilian/ 'fJl.Qaltla + ~llad Tallb1111yal.Clilda Iodation A· ~a~Cimp 11 · ttllllao ~ • ''l:Ocl ... •• ...-wi:-.-...... _.....··- ...... -...... ··~· BBeS'F.//NOFOJIN ,.,! · capture or ki;ll specific al mander demonstrated sufficient territory throughout the·rough ! , ~ ~ . .Qaid(l leadefE!. de~ignated ability to protect an insel,'te!l. · central seetionofAfghanistan. . I )Ijgh Value T{lrgets (HVTs). team and the means and will to Ethnic Tajiks, Hazaras, and ; l }W/NF) attaek the enemy. ~/NF) Uzbeks, with a few Pashtun allies, exercised varying degrees Phae~s One and T:yvo, of course, ofinfluence in these areas and ,could overlap with .Phase·Three. Phase Qn~: Taliban/Al-Qai4 knew the·enemy well. In. fact, This, in fact, wtlB·how al-Qaida's Armies (U) · they were engaged regularly in seeond-m-cQmJl!.and, Ivlohamed skirmishes and artillery . ' AJef, wasJdlled in .a US i,ijr W4ere t.o a:1.ttaCk.? Through exchanges w:ith Taliban forces. str;Ute. -But; where to begin Nor(;hern Alliance partners, CIA In the south, Pashtun agent net ·Phase One? With- the Taliban had~ a:ooe&s to t:jie mountainous works arid potential Pashtun ' ut. nortbeast~~~r ofAfghanistan, eontrq~gcor infl:uencin. '. tribal allies held no territory and inclucijng the PaDjshir Valley, · .80.percentofthe.courit .. e there.was no organized allied few·area~of:Afghap trib~ oppo wbtch opened'into th~ Shomali. tribal army, certainly nothing sitiOn.dictated'the answer. CIA Plains north of-Kabul. Other te~nis ~ould begin work ~th . l}l,lied tribal eleµients, loosely comparable to the Northern Alli the strprig~st: ~Iliad Afgh~ folded under the Northern Alli ance that had, armor, artillery, ~orc~s. wliere the local com ance, ~eld-raggedchunks of and a few airerart. '8JINF) 8EGAEt/INOFORN//X1 13 , . -- ... -· --~·:---: ! • . . ~(:0:1163162 .. t;l:~t,i~ I :tNOF0RN//X1 . .:. . Afghanistan '•,_" . ' " " i f Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507) ':Tlie--northeni qption-for inser assessed, prompt most A,fghaiis ·tioll.'~il.d attack,.howev~r, ran. the to tak~ advwitage ofthe·Us_· .. risk.. qfalienatiilg.potential P~h momenturii'and seektOjom the CIA. did·nqt want to . tun.alli.e:sfa tlie :sOU:th:and eaet. Viinnhig.sid~; ·'81/Nf) .· ·.. . · ·c:tA. did no.t want:tO spar~ a· spark a northlsQuth ,. '' ; •, -. riorthlsoutli civil war..With that How best~ erigjige ;:µld.cl.estroy ' civil.war. in ~\nd,I Ipushed the enemy?..Recent·lristoi:y pro Jor·a ,delay,in the·att~ck to allow vided·the ~er. ·In.ihe'summer ··- ~r~tw.hile Pasb:tun fotees t(traily of1997 Northern Alliance forces .. - and·gElµi· strength ·against the had coniroll~d:Maziir~e-aharifand .. Tali.J?an: :~ti~..______, the lan:dbtjdg~ fo Uzbekistan, tlrtd ''. · · CllieflNAL'r lol;>bied_~d f~r.·the bad. ~anag~d·to eut:Higb.way Qne, ·GIA, ap.d t}_le -US military a.in!ed i .- ... -insertion ofnioreteam.s in the which-nrilBfrom:Kiibulriorth t.O · torepeatJhis.encirclement of ' : ·· ~orl}i., ;q~-,~sttjk.~s ~g~~t Kondw;, thus encircling thou 'Th.liban/al~Qaida forces. In Octo eiieniY-forees;,and tribal forces sandsofTalibanforces.fu.-the ·ber/November-200i, with US . ·atta<:ki~g m,· cocir~ated mass. Kondu?/iaiaquan area. ·The~Tali~. ·aITT>o\ver controlling the skies, After debate, with.no significant bari however, had maintained.