PERESTROIKA—A NEW STAGE IN SOVIET REFORM By GREGORY FELTON B.A. University of British Columbia, 1979 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA July 1988 (£) Gregory Felton, 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of IhuTlCA/. Sdl&Mtf The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date DE-6(3/81) i ABSTRACT Perestroika, unlike previous attempts at economic reform, represents the beginning of a new era in post-war Soviet politics. If one were to categorize the major Soviet leaders since Stalin it would be more accurate to term Khrushchev a liberal Stalinist, Brezhnev a conservative Stalinist, and Gorbachev, may be properly classified as an anti-Stalinist. Gorbachev's accession to power represents the beginning of what might be termed post-post-Stalin reform. To illustrate the uniqueness of perestroika, this thesis is structured around a comparison of Gorbachev's economic, political, and social reforms with those of Nikita Khrushchev. A contrast with Khrushchev is necessary because it is impossible to determine the uniqueness of perestroika and to draw informed conclusions about Gorbachev unless the record of the first-post Stalin reformer is examined. Because Gorbachev and Khrushchev are both reformers, it is to be expected that they should share certain common objectives. But the similarities are far less significant than the differences. The differences between Gorbachev's and Khrushchev's approaches to reform are a function both of substantive policy differences and historical circumstance. Historical Context Khrushchev came to power at a time when the Soviet Union was weak relative to the United States. Externally, the most pressing need was for the Soviet Union to achieve military parity with the United States. Internally, Khrushchev's first years were ones of struggle for absolute leadership with other Politburo figures who had differing notions of reform. The world that Brezhnev and his successors bequeathed to Gorbachev bore little resemblance to the one which Stalin left to Khrushchev. By the time of Gorbachev's accession to power, the Soviet Union had become the military equal of the United States. Political Reform Khrushchev's main objective was to weaken the power of the bureaucracy largely in order to enhance his own personal power. Gorbachev's focus is less Stalin than it is the Stalinist system. The lack of subordination of political and economic reform to the pursuit of personal one-man rule marks perestzoika as a distinct improvement over de- Stalinization. Economic Reform In economic policy, Khrushchev followed Stalin's practice of meeting economic problems with administrative measures. Although Khrushchev made his reputation by denouncing Stalin's leadership, he did nothing to address the root of the Soviet Union's troubles—the Stalinist economic system. Perestroika is theoretically superior to de-Stalinization because Gorbachev eschews administrative tinkering in favour of economic change. Gorbachev has rediscovered the co-operative socialism and limited iii tolerance for free-enterprise of the 1920s. The implication of this return to 'Leninism' is an admission that the Stalinist system is a failure. CONCLUSION The essence of Khrushchev's reforms, and their subsequent failure, can be traced to his fixation with appearance over substance. For all of his 'liberal' reforms, Khrushchev is essentially a 'Stalinist' politician. Perestzoika is superior to de-Stalinization both because of historical circumstance and substantive philosophical differences. Gorbachev's return to Leninist principles effectively ends the period of reformed Stalinism. But the objective need for reform does imply its necessary success. There are many obstacles to effecting deep change in the Soviet Union, obstacles which cannot be surmounted soon. It cannot be expected that a people will cast off the habits of a lifetime. Nonetheless, Gorbachev's reforms are rigorous and potentially longlasting, as opposed to Khrushchev's 'administrative' changes which did not really address the flaws of the Soviet system. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract Introduction: History of Reform CHAPTER I Historical Context CHAPTER II Political Reform CHAPTER III Economic Reform CHAPTER IV Conclusions Notes Bibliography 1 INTRODUCTION My purpose in writing this thesis is to demonstrate that Mikhail Gorbachev's program of perestzoika, or restructuring, marks the beginning of a new stage in post• war Soviet politics. To defend this position, I will contrast pezeatzoika with Nikita Khrushchev's de- Stalinization reforms of the 1950s and 1960s. A contrast with Khrushchev is necessary because it is impossible to draw informed conclusions about Gorbachev unless the record of the first post-Stalin reformer is examined. It is incumbent upon us, as would-be interpreters of perestroifca, to understand the theory and practice of Khrushchev's reforms in order to determine why he was ousted and to conclude therefrom what significance his political demise may mean for Gorbachev. Without an appreciation of previous reforms and the context in which such changes take place, any analysis or prognosis of pezeBtzoika is ahistorical and hence devoid of meaning. As Stephen Cohen observed,"...most Sovietological studies of conflict (over change] in post-Stalin politics lack any historical dimension, whereas much of that conflict actually grows out of—and thus cannot be fully understood apart from—the historical events...."1 To build the proper historical foundation for a discussion of perestroifca, this thesis begins with the event that inaugurated the era of de- Stalinization—the death of Joseph Stalin. Reform—A Historic Overview The fact that Stalin died in March, 1953 did not diminish the influence his criminal past and his centralized economic system had on future generations of Soviet decision-makers. With his death, the task of his successors was to reform the terroristic Stalinist political system while being careful to avoid precipitating a genuine, comprehensive debate on the Soviet system and Stalin's leadership. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization represents the first stage of post-Stalin reform. In fact, all post-Stalin reform is essentially de-Stalinization. How a leader deals with the 'Stalin question' classifies him either as a 'liberal' or 'conservative' reformer. Some might object to my use of the terms 'liberal' and 'conservative' with respect to Soviet politics. These labels have a very specific meaning in Western culture and are based upon the value-laden notions of Lockean or Burkean democracy with their attendant virtues of laissez-faire capitalism, individual rights and universal suffrage. In this thesis I employ 'liberal' and 'conservative' in the broadest sense: 'liberal' refers to a reformer who seeks to effect economic and political change. The 'liberal' reformer recognizes that economic reform requires political reform and that political reform requires a proper understanding of history. Broadly speaking, Khrushchev's 'liberalism' was based upon a willingness to expose Stalin's failures to discredit his personal rule, while leaving the basic Stalinist approach to government and economic policy intact. Ultimately, though, Khrushchev was turned out of office in 1964 by 'conservatives' who were uncomfortable with Khrushchev's unorthodoxy. The dominant characteristic of the 'conservative' leadership that followed Khrushchev was a quiet continuation of established Khrushchevian social and economic reforms at the mid-bureaucratic level, coupled with a reimposition of bureaucratic authority at the highest political level. This reimposition of bureaucratic order required an end to challenges to Soviet authority. Thus, the Brezhnev leadership terminated Khrushchev's historical revisionism in favour of the positive re-evaluation of Stalin, his cult, and his policies. This reimposition of bureaucratic authority should not be taken to mean that the post-Khrushchev leadership formally abjured reform. In fact, the Brezhnev/Kosygin era may be understood not as a struggle between reformist and anti-reformist forces, as it is often argued, but rather as a competition between two competing approaches to reform. As the reader will discover, one of the dominant themes of this thesis is the concept of reform as a constant feature of Soviet politics from 1953 to the present. It is better to think of post-Stalinist Soviet history as a sequence of leaderships dedicated to differing understandings of reform. If one were to categorize the major Soviet leaders since Stalin it would be more accurate to term Khrushchev a liberal Stalinist, Brezhnev a conservative Stalinist, and Gorbachev, may be properly classified as an anti-Stalinist. Gorbachev's accession to power represents the beginning of what might be termed post-post-Stalin reform. Because
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