DOCSLIB.ORG

The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002 (U) · Withheld Under Statutory Authority Ofthe H Enry A

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002 (U) · Withheld Under Statutory Authority Ofthe H Enry A ,. .v -· > ;,;c6'i163162 SEGRE11/NOFORN//X1 ··~ .... i.· . On the·Front Lines The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002 (U) · Withheld under statutory authority ofthe H_enry A. Crumpton D Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO U.S.C., section 3S07) Editor's Note: The following. cities had fallen to US and allied essay refiects the perspective ofa tribal forces and surviving enemy veteran officer ofthe Clandestine forces were on the run. A core of Service who led the CMs cam­ OcIA and0USArmy Spe­ paign in Afghanistan from cial Forces (SF) ersonnel, . 20 September 2001until28 June 2002. As Chiefofthe Counter­ 1,i~~l.YS terror(st Center's Special Opera·. · ...airp~':--o-w_e_r-=-h-a-.d"'"'d.-e_,st,...ro"'"y-'ed ~e Tali!. ,tions, he participated directly in ban regime and disrupted·al­ In the aftermath ofthe unfolding events, from the White Qaida, with approximately 25 House to the front l~nes. Given percent ofthe enemy's leaders 11 September'' 2001 the brevity ofthis overview and killed or captured. More than 20 terrorist attacks ••• the author's singular optic, much al·Qaida training camps and · remains to be told. Nevertheless, sanctuaries had. been seemed, President••• calledfor the narrative is designed to con· unilateral CIA covert tribute to the critical dialogue on . how the United States should IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) I action, operationswith wage counterterrorism wars in liaison services, and .the future. <;5/fNF) Some "-::-.,,..,,.,,....,-~~=-~..,--;- support to the US in the aftermath ofthe l1 Sep·. 5,000 to 10,000 eneiny had been military's effort in the tember 2001 terrorist attack~ i~ killed, while US casualties Afghanistan theater. New York and Washington, the . remained low. 1 And, .finally, more President ofthe United States . than 5,000 prisoners had been ordered the Director ofCentral rounded up, some ofintelligence lntelligel).ce cocn to launch a " value. '$/INF) covert action war against the al.:. Qaida terrorist organization and its Taliban supporters in Afghan­ Although the global war against '' istan. This order, in response to i:.I~Qa,i.~ remains unfin~l%hed, the initial military campaign in · Withheld under statutory authority of the a proposal submitted to the Pres­ ident by the head ofthe DCI's. Afghanistan sit.cceeded. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO collapse ofthe Taliban enabled U .S.C., section 3S07) Counterterrorist Center four . days after the attacks, called for · the Afghan people oo begin unilateral CIA covert action, · Henry A. Crumpton serves in operations with liaison services, the CIA Directorate of 1 One CIA officer and one Special Forces , and support to the US military's soldier detailed to the CIA died in combat, Operations. effort in the Afghanistan.the­ both casualties oftreachery-the fmat was killedby revolting prisoners; thesecond by ater. (j3//NF) · an Afghan teen~r manning a local road­ block. The US military suffered fewer than 100 casualties, the majority the By the second week ofDecember, tra!!!c result offriendly fire or transport acc1denta. Northern Alliance and other three months after the Presiden­ allied tribal forces' l<>sses were in the low · tial directive, all major Afghan hundreds.)!iJf/NF) DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, 6ECRET//NOFORN/IX1 1 E.0.13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-041, document no. 1 I ~ DECLASSIFICA~ION DATE: May 6, 2019 I . ~' C01163162 Sc6FlcTt'/NOFORN/JX1 . Afghanistan . '°\ and were managed? Ana how can we apply these lessons to counterteITOrism (CT) warfare in the future? kB/INF) Authority, Responsibility, and Leadership (U) Clarity ofpurpose, clarity ofcom­ . mand, and accountability are critical in.war. At the outset of the Afghan war, the President conveyed unique and specific authOJ;ities to the CIA,,via a Presidential Finding. He rein­ forced this directive with a visit to Headquarters on 26 Septem­ ber 2002. :His message to the CIA leadership and those in CTC given responsibility for execut­ ing his orders resonated clearly: Destroy al-Qaida. Ilis detenni~ - lmlmdottttliatnlt11 --·-Plot!.... ­ nation, which translated as raw * -"'111'11 political will and strong leader­ • - ..pl!al ~flll'f\'lld ship, set the tone. Froni the· President, via the DCI, the Dep· ·-""-­• l!O .,._ uty Director ofOperations ....'