HISTORY EXTENSION Major Essay: Account for the changing attitudes of historians towards Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg over time in evaluating him as a “heroic historical figure”. Synopsis When we cast our minds back to the totalitarian nature of the Nazi regime that was present in Germany prior to and during the Second World War, the layman can be forgiven for believing that the German population all advocated the policies of the National Socialists. Upon a little more research, however, one can find that this was not in fact the case. Large factions of the German populace at this time in fact condemned the Nazi rule, in one form or another. Whether this be through political or passive resistance, religious or moral resistance, or stronger, military resistance as demonstrated by groups such as the Kreisau circle and those involved in the 1944 July Plot, resistance to Hitler was always there and at the forefront of German societal issues at this time. As we are aware, the Gestapo was swift to eliminate all forms of active resistance to Hitler through the use of shear force, and so the for the activity of military resistance of Stauffenberg and company to go unnoticed up until the bomb plot in July 1944 is something of a minor miracle. In this essay, ongoing diffidence between the attitudes of historians towards Colonel Stauffenberg and his actions on July 20 1944 shall be accounted for, in evaluating Stauffenberg as a “heroic historical figure”. Concepts such as residual Nazism and Prussian militarism, post war mentalities, and more modern, media, entertainment and financially driven perspectives shall be used to account for the shift in opinion not only over time, but also across international perspectives. This will lead to the casting of an evaluative judgement based on research of primary and secondary knowledge, made throughout the investigative process. Account for the changing attitudes of historians towards Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg over time in evaluating him as a “heroic historical figure. As with any event that holds cultural, national, or indeed emotional significance in the minds of those that follow, the historical view of Colonel Stauffenberg leading up to and including the infamous July plot of 1944i, and particularly the attitudes of those historians studying it, is one filled with intrigue, ongoing debate and relative historical ambiguity. Historians debate whether Stauffenberg can legitimately be described as a “heroic historical figure” for his actions leading up to the attempted assassination attempt on Hitler and whether the “failed” assassination attempt in July 1944 was a success or not. This disparity in opinion has, following observation of a range of sources, generally varied depending on a number of factors such as the nationality and political perspective of the historian, and in the case of German historians, civil boundaries including those of East and West Germany, the period in which they are writing and recording, and the general aim of the historian. All of these factors, we can see, are an amalgamation of the historians perspective and context, which is by and large what comes to shape, and in doing so, account for the changing attitudes of historians over time towards Stauffenberg and his co-conspirators. If we consider the conspirators primary aim to be the assassination of Hitler, the plot and ensuing coup de etatii was indeed, a direct failure. This seems to be a popular view among a number of key resistance commentators. This denigration of the military resistance and Operation Valkyrieiii stems mainly from early West German intelligentsiaiv, from which emerged a strand of residual Nazism following the end of the war. This attitude also tends to take into account that, by July 1944, the war for Germany was lost effectively and as a result, the Resistance should be viewed as serving no particular purpose. Ernst Graml noted in his 1970 account of the resistance: “German resistance to Hitler and National Socialism is still a highly controversial subject … marred by political controversy between the two Germanies which have emerged from the war – West German historians … and prominent British historians…consider the whole German opposition to Hitler highly overrated.”1 It is through this early impression of the resistance, and in particular the actions of the Valkyrie plot, that we can begin to observe, and make tentative links between this disparaging attitude, and the maintenance of Prussian militarism in Germany following the war. Preserved by the public nature of Adolf Hitler, many Germans, particularly industrialist, business orientated Junkersv still held the traditional priority of a military state. This in turn, granted substance to the nationalist belief that regardless of moral nature, such resistance, particularly of the scale of the July Plot, constitutes high treason, and is therefore fundamentally wrong, and in turn to be considered a highly punishable offense. This attitude is