-an . CIA/S.F (Teams _Alpha and-Bravo) . fa11htiill ,resist~cein sig~t, CIA arr.link to their surrounded forces s1,1pplied and dire~d'_allied .. moved-torWaid With the north- .Eind kept them'r~u:PptieQ.. 'J'ali Afghtm ground forces tO drive . ~rri.option;·With the anticipatio~ . ban operatives eventuaUy'bribec:l L north, captUre Mazar, a.D.d·esta~ l !, h ·of Pa11htUn force_s eventually jOin~ Gen. DostUin's subcommanders to ;flish· a landbridge to Uzbekistan. ~ ; t . ; tj • · ..·iD:g:the: fray agafrl'st the Taliban swit~ side8, forcillg Dostiun:fo fl¢e JC.oncurrentlY; in early November, ( ..:·.,i .·: iind.'ai-Qai~a. A fast and ·deci- Mazar and.brealµng the potential ,:,,cNorthern AliiaD.ee forces·struck L· siveattack.would,.the CIA seige. J!5/!NF) . ··:ft.om the e~~temmountiµns and .....----'-___._-____· _·___ · ------~ drove westwa:fd with a northern .and southern pincer movement . around the Kond'uz area. Haz ara Shia foree~; assisted by Team ·Delta, pusheQ. .froiµ Bamian to ·the east, while· Northern Alli . a.ilce1armje~, assisted by the NALT, ~las~d· s()uth through the Shomali Plams· toward Kabul · arid alao swU:ng '!l~stWard to cut Highway One and gain control of the SalW:i.g i'uiuiel. Tb.is ~io.sed the.loop, trapping enemy for¢es 4i the K0ndnz pocket. In coordi nated movemen~, Isliiail:Khan's : forces supported by Team Char: lie cut the Natfonal Ring Road in the far west, to interdict enemy resuppply effQrts, .an:d then pU,shed to Herat,and· eventually Shindand Airfield. -'8f/NF) The Pashtun south re:qi.a.4_ied a greater .challenge, given that r ··.... Withheld under statutory authority of the 14· · SEORET//NOFORN/JX1 ' -,.-.. . ' Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 ' ' ; U .S.C., section 3507) '. ; ~ . €.0:_1163162 · SE;CRET//NOFORN/IX1 . Afghanistan Psy9).iqlogical operatioP:s''proved ~Jj!i~al in the pr~);?~ation and. . JU~nP:~ation of t}le ' -:baftlijfieldin favor of'. ,th~ Uidted States. 'l' E:o:'.13S26,'secti9nl.4(c)... f. ' '' I · . tribal alliea.controllei:i'.110. terrori. · \tQry. ·T6aiiij~ciio, insertefilito {in ·. '·· at~~.-n~ar.Torin.KoWt under · · :Hamii ~r~lii'ifitilluence,. rallied. ' sufficient forces to estab~sh a tenuous operational base. ·Sur' rounded by e11emy fqrce~,, Team Echo, with.US air power, man from Pakistan. and battled west '. I aged.'to destroy:an attacking tection,.and lay the foundations : : Tali~.~ col1Vl'.JY, on 17/1S:Novem to I\ruidahar. (,SfINF} for loc.al political .devefopment •b,er andifigh~its'way south to ajter'the'war. JJSl/NF) ~dahar.: (3hie:f/Echo played a In coordination with these .piv(l~'ro~e,· con1.ij11cing.tribal attacks, CIA directed all covert . H,;!)W to at,t.ack? Su<:eeas would aetie>n asseta to initjate sabe>ta:~e require speed, .and pre ·couricils~to ..c09~rate.e:n,l:J then sttr:prise,. le~ding'K~!'zaii~: unpr9ven forces and'.ambueh operatioJ\l.s a~ . cision in.concert with'balancing -. enemy throughout A:fgha:q.. . the ptiJitical/militarjr need~- of ~ iI:ito .bittJ.~;r'l:his specific success foi:ces istan. 011e warl IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) seeR!'f/jNOFOAN//X1 15 r- .. coi 1,Ei31.62>FORN/IX1 .