~-~·,,,., a. -­ Cr>DO); and the Director of CTC, UNCLA88IFIED directly down to me, as Chiefof CTC's Sped.al Operations reclaiming their country, and leadership. "External elements," (CTC/SO), the authorities and provided the US with an pres~nting both challenges and responsibilities were clearly opportunity to build a opportunities, included geogra­ defmed. CBf/NF} · partnership with an emerging phy, weather, history, tribal government. f$/fNF) alliances, deployment ofenemy The White House and CIA lead­ forces, enemy tactics, regional ership declared the major What were the elements ofwar politics, Afghan culture, and objectives, set broad parameters, -in Afghanistan and how were world opinion. Often these expe¢ted results, and remained they combined to produce such a elements complemented one intensely engaged with hard . dramatic. outcome? "Internal another, producing synergy and questions"md some deep con­ elements":..._those within the pur· positive momentum. At other cerns-yet they refrai;ned from view ofthe US government­ times, however, combinations of micro-management. The QCI included intelligence collection, elements created stress and provided daily brief:mgs to the combat capabilities, covert internal conflict. What did we President and senior officials at action, communications, learn in Afghanistan about how the NSC. To reinforce the link bureaucracy, technology, strat­ internal and external elements of between policy and operations, egy, politics, logistics, and warfare influenced each other the DCI asked that I accompany 2 SECRET//NOFORN//X1 ."' ·· cOi163162 SEGRETNNOFORN//X1 Afghanistan To their credit, CIA leaders demonstrated him for these briefings on more , · political courage and than 20 occasions during the war.. leadership by aI.lowing I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) (The White House, of course, also tinprecedented received daily updates from thEl operational leeway. US military.) r$/!NF) .___ _, The first insertion of an intelligence team to meet with Northern Alliance Commander To their credit, the DCI and other Ahmed Shah Masood occurred in CIA leaders, especially the Dire'c­ May 1997. ~/INF) tor ofCTC, demonstrated political · HUMINT at the'' Core (U) coilrage and leadership by allow­ The al-Qaida attacks against US ing unprecedented operational The US government's political­ e~bassies in East Africa in · leeway, within a clear, complemen­ strategic understanding of the August 1998 led to a limited tary policy context that demanded region, tactic9.J. military opera­ Presidential Finding and a accountability. Daily briefings tions, and lethal covert action White. House demand for . throughtext,graphs,maps,and programs all depended on increased intelligence collection HUMINT. Rooted deeply in oral presentations kept them focused on al-Qaida com­ cov~rt action operations against informed and provided the stimu­ mand/control/communications the USSR and its puppet govern­ · (03) in Afghanistan. Liaison lus for constructive dialogue and ment in Afghanistan from 1980 guidance. Understanding the need with the Northern: Alliance to 1992, GIA intelligence net­ im roved for timely operational decision­ works were expanded making on the ground in Afghanistan, the CIA encomaged E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) operators to operate. Not once did I 2 The Northern Alliance, a loose network ofcompetitive tribal forces, Included CIA leaders order OTC/SO to scrub. TajikS, as the majority, but also Uzbeks, a mission; but the same CIA lead­ Hazaras, and others. (U) ers probed deeply prior to any major operation. Other leaders, less confident and more risk adverse, might have second­ guessed. operational decisions and tactical. moves, or distanced them­ selves from responsibility--ejther I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) action could have pulled the war effort into political/bureaucratic gridlock. Avoiding a repetition of errors made in Vietnam and Soma­ Withheld under statutory authority of the lia, the White House and CIA Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 leadership unleashed operational U.S.C., section 3507) · forces. Inso doing, they facilitated. the application of innovative and unconventional tactics, which led to victory, and, in the process, help~d to forge a CT war congru­ ent with broad US policy objectives. JJ!/INF) S!CRET//N9FORN//X1 3 ; •' .f ;.· C01163162 SEO.RE"f//NOFORN//X1 Afghanistan IE.0. 13526, section 1.4(c) This agent inventory expanded'' exponentially after 9111 when.CIA offieers started recruitillg tribal armies. Intelligence, the bulk from HUMlNT, provided the means to measure a number of the exter­ nal elements of war-including the stre~gths of allies and ene­ mies~wliicn formed the basis for '' US government internal decision­ ~akillg-on policy, strategy; and I covert action (including psycho­ logical operations). HUMINT afforded the CIA considerabl.e influence over ~trategic plan­ ning, with a .covert action war at I its center, which in turn led to i \The pace more resources and more intelli­ of operational activity again gence. ~/NF} accelerated after the al-Qaida attack on the'USS COLE in Yemen in October 2000. ~/NF) ( s. With ll() US Embassy in Kabul and the activities ofal-Qaida spanning the globe, intelligence operations ~inst Usama bin Laaen (UBL) were ban ed by a Chiefof IThe Pakistanis wres­ Station (COS) heading a virtual ~tion at ....,,.-=-~'.'"" CIA Headquarters (OTC/UBL). INF) tled with their fears of a new IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) I .•4 5&CRET//NOFORN//X1 ·'--'-.,.,__-"'_ C01163162 6EGRETNNOFORNJIX1 Afghanistan I E.O. 13526, section l.4(c) Electro.Die mappi.Dg te_chnology,'' an Afghanif;!tan beyond their influ­ intimate partnership special targeting uni ence, but. eventually succwnbed with the US.nµlifaey, to US.pressure and played an and fast· offen,siye 're.ctly linked with eight other important ·supporting role.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban
    Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban A thesis submitted to the Miami University Honors Program in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for University Honors with Distinction by, Brandon Smith May 2005 Oxford, OH ABSTRACT AFGHANISTAN, 1989-1996: BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE TALIBAN by, BRANDON SMITH This paper examines why the Afghan resistance fighters from the war against the Soviets, the mujahideen, were unable to establish a government in the time period between the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989 and the consolidation of power by the Taliban in 1996. A number of conflicting explanations exist regarding Afghanistan’s instability during this time period. This paper argues that the developments in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1996 can be linked to the influence of actors outside Afghanistan, but not to the extent that the choices and actions of individual actors can be overlooked or ignored. Further, the choices and actions of individual actors need not be explained in terms of ancient animosities or historic tendencies, but rather were calculated moves to secure power. In support of this argument, international, national, and individual level factors are examined. ii Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban by, Brandon Smith Approved by: _________________________, Advisor Karen L. Dawisha _________________________, Reader John M. Rothgeb, Jr. _________________________, Reader Homayun Sidky Accepted by: ________________________, Director, University Honors Program iii Thanks to Karen Dawisha for her guidance and willingness to help on her year off, and to John Rothgeb and Homayun Sidky for taking the time to read the final draft and offer their feedback.
    [Show full text]
  • COIN in Afghanistan - Winning the Battles, Losing the War?
    COIN in Afghanistan - Winning the Battles, Losing the War? MAGNUS NORELL FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden’s largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fields such as security policy studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors. FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency Phone: +46 8 555 030 00 www.foi.se FOI Memo 3123 Memo Defence Analysis Defence Analysis Fax: +46 8 555 031 00 ISSN 1650-1942 March 2010 SE-164 90 Stockholm Magnus Norell COIN in Afghanistan - Winning the Battles, Losing the War? “If you don’t know where you’re going. Any road will take you there” (From a song by George Harrison) FOI Memo 3123 Title COIN in Afghanistan – Winning the Battles, Losing the War? Rapportnr/Report no FOI Memo 3123 Rapporttyp/Report Type FOI Memo Månad/Month Mars/March Utgivningsår/Year 2010 Antal sidor/Pages 41 p ISSN ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet Projektnr/Project no A12004 Godkänd av/Approved by Eva Mittermaier FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys Department of Defence Analysis 164 90 Stockholm SE-164 90 Stockholm FOI Memo 3123 Programme managers remarks The Asia Security Studies programme at the Swedish Defence Research Agency’s Department of Defence Analysis conducts research and policy relevant analysis on defence and security related issues.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cold War and Mccarthyism Howard Tennant
    WARS The Cold War and McCarthyism Howard Tennant 1. Work in pairs. Read the text on the Cold War and then make questions, HISTORY using the phrases in bold. The first question has been done for you. Text A The Cold War The term ‘Cold War’ is used to describe the relationship between America and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1980. It was a period of conflict, tension and rivalry between the world’s two superpowers. (1) Neither side fought the other – the consequences would be too terrible – but they did fight for their beliefs using other countries. For example, in (2) the Vietnam war in the 1960s and 1970s, (3) South Vietnam was against the Communists and supported by America. North Vietnam was pro-Communist and fought the south (4) using weapons from communist Russia or communist China. In Afghanistan, the Americans supplied the Afghans with weapons after (5) the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. They never physically involved themselves and so avoided direct conflict with the Soviet Union. 1. Did America and the Soviet Union fight each other? 2. When was ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________? 3. Which country did the USA ____________________________________________________________________? 4. Which countries supplied weapons ______________________________________________________________? 5. When did the Soviet Union ______________________________________________________________________? • This page has been downloaded from www.onestopclil.com. 1 of 2 Written by Howard Tennant. © Copyright Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2008. FROM WEBSITE •PHOTOCOPIABLECAN BE DOWNLOADED HISTORY 2. In pairs read this text on McCarthyism and make the questions. Text B McCarthyism (1) The term ‘McCarthyism’ refers to a period of strong anti-communist suspicion in the USA that lasted from the late 1940s to the late 1950s.
