Hume’s Argument Against the Miraculous and Theistic Rationality. David Hume’s argument in the seminal `Of Miracles’ concludes in stating that it is always irrational for a person to believe in the instantiation of the miraculous. Following from this Hume states that theistic belief can never be epistemically justified and that for person to do so s/he must resort to fideistic strategies.1 Hume’s argument in his essay is in fact a variegated one arguing for the irrationality of belief in any miracle and the second a group of a posteriori arguments arguing for the lack of evidence regarding past purported miracles.2 It will be the claim of the first argument on which this paper will concentrate. This paper will argue that, on the correct reading, Hume’s argument is coherent and that faith in a supernatural power may be foundationless given the assumption that the wise man is external to the events he is evaluating. However, if this assumption is not granted and the wise man is a witness to the alleged miracle then he may be epistemically justified both in his belief in the actuality of the event and his theistic convictions. It should be noted that this paper will have one major limitation. Hume, (127) argues that a “miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion”. This must include a study of the arguments of part two of his essay, which, because of space limitations is unfeasible. However, the argument in this would be much the same as the conclusion to this paper. Also, if the argument of this paper is upheld that the principle and the major theoretical obstacle to revealed religion regarding the miraculous will be overcome (Flew: 1997: 46). Hume’s argument in `Of Miracles’ is an ambiguous one and that two different readings appear feasible (Geisler, 1997: 75). The author will refer to these as the a priori and a posteriori arguments. However, prior to exploring these arguments in any detail the author will delineate Hume’s conception of the miraclulous.3 1 Elsewhere in his dialogues Hume writes that in the realm of religion “A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable resource” Humes, Dialogues concerning natural Religion cited in Charlesworth, 2002: 99). 2 These arguments are given in part two of Hume’s work. The overall argument is that no historical miracle- claim is believeable because a) people love to sensationalise and gossip about extraordinary events, b) some religious people are prepared to deceive to advance their truth-claims, c) these miracles often appear to occur in “ignorant and barborous nations” and finally d) miracles occur within the context of different miracles and are inter-mutally discredited by members of these religions. In this paper the author will refer the the a posteriori argument, however, in this paper the reader should understand that this refers to what will be shown as a alternate reading of Hume’s first argument and not one of the a posteriori delineated here. 3 There are, in the author’s opinion, serious inadequecies in Hume’s concept of Miracle. However, to establish the level of the argument’s self-referential cogency Hume’s concept of the miraculous will be be granted. 1 The fullest explication Hume, (115 n.1) gives on what constitutes a miracle is “a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent”. Immediately prior to this statement Hume, (115) noted that nothing “is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature”. Foundational to Hume’s definition is a) the belief that there are laws of Nature, b) the conviction that these laws of nature are immutable4 and, c) that the truth or falsity of the God-hypothesis is immaterial to the continued operation of these laws.5 The a priori Argument. The a priori argument against the very possibility of the miraculous can be formularised as follows: 1. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature (Hume, 114). 2. These laws have been established on the basis of “firm and unalterable experience” (Hume, 114) Therefore, 3. Miracle cannot occur.6 It is clear that for many such a syllogism has proved convincing; for instance, John Hick, (1973: 46) can declare that “if a miracle is defined as a breach of natural law, one can declare a priori that there are no miracles”. To this argument in its humean formulation, however, the author would like to posit an objection. Hume’s argument seems to beg the question. The crucial point of discussion must concern premiss 2. Since a law of nature is defined as unalterable experience and a miracle is a violation of these laws, then a miracle is a violation of what cannot be altered (Geisler, 1997: 75). Hence, were it the case that the sun not rising tomorrow were in fact a special act of God, this could still not be a miracle. Instead of the proposition X = Y (where X is the regular occurrence of the sun rising in the morning and Y is the law of nature) one could 4 Hume, (114 emphasis added) notes that “a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws”. It remains the case that one’s understanding of what these Laws actually are is mutable as the contingencies of scientific knowledge continue to advance. 5 Hume has not offered any proof that these Laws of Nature will in the future continue to determine the conditions of life. Logically the proposition ‘the sun has risen every morning for the last X millenia’ does not definitively prove that `the sun will rise tomorrow morning’. This is a logical conclusion from the first two propositions (if A and B then C). 6 Hume, (115) seems to argue this way when he writes: There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appelation [premiss 1 and 2]. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, here is a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any [a priori] miracle; nor can such a prrof be destroyed (Emphasis added). 2 justifiably posit Y = X + 1(day) because Y corresponds to regular experience.7 In short, since the very notion of an actual miracle, within the strict confines of the syllogism, is both physically and logically impossible any event that would seem be such an event necessititates a readjustment to Y for the argument to remain valid. Given that Hume has defined a miracle as a violation of natural law and secondly declared that everything that occurs in this world is determined and explained by these natural laws then the way Hume begs the question is made clear. Hume assumes the truth of metaphysical naturalism. Given that Hume’s argument is an attempt to argue for the non-ocurrence of a miracle the prior assumption that everything must be explainable by purely natural means with no space for supernatural agency is unreasonable. Of course, metaphysical naturalism may be true, however, for Hume’s argument to avoid begging the question he must at least grant that it might not be (Nash, 1997: 119-123; Reppert, 1998: paragraphs 10 -15).8 The a priori Argument and Theistic Rationality. Were it the case that the a priori argument were true then Hume would have reached a proof not only for the non-existence of the miraculous but also the non-existence of a deity that intervenes in human affairs vis-à-vis the falsity of orthodox Christianity. If laws of nature were absolute and immutable in the fashion Hume argued then claims of Jesus being born of a virgin, living on the earth as the hypostatic union of deity and humanity and rising from the dead never again to die are a priori erroneous. Reason would dictate as absurd anyone who would countenance such beliefs. The a posteriori Argument A far more significant humean argument against epistmeology of theistic belief Hume’s a posteriori argument. A distinction should here be made between the possibility of the occurrence of a miracle and the reasonableness of an agent’s belief in the occurrence of this same alleged miracle (Davis, 1993: 3; Flew, 1997: 49). Hume’s a posteriori argument is an attempt to argue that there have never been the circumstances present, and there it is unlikely that the necessary epistemic environment will ever be actualised to make belief in a 7 Of course Y in this context is not synonymous with a law of nature but rather humanity’s understanding what are the laws of nature. It would be the case that the agents would understand X + 1 better corresponds to Y than X did. 8 Metaphysical naturalism is defined as the a priori exclusion of any supernatural entity whereas methodological naturalism is taken to refer to the reasonable presumption against a supernatural incursion into the natural. 3 particular miracle reasonable. Given the question-begging present in the a priori argument, one may restate the first two premises as follows: 4. A miracle is by definition uncommon and not in accord with natural law. 5. Natural Law is the description of regular occurrences. Premiss (4) solves the previous question-begging flaw in the a priori argument by admitting the theoretical possibility of the miraculous.9 Likewise, premiss (5) maintains that collective human experience is important for discovering the nature and content of natural laws.