Being Privileged Overseas: Some Observations on Taiwanese People in Jakarta Ping LIN Associate professor at Dept. of Political Science, National Chung Cheng University in Taiwan Email: [email protected] 1 Being Privileged Overseas: Some Observations on Taiwanese People in Jakarta Introduction Due to rising production costs in Taiwan in the 1980s, many Taiwanese firms have moved to China or Southeast Asia (Tseng 2000; Chen and Ku 2004). This trend of firm relocation caused many Taiwanese people to move to China or Southeast Asia as entrepreneurs, firm managers, or accompanying family members (Ku 2006; Tseng 2011; Lin 2013; Tseng and Lin 2014). While studies concerning the Taiwanese in China have expanded from a focus on firm relocation to population movement, studies on the Taiwanese in Southeast Asia are still underdeveloped. Limited studies are concentrated on the strategies of firm management and they pay little attention to the daily lives of people (Chen, Jou and Hsiao 2004, 2008). How Taiwanese people live in the countries of Southeast Asia is not clear. This pilot study is based on my fieldwork in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2015. Through conducting interviews and participant observation of Taiwanese people affiliated with the Jakarta Taipei School (hereafter JTS), I argue that a certain number of Taiwanese people live their lives as ‘privileged migrants’ in Jakarta. Most respondents had high level of quality of life. Those who marry rich Chinese-Indonesians live at a status which is higher than that available to them in Taiwan. The preliminary findings reported in this article will be further examined in a research project on the interaction between three ethnic Chinese groups (Chinese-Indonesian businessmen, businessmen from Mainland China, and businessmen from Taiwan) in Indonesia. Literature Review In this section, I first review the studies on privileged migration. Then I briefly review the relationship between Taiwan and Indonesia. Finally, I put forth several questions regarding Taiwanese people in Indonesia, which will be addressed in the rest of this article. Privileged Migration Most studies on international migration concentrate on the movement from the Global South to Global North, i.e. people moving from less to more developed countries. These studies argue that international migration consists of people moving to developed countries to benefit from the economic returns overseas (Massey 1998; 2 Massey et al. 1993). Therefore, people who move to developing countries are usually regarded as “tourists” or “foreigners”, thus implying a short period of stay in the host countries. However, this migration/tourism dichotomy is problematic. Some people might move as tourists in the beginning, but gradually settle down overseas. Some others may return home after living overseas for years or decades (O’Reilly 2000; Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014). Therefore, some studies refer to people who move to less developed countries (as students, tourists, etc.) as “privileged migrants” or “lifestyle migrants”, a term which means that these people are more resourceful and occupy a higher social status than the people of the host countries. The lifestyles of privileged migrants are usually different from those of labour migrants (Amit 2007; O’Reilly and Benson 2009; Croucher 2012). This “reverse migration” is not new, but little discussed. Some studies have explored the lives of Europeans in Africa during the colonial period (Kirkwood 1984; Callaway 1987). Some have discussed European expatriates and their family members in the Middle East or East Asia (Tremayne 1984; Yeoh and Khoo 1998; Fechter 2007; Beaverstock 2002; Tzeng 2010). Some others have concentrated on multi-types of movement, such as religious pilgrims, tourists, criminals, and retired migrants, between certain countries as, for example, from the UK to Spain, from the US to Mexico, and from Europe to India (O’Reilly 2000; Oliver 2008; Croucher 2009; Korpela 2009). Although most migrants in these studies are just ordinary people in their home countries, they are more resourceful than most people in the host countries. Some studies argue that the lives of these privileged migrants are partially affected by the relative position of countries in the global hierarchical structure. Due to the advanced position of the home countries, migrants’ limited knowledge and skills are highly appreciated by people of the host countries. Therefore, these migrants obtain better jobs, occupy higher social status, and have more comfortable lives than most people of the home countries (Benson and Osbaldiston 2014). Apart from the material benefits and higher social status, some studies argue that these migrants often have certain lifestyle expectations towards the host countries. By means of a move to