    [Show full text]
  • You, Me, and Charlie Wilson's War George Crile's Charlie Wilson's War, the Tale of the Defeat of the Soviet
    SPECIAL SECTION: You, Me, and Charlie Wilson's War George Crile's Charlie Wilson's War, the tale of the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (which led directly to its subsequent unraveling), is quite simply the most extraordinary non- fiction potboiler I have ever read. And, perhaps surprisingly, it has lessons for you and me from Congressman Wilson and his CIA cohort, Gust Avrakotos: (1) Make friends with the ... "Invisible 95%." Gust Avrakotos apparently knew every "top floor" CIA executive secretary by name—and had helped many of them sort out personal or professional problems. The folks in the mailroom and in the bowels of the computer operations affairs were also the subject of Gust's intense and affectionate attentions. In effect, you could say that Gust was Commander-in-Chief of the "Invisible 95%" of the Agency—which allowed him to make extraordinary things happen despite furious resistance from his bosses and bosses' bosses sitting atop a very rigid organization. (2) Create a Networker-Doer Partnership. Congressman Wilson had the networking part down, but he needed help with the doing. Conversely, if you are the doer, then you must find the politician-networker. (3) Carefully manage the BOF/Balance Of Favors. Practice potlatch—giving so much help to so many people on so many occasions (purposeful overkill!) that there is little issue about their supporting you when the (rare!) time comes to call in the chits. (4) Follow the money! "Anybody with a brain can figure out that if they can get on the Defense subcommittee, that's where they ought to be—because that's where the money is."—Charlie Wilson (5) Found material.
    [Show full text]
  • Trend Analysis the Israeli Unit 8200 an OSINT-Based Study CSS
    CSS CYBER DEFENSE PROJECT Trend Analysis The Israeli Unit 8200 An OSINT-based study Zürich, December 2019 Risk and Resilience Team Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study Author: Sean Cordey © 2019 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich Contact: Center for Security Studies Haldeneggsteig 4 ETH Zurich CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland Tel.: +41-44-632 40 25 [email protected] www.css.ethz.ch Analysis prepared by: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich ETH-CSS project management: Tim Prior, Head of the Risk and Resilience Research Group, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Deputy Head for Research and Teaching; Andreas Wenger, Director of the CSS Disclaimer: The opinions presented in this study exclusively reflect the authors’ views. Please cite as: Cordey, S. (2019). Trend Analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study. Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. 1 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study . Table of Contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Historical Background 5 2.1 Pre-independence intelligence units 5 2.2 Post-independence unit: former capabilities, missions, mandate and techniques 5 2.3 The Yom Kippur War and its consequences 6 3 Operational Background 8 3.1 Unit mandate, activities and capabilities 8 3.2 Attributed and alleged operations 8 3.3 International efforts and cooperation 9 4 Organizational and Cultural Background 10 4.1 Organizational structure 10 Structure and sub-units 10 Infrastructure 11 4.2 Selection and training process 12 Attractiveness and motivation 12 Screening process 12 Selection process 13 Training process 13 Service, reserve and alumni 14 4.3 Internal culture 14 5 Discussion and Analysis 16 5.1 Strengths 16 5.2 Weaknesses 17 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 18 7 Glossary 20 8 Abbreviations 20 9 Bibliography 21 2 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study selection tests comprise a psychometric test, rigorous Executive Summary interviews, and an education/skills test.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kgb in Afghanistan
    THE KGB IN AFGHANISTAN RALPH PICKARD Figure 1: A display case of a KGB officer’s grouping showing his known Soviet and Afghanistan medals and award booklets earned during his service in the KGB. There has been much written over the years about the intent of stabilizing the Afghan government from the history of the Soviet forces occupation of Afghanistan deterioration that was occurring throughout the region and during the Cold War. However, less has been written especially the souring relationship with the government from the collecting community perspective about the prior to December 1979. The Soviet forces’ intent was Afghanistan medals and award booklets that were earned to seize all important Afghan government facilities and by Soviet personnel during that same time period. The other important areas.1 Within days after the Soviet forces intent of this article is to shed a little light on a few of invasion into Afghanistan and occupation of the capital the Afghanistan medals that were awarded during the of Kabul, the Afghanistan President was assassinated Cold War through a unique group that belonged to a and replaced with the more pro-Soviet government of KGB officer (Figure 1). This grouping provides strong President, Babrak Karmal, who had promised his loyalty indications that this officer served multiple tours and earlier to the Soviet government. 2,3,4 continued to operate in Afghanistan even after February 1989. However, prior to illustrating more about the group Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets the in this article, a brief overview of the Soviet invasion and two governments had an ongoing relationship dating back available history of the KGB in Afghanistan during the to the early 1920s with Soviet advisors and technicians Cold War will be presented.