· .Atghanls~an . I Xbe Agency was too thi:il ~n. th~''gfuUD.d and siv~ 1 ,9yerwhelnlit!g US foree was - CENfCOM too s•~w to MOI'eover, winter loomed and the - -. -ellslirinedifrtb.e!'J>owell Doc· clos~-tbe.po;ro~loop prospects for·cleat skies. were :trine:~ eXercised brllliantzy by the _diµlirii~. With .the Uriited ·Chiefof the Jofut Chiefs of Staff ••.• allowing al•Qtiida States.dependent on· helfoopt.ers - in ihe Gulfwar: :AI4aida knew· coDJJ,Jj,andets to-slip and·small fixed-wing aircraft'for -tbis:an How t.o locate and destroy al· Qaida pockets, in the_ aitermath of the.TaliQan defeat? Phase One strategy was unsuitable for Phaae Withheld under statutory authority of the Two, ~ ~he Taliban cqll,apsed as a Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO unUie4·fightingforce amd al U.S.C., section 3507) -Qai<4i remnantsfled·to high. mounta,in.sanetuaries. Some Pen tagon pessimists were stunned at the overwhelming success: Even CENTCOM and CIA, while confi· dant of vi~tory, were surprised and unprepared for the rapid pace of success and the demands of enemy pursuit. The strategy of Phase One, whereby tribal allies - 16- ·¥GAET/JNOFORN/IX1 I j· ------ -----·--· -...... • C0116319_2 SECRET//NOFORN//X1 Afghanistan IKO. 13526, section 1.4(c) carried the-mass weight and occu pied ground, would not apply as· . ~fl'ectively inPhase Two. SmaJ,I numbers ofal-Qaida forces,. much bett;er trained:and equipped.than the defeated Taliban armies and rag-tag Pakistani volunteers, retreated to redoubts outside the ti'aditional homelands ofvictori .· oilil, celebrating tribal allies, _ manyof whom, at this·point, were . more mterested in th.e spoils of . war than hunting-hardened Arab and Che_chen fighters ensconsed . in-moun:tafu caves. {$!/NF)· During the December battlefor th~ ~ra Bora redoubt, allied Afghan fighters served as bfock ing fQrces, with some success in .the north but very little in the west, where ru-Qaida command ers-including bin Laden-and some oftheir men slipped over The key to victory in Tora Bora the border into Pakistan. CIA rested, again, .on the union..,.o=f--. operatives on the ground CIA. SF, and US airpower. ·expressed to CIA Headquarters their concei-n a,bout the limited abilities ofAfghan and Palµstani allies, but t);l;e Agency was too thin on the ground and CENT: COM too slow to close the porous ' .. loop. In the March 2002 battle.of Sha ;;_~.; , hikot, after weeks of preparation, , the US military worked the tar ii The Pakistanis · get with significantly larger !I '-c:::a:=p:ctu'.:'.:r:-=e~so':':m~e,-l. ut many others numbers ofUS forces and even ·,~i fled to sanctuaries irr Pakistan or greater. firepower than at Tora I to their home countries. Never Bora. As many as 800 enemy 1 theless; the enemy: was routed, a were killed. Nonethel~ss, the ·' j: : critical sanctuary was captured, weeks of delay enabled al-Qaida ., and time was not wasted. to prepare and many escaped to ! · ·Lawrence ofArabia said: "Bet the W'aziristan tribal area of . ter to let the:gi do it imperfectly Pakistan. CIA-sponsored tribal Ji than do it·pe#'~ctly yourself, for it a Joint Direct Attack Munition.a use a blookini forces, again, did not !I ! guidance kit to convert unguided, free-fall .i'.! is their country, their way, and bombsfutoall-weather"smart"munitiona. shut down enemyrat lines across l your time 'is ~hort." ~/INF) (U) the border. ~INF) r! IE.O. 13526, section vif,c) SECRET//NOFORN//X1 17 ------~- '-"-"---~ , col.16:3·162. . . ·-: -·-. __ .... JOFORN//X1.. ~ ··Atg/U1nlstan . r . ( What ofthe.fµ.tve? We JD.usthaveleat\,ersliip'' Ph~e.Tliree:· IDgh Vabae at every level, With ·' ·the will to-win the war on terror Tar 'ets (U·): · · · · •:I:. - . empower~d w~ors ism, but we will need more ifwe on the ground. are to-claim victoryin a.ci:>nflict -A$ e:ipe~d, the last phase that stretches before-us for1;11Jl!J.Y. pi:oved the most'difficult part of years. We rqust.have leadership .. the campaign, CWSF·teams, · at evE,'ry level, with empowered using~psychologierd ~ctics warriors on the ground. w~ :ll:lust . ~~stl~~fAfgJ;i:9:fi groU.ps, . The external elements ofwar- · learn the·,art-ofthis unique and 1Jl$ll.a!Jed to•pµ~,a~e access, ~: primarily· evolving contiict,:which requires· '' greater in~ospecticin and intelli ~obUJ.ty;;~nd s_«?metimes coopera::-,... ".:1\:·g~gaphili ._ ti&D.;, how~yer,_s~l~om· dia.this . Afghams~-:-.:d~eply-fufluenced gence ,collection than past-wars to tr~la~:~to act;1o~able·mtelli~ how USJeader!!lshaped the i_nter d~te~e the optimu:µi 'Qalance :·g~ce,:~st ~-Q*"-1da. l~der,s nal elements. ofwar under'thefr or'internal and external fiictors to .wI?-o ~ou.ght their own ¥u~nce eont~~l in.ti> a micceasful ~trategy achie~e strateg}.c_~d tacti~i'suc .~~ tim~ ~.flee.~ The High Value and cainp~~: Senior govern c~ss against anewkind ofenemy. ?:'arge~ slipped.int,o the ment foaderif endorsed the CIA'.s est/NF) .¥'~~~horde: area, proposalto deploy sem.i~~~j;o:!lo -W:hei:e some s~ayed, w~ others mo-lls teruns to eonforintoitn~ . All the tool$ ofthe US govern . ment must be applied, in Qis~~r_sed wor~dwide, witlfso~e rrit.C~~a: geo}>olitical ~~t~e of . ~~tLire~ ~ate~ ~Y:~ocal aut~on Afghanistan. Surprise and 'integta~joinfoperations.sup" · .ti.~·working-V\'ltli CIA stations. speed,l.n.Stead ofa slower -ported· by: an:source in,.te~lig~nce wrapped around a HUJWNTcore. fj!ffINF) : · conventional US respOD.tle, con And Hl!J:MINT must drill deeply :foun~ed ene:¢y e:iq>ectations and into the enemy's capabilities, threw.them into disarr~. Well .plans and.intentions, and motiva ( i Oo:D.~lusion (U) ~ded. psych9logfoal operatio,.-is, tions. Why someone fights which ·reiD;fqrced such Afghan determines who and how he · · ''The·strategy outlined· · cultural traditions as honorable 'tights. We must craft a strategy · :'rJbove; • ..sets-fitgh goals in defect~on in trib!llfclan·waiflire, to exploit the physical,. political, .·· : ,very.unpeita~n; shJftiri.g·ter wori: conibatBn,~ to the allie4 and cultural battlefield. We ··. -rain: We are fogh#ng.for the effort. A nuanced psychological must accf3)t 11ew approaches campaign nourished Afghall sus <. .Q';l',o'IJ}~~~s in·ihe A.fi}h,an pi:enµsed on ·the annihilation of thea.~r, :b~t we-are also filJht picion ofal•Qaida '!foreign enemy lea~ership· and sru1ctuar ingfof thefuture•ofCIA/J)OD invaders" while, paradoxically, ies; and seek to resolve the f.. inte~d.w(!,T'ft:ire:a_round:the . facilitating the E!p.try of'our own origins oftheir profound discon glObe. ·Whlle.we will make ~ . . . 5 Oct 2001 (S//NF) paj.gn? We have the might and {' l , ' [. 1.Q . S_ECRETJ/NOF9RNl/X·1 !· \ '