echoed in the writing of the German historian Joachim Fest, who in 1996 wrote: “Foremost among the many reasons for this diffidence is the feeling – one deeply rooted in Germany’s authoritarian heritage –that the opposition committed treason by abandoning the German people to its collective fate at a critical moment.”2 And thus we can maintain that in this way, many of those who hold this attitude judged Stauffenberg not as a hero, but in fact a villain, particularly because of his “…abandoning the German people to its collective fate at a critical moment”. As a result, we can see that the maintenance of “Germany’s authoritarian heritage” and indeed, strands of Prussian militarismvi in German society can be deemed accountable in shaping the attitudes of early commentators and writers of resistance literature, particularly in West Germany. Graml also seems to indicate certain scepticism of Stauffenberg between British historians. While Graml was writing in the 1970’s, an exemplar of his indication is Richard Evans, who is currently working as a history professor at Cambridge University. Evans is a known source of resistance criticism, and so holds the view that Stauffenberg was ultimately a historical failure. In an article written for a German newsletter Der Zeit, Evans writes: “In failing, he (Stauffenberg) failed comprehensively…Anti-democratic, elitist and nationalist, he had nothing to offer the politics of the coming generations, still less the politics of today…Germany’s honour was not rescued…As a moral gesture, Stauffenberg’s bomb was wholly inadequate to balance out the crimes that had been committed in Germany’s name.”3 While seemingly in agreement with the aforementioned West German intelligentsia that emerged from the war, Evans tends to move away from Stauffenberg’s act as one of treason (as a result of his international perspectivevii which lacks German nationalism), and instead has moved the issue forward in its complexity. A common standpoint for pro-resistance writers is one that considers the plot to be a moral gesture; determined to point out that the bomb was more than just simply to kill Adolf Hitler, but rather one that would (as Evan’s points out) “balance out the crimes that had been committed in Germany’s name”. Commentators move to demonstrate that what Stauffenberg did, was inform people on an international stage, that not all German’s were willing to follow the disastrous actions of war on Hitler’s terms. Evans denies Stauffenberg of his “moral gesture”, under the pretence that not only did the plot fail to kill Hitler, but the mass liquidationviii of Jews, partisans, and other societal groups was not able to be stabilised in the minds of internationals by one single bomb. For the most part, this assumption proved true for many internationals, most likely as a result of remaining stigmas surrounding Germany following the war. In a similar way to the Prussian militarists, the international commentary emerging from the war regarding Stauffenberg and the 1 The German Resistance to Hitler, Hermann Graml, Introduction page vii 2 Plotting Hitler’s Death, Joachim Fest, Preface page 3 3 Richard Evans – ‘Why did Stauffenberg plant the bomb? Die Zeit 2009 resistance was one of scepticism and militaristic amateurism. Regardless of personal values, Stauffenberg was an officer in the Wehrmachtix alongside many of his co-conspirators such as Henning von Tresckow, Ludwig Beck, Philipp von Boeselager, Hans Oster, Freidrich Goerdeler and Ulrich von Hassell and the other members of the July Plot. As a result, Stauffenberg was to be held accountable for his actions which, as aforementioned, constituted high treason, and demonstrated a lack of military discipline. Despite this, we can observe a gradual shift in beliefs, as a result of movement away from war mentality over the years since Stauffenberg’s actions. He now has a memorial in Berlinx, in the square in which his summary execution was held, has been the subject of a Hollywood film, as well as countless documentaries. Because the world moves into somewhat of a media and film driven ‘neo-romantic’ period, what has resulted is the glorification of historical figures, with emphasis on the positive, dramatic, and courageous actions of subjects, in order to facilitate entertainment of the masses and drive financial gain. In response to Richard Evan’s claims in the mentioned article, a German historian by the name of Karl Heinz Bohrer made a scathing attack on the words of Evans. He countered Evan’s work with this: “Unclear in his argumentation, Evans continues to play off "military" against "moral" motivation until he collapses into self-contradiction. While, on the one hand, he talks about Stauffenberg being "motivated more by military than by moral considerations" in the next paragraph he talks about his "moral conviction" so as to distinguish him from the other conspirators.”4 A number of present day historians also follow this mentality, of which a certain Peter Hoffmann has become somewhat of a canon on the subject.