    [Show full text]
  • Robert M. Gates, Ph.D
    Robert M. Gates, Ph.D. Secretary of Defense (2006-2011); Author, New York Times Best Seller, DUTY: Memoirs of a Cuyahoga Community College Secretary at War and A Passion for Leadership Cuyahoga Community College (Tri-C®) is a regional leader in public education, academic Robert Gates served as the 22nd secretary of defense (2006-2011) and is the only secretary innovation and cultural enrichment. For more than 55 years, the College has tailored its of defense in U.S. history to be asked to remain in that office by a newly elected President. curriculum to meet changing workforce demands, helping individuals qualify for work in the President Barack Obama is the eighth president Gates has served. He previously served under job market’s most sought-after fields. With six Centers of Excellence and more than 140 career, President George W. Bush. technical and liberal arts programs, Tri-C empowers students by providing clear pathways On Gates’ last day in office, President Barack Obama awarded him the Presidential Medal of to degree and certificate completion. Tri-C has helped more than 900,000 students toward Freedom, America’s highest civilian honor. meaningful careers or advanced education, and more than 85 percent of Tri-C graduates Before becoming secretary of defense in 2006, Gates was the president of Texas A&M University, continue to live in the area, providing a pool of skilled workers that includes nurses, teachers, the nation’s seventh largest university. Prior to assuming the Texas A&M presidency on August medical technicians, firefighters, engineers, police officers and business professionals.
    [Show full text]
  • North Korea's Political System*
    This article was translated by JIIA from Japanese into English as part of a research project to promote academic studies on the international circumstances in the Asia-Pacific. JIIA takes full responsibility for the translation of this article. To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your personal use and research, please contact JIIA by e-mail ([email protected]) Citation: International Circumstances in the Asia-Pacific Series, Japan Digital Library (March 2016), http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/korean_peninsula.php Series: Korean Peninsula Affairs North Korea’s Political System* Takashi Sakai** Introduction A year has passed since the birth of the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea following the sudden death of General Secretary Kim Jong-il in December 2011. During the early days of the regime, many observers commented that all would not be smooth sailing for the new regime, citing the lack of power and previ- ous experience of the youthful Kim Jong-un as a primary cause of concern. However, on the surface at least, it now appears that Kim Jong-un is now in full control of his powers as the “Guiding Leader” and that the political situation is calm. The crucial issue is whether the present situation is stable and sustain- able. To consider this issue properly, it is important to understand the following series of questions. What is the current political structure in North Korea? Is the political structure the same as that which existed under the Kim Jong-il regime, or have significant changes occurred? What political dynamics are at play within this structure? Answering these questions with any degree of accuracy is not an easy task.
    [Show full text]
  • IDF Special Forces – Reservists – Conscientious Objectors – Peace Activists – State Protection
    Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: ISR35545 Country: Israel Date: 23 October 2009 Keywords: Israel – Netanya – Suicide bombings – IDF special forces – Reservists – Conscientious objectors – Peace activists – State protection This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Please provide information on suicide bombs in 2000 to January 2002 in Netanya. 2. Deleted. 3. Please provide any information on recruitment of individuals to special army units for “chasing terrorists in neighbouring countries”, how often they would be called up, and repercussions for wanting to withdraw? 4. What evidence is there of repercussions from Israeli Jewish fanatics and Arabs or the military towards someone showing some pro-Palestinian sentiment (attending rallies, expressing sentiment, and helping Arabs get jobs)? Is there evidence there would be no state protection in the event of being harmed because of political opinions held? RESPONSE 1. Please provide information on suicide bombs in 2000 to January 2002 in Netanya. According to a 2006 journal article published in GeoJournal there were no suicide attacks in Netanya during the period of 1994-2000. No reports of suicide bombings in 2000 in Netanya were found in a search of other available sources.
