An Inter-Disciplinary Study of Learning in the 32nd Division on the Western Front, 1916-1918 by Stuart Bruce Taylor Mitchell Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, 2013 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract The idea of a learning process has become broadly accepted among military historians of the First World War, but explanations for how and why this occurred remain limited. This thesis uses a number of different disciplines alongside more orthodox historical analysis of what the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) did at the divisional level to learn the lessons from combat in an uncompromising operational environment. At the beginning of 1916 the BEF was predominantly a citizen army lacking experience. This marked a low-point in the BEF's fighting capabilities. This thesis charts the development from 1916 to the Armistice in 1918 using the British 32nd Division as a case study. The division participated in a number of major operations including the Battle of the Somme, the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, the Battles of Nieuport, Passchendaele, Amiens and the Hundred Days. They experienced both success and failure ensuring they are a representative case from which to draw broader conclusions. This thesis argues that the BEF's learning process developed as structural improvement occurred, battle experience was gained and leadership improved. 1 Contents Page Abstract 1 Contents 2 Abbreviations 4 Introduction 7 Part I The Divisional Structure and Learning Chapter One: Command Structure and Learning: Edwardian and Modern 28 1.1 Ethos, Command and Structure 30 1.2 Modern Frameworks 43 Chapter Two: Structure on the Somme, A Case Study: 1-16 July 1916 50 2.1 Planning 1 July 1916 51 2.2 Structure and Command during the Battle 61 2.3 Appraising the Battle 73 Chapter Three: Perfecting the System 88 3.1 Liaison with the French 1916-1918 88 3.2 Divisional Structure and Learning in 1917 and 1918 96 3.3 Conclusion 121 Part II Battle Wisdom Chapter Four: Battle Wisdom 125 4.1 Definitions and Theory 125 4.2 Examples of Battle Wisdom 136 4.3 Disobedience 144 4.4 An Evolutionary Process 165 4.5 Conclusion 167 Part III The Role of Leadership in Learning and Fighting Performance 2 Chapter Five: Leadership and Learning: Theory, Context and Characteristics 170 5.1 Leadership: The Theories: Classical, Contemporary and Modern 171 5.2 A Case Study in Leadership and Learning: Cameron Shute Context and 191 Characteristics Chapter Six: Learning and Leadership: Intellectual Understanding and Influence 209 6.1 Personal Command System 209 6.2 Aims of Leadership: Identity and Cohesion 248 6.3 Shute: a Mentor, Role Model and Peer? 255 6.4 Conclusion 265 Conclusion 266 Appendix 1 Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations, 'Advice on Orders' 271 Appendix 2 Divisional Artillery Organisation 1 July 1916 272 Appendix 3 J.N. Marshall Victoria Cross Citation 273 Appendix 4 Extract from 'Duties of an Officer' 274 Appendix 5 General Cameron Deane Shute Biographical Information 276 Appendix 6 A.P. Herbert's Poem 277 Appendix 7 32nd Division Casualty Tables 278 Sources and Bibliography 280 3 Abbreviations 2/Lt Second Lieutenant AA and QMG Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General Argylls Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders ASC Army Service Corps BEF British Expeditionary Force Borders The Border Regiment CO Commanding Officer Col. Colonel Coy Company DAC Divisional Ammunition Column DHQ Divisional Headquarters Div. Division Dorsets Dorsetshire Regiment DSO Distinguished Service Order ed. Editor FSR Field Service Regulations Gds Guards Gen. General GHQ General Headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding Gordons Gordon Highlanders GSO General Staff Officer HAC Honourable Artillery Company HLI Highland Light Infantry HMSO His Majesty's Stationery Office IWM Imperial War Museum JCH Journal of Contemporary History JSCSC Joint Services Command and Staff College KOYLI King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry KRRC King's Royal Rifle Corps KSLI King's Shropshire Light Infantry LF Lancashire Fusiliers LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives Londons London Regiment 4 Loyals Loyal North Lancashire Regiment Maj. Major Maj.