a less developed country, people could have their dreams come true easily (O’Reilly and Benson 2009; Benson and Osbaldiston 2014; Croucher 2012). Indonesia, Chinese-Indonesian, and Taiwan 3 Indonesia did not come into existence as a country until the end of WWII 1. The physical boundaries of Indonesia were established by the Netherlands when the Dutch took over many islands and made them a single colony (Vickers 2013). Although the number of Chinese people was limited, most Chinese people acted as a “middle-man minority” between the Dutch and the native Indonesians in business (such as the sugar and tea industries) and tax collection. Therefore, it is believed that the average Chinese person was far better off than the average Indonesian (Skinner 1958; Wilmott 1960; Mackie and Coppel 1976; Blusse 1988) during the colonial period. In the 20th century, the Chinese people organised their own societies (i.e. Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, the Chinese Association, hereafter THHK), schools (i.e. THHK School), newspapers (i.e. Sin Po), and political parties (i.e. Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, PTI) (Suryadinata 1972, 1976; Coppel 1976; Hoon 2008). Nowadays, Indonesia is the fourth-largest country with 2 to 3 per cent ethnic Chinese (Mackie 2005: Suryadinata 2008) 2. Indonesia has turned slowly towards democracy since the granting of its independence in 1950. It was ruled by various political models: Parliamentary Democracy (1950–1958, power shared by the President Soekarno and the elite members of parliament), Guided Democracy (1958–1965, power dominated by the President Soekarno), New Order (1965–1998, power dominated by the President Soeharto), and Reform Era (1998–present, power reshuffling through regular elections). Therefore, the Indonesian government adopted various policies towards their international and domestic affairs. It adopted flexible policies to incorporate the Chinese people in the first two stages, but many Indonesian-born Chinese people still rejected being incorporated (i.e. rejected Indonesian citizenship) (Mackie and Coppel 1976; Suryadinata 1993; Skinner 1996). During the period of New Order, the Indonesian government adopted restricted policies towards the Chinese people. All Chinese schools, newspapers, and societies 1 To be more precisely, there existed several monarchies before colonial control by the Dutch, such as Srivijaya in the 9th century and Madjapahit in the 14 century. Although Sukarno proclaimed Indonesia independence on August 17 in 1945, the Dutch returned to Indonesia after the end of WWII. Then the Dutch organised a federated state to confront Sukarno. After a series of wars and negotiations, the Dutch eventually agreed to hand over sovereignty to Indonesia on December 27 in 1949 (Vickers 2013). 2 It is difficult to estimate how many Indonesians are ethnic Chinese. Because of the assimilation policy in 1960s-1990s, some Chinese-Indonesians may reject to identify themselves as ethnic Chinese. Therefore, the number of ethnic Chinese varies in different studies. An article even suggested that the number of ethnic Chinese declined from 1.60 per cent (3.22 million) in 2000 to 1.18 percent (2.57 million) in 2005 (Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar 2008). 4 were forced to close. However, the socio-economic gap between the native Indonesians and the Chinese-Indonesians was wide even after three decades of assimilation (Suryadinata 1993; Susanto 2011). In 1996, 26 of the top 30 Indonesian firms were controlled by Chinese-Indonesian tycoons (Coppel 2008; Chua 2008). Some violence was targeted toward the ethnic Chinese because of this socio- economic inequality. Chinese-Indonesians are usually regarded as powerless in politics, but powerful in the economy (Bertrand 2004; Purdey 2006; Coppel 2008). The fall of Soeharto in 1998 brought more space for the development of Chinese culture and Chinese schools, newspapers, and societies were gradually allowed again in the 2000s. Some Chinese-Indonesians also joined the election campaigns. Although Chinese-Indonesians are recognised the same as the native Indonesians, the integration between them is still unsuccessful (Hoon 2008; Suryadinata 2008; Soebagio 2008; Dieleman, Koning and Post 2011; Setijadi 2013). Additionally, in spite of the fact that Chinese-Indonesians originated from the Chinese mainland, official interaction between Dutch Indonesia and Imperial China was limited (Blusse 2006). Interaction between Java and Taiwan can be traced to the 17th century, when both were partially controlled by the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, the Dutch East India Company). This relationship intensified in 1942– 1945 when both islands were controlled by Japan, and at which time Indonesia and Taiwan exchanged some raw materials such as sugar,