    [Show full text]
  • The Vietnam War 47
    The Vietnam War 47 Chapter Three The Vietnam War POSTWAR DEMOBILIZATION By the end of 1945, the Army and Navy had demobilized about half their strength, and most of the rest was demobilized in 1946. Millions of men went home, got jobs, took advantage of the new Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (commonly known as the “GI Bill,” passed in 1944), got married, and started the “baby boom.” Just as in the period following victory in World War I, few Americans paid much attention to national defense. The newly created Department of Defense (formed in the 1947 merger of the War Department and the Navy Department) faced several concurrent tasks: demobilizing the troops; selling off surplus equipment, land, and buildings; and calculating what defense forces the United States actually needed. The govern- ment adopted a postwar defense policy of containing communism, centered on supporting the governments of foreign countries struggling against internal communists. In its early stages, containment called for foreign aid (both military and economic) and limited numbers of military advisers. The Army drew down to only a few divisions, mostly serving occupation duty in Germany and Japan, and most at two-thirds strength. So few men were volunteering for the military that, in 1948, Congress restored a peacetime draft. The world began looking like a more dangerous place when the Soviets cut off land access to Berlin and backed a coup in Czechoslovakia that replaced a coalition government with a communist one. Such events, in addition to the campaign led by Senator Joe Mc- Carthy to expose any possible American communists, stoked fears of a world- wide communist movement.
    [Show full text]
  • International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION Vol
    International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION Vol. XXIII No 1 2017 RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS CONCERNING THE USE OF OUTSOURCING SERVICES IN THE BULGARIAN ARMED FORCES Nikolay NICHEV “Vasil Levski“ National Military University, Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria [email protected] Abstract: Outsourcing services in the armed forces are a promising tool for reducing defence spending which use shall be determined by previously made accurate analysis of peacetime and wartime tasks of army structures. The decision to implement such services allows formations of Bulgarian Army to focus on the implementation of specific tasks related to their combat training. Outsourcing is a successful practice which is applied both in the armies of the member states of NATO and in the Bulgarian Army. Using specialized companies to provide certain services in formations provides a reduction in defence spending, access to technology and skills in terms of financial shortage. The aim of this paper is to analyse main outsourcing risks that affect the relationship between the military formation of the Bulgarian army, the structures of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria and service providers, and to assess those risks. The basic steps for risk management in outsourcing activities are determined on this base. Keywords: outsourcing, risk management, outsourcing risk 1. Introduction It is measured by its impact and the Outsourcing is an effective tool to generate probability of occurrence, and its new revenue, and the risks that may arise, management is the process of identifying, draw our attention to identifying the main analysing, evaluating, monitoring, types of outsourcing risks. This requires the countering and reporting the risks that may focus of current research on studying and affect the achievement of the objectives of evaluating the possibility of the occurrence an organisation and the implementation of of such risks, and the development of a the necessary control activities in order to system for risks management on this basis.
    [Show full text]
  • Unit 6 Light EXPLORE
    EXPLORE Unit Six: Unit Six: Light Table of Contents Light Interdisciplinary Unit of Study I. Unit Snapshot ............................................................................................ 2 II. Introduction ............................................................................................... 4 NYC DOE III. Unit Framework ......................................................................................... 6 IV. Ideas for Learning Centers ......................................................................... 10 V. Foundational and Supporting Texts ...........................................................24 VI. Inquiry and Critical Thinking Questions for Foundational Texts ................. 26 VII. Sample Weekly Plan................................................................................. 29 VIII. Student Work Samples .............................................................................. 35 IX. Supporting Resources ............................................................................... 37 X. Foundational Learning Experiences: Lesson Plans ..................................... 38 XI. Appendices ...............................................................................................54 The enclosed curriculum units may be used for educational, non- profit purposes only. If you are not a Pre-K for All provider, send an email to [email protected] to request permission to use this curriculum or any portion thereof. Please indicate the name and location of your school
    [Show full text]