-Gen. Major-General Manchesters Manchester Regiment MC Military Cross MGC Machine Gun Corps MG Coy Machine Gun Company MO Medical Officer NAM National Army Museum NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NF Northumberland Fusiliers NLS National Library of Scotland OC Officer Commanding OH Official History PKCA Perth and Kinross Council Archive Queen's The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment) RA Royal Artillery RAMC Royal Army Medical Corps RE Royal Engineers RFA Royal Field Artillery RF Royal Fusiliers RFC Royal Flying Corps RGA Royal Garrison Artillery RIF Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers RMA Revolution in Military Affairs R. Scots Royal Scots R. Sussex Royal Sussex RWR Royal Warwickshire Regiment RWF Royal Welsh Fusiliers SR Scottish Rifles (Cameronians) S. Lancs South Lancashire Regiment S. Staffs South Staffordshire Regiment TMB Trench Mortar Battery TNA The National Archives Vo l . Volume VC Victoria Cross 5 WO War Office Worcesters Worcestershire Regiment W. Yorks West Yorkshire Regiment 6 Introduction How did the British Army learn on the Western Front during the First World War? That is the question that lies at the heart of this work. The concept of learning has loomed large over the historiography of the Great War yet this most fundamental question of how it actually occurred has been overshadowed by other issues. Debates have raged over the competence of senior figures, the conduct of battles and the experience of the 'everyman at war'.1 How the BEF improved has often been subsumed by these larger themes. One of the biggest impediments to the study of learning during the First World War has been the lack of common acceptance, within the Anglophone literature at least, of any development having actually taken place. Historians have often found themselves fighting on ground not of their own choosing challenging perceptions of futility, victim- hood and poetic sacrifice. Since the 1980s this has begun to change and, within the academic world at least, there is a broad acceptance of what has come to be simplistically known as the 'learning curve' concept. This has opened the way for more technical studies of the BEF between 1914 and 1918 and this thesis is intended to contribute to this growing area of study. Given the limitations of word length this work will not cover the entirety of the conflict. The changing composition of the British forces on the continent would require any broad conclusions to come with a detailed list of caveats, which might reasonably require studies unto themselves. By 1916 Britain had accepted the need for a national commitment.2 The 'Military Service Act' of January 1916 marked a watershed moment: it was the last nail in the coffin of the idea that Britain 3 could operate under the notion of 'business as usual'. Sir William Robertson in his new role as 1 The literature review will cover these schools of study in more depth; for the origin of the term 'everyman at war' see Charles Purdom, Everyman at war: sixty personal narratives of the war (London, J.M. Dent, 1930) 2 David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of the First World War (London, Allen Lane, 2004) pp.268-270 3 For an account of the introduction of the Military Service Act see Peter Simkins, Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988) pp.138-161 7 Chief of the Imperial General Staff began working out the manpower requirements and remarked: 'The only safe basis of calculation was to assume that every man in the country would sooner or later be needed for one kind of national work or another.'4 Summer 1915 had seen the blooding of the first divisions of the New Army at Hooge in Belgium, Suvla Bay on the Gallipoli peninsula, and later at the Battle of Loos. The commitment of these citizen formations would only increase in 1916. The character of the army in 1916 was markedly different from the one that set sail for France in August 1914. The largely citizen volunteer force had no experience of the scale of the battles that would face them, thus the start of this work picks up from this lowest ebb of practical experience. The tactical level of war was the pivotal level for learning. The division would have frequent opportunities to gather and implement the lessons of combat and gain experience of battle. It was at the divisional level and below that many of the tactical developments occurred, yet it remains understudied. To address this gap and provide an insight into how learning functioned the BEF's 32nd Division will be the main focus of this study. This is not a divisional history. To address the complexities of how a large organisation learns the work will draw upon a number of different scholarly disciplines. Organisational learning theory, leadership and political theory have all been considered and employed to help understand why the division was a success or failure in certain situations. This approach always carries with it the danger of unfair ex post facto judgements, so to eliminate this possibility the prevailing Edwardian understanding of these concepts, as shown through documents, doctrine and testimony, have been considered alongside any modern theories.