~t\ 1A'J ~~ I~. Independent Boord of Inquiry Into Informal Repression Phone (011) 403-3256/7 Fox [011) 403-1366 REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO INFORMAL REPRESSION FOR THE MONTH OF MAY 1991 - I. INTRODUCTION: The government sponsored peace summit held in Pretoria on May 24 and 25 seems to have had little impact on the current violence wracking the Reef. On the eve of the summit two gunmen wearing masks and balaclavas opened fire on patrons at a beer hall in Sebokeng killing 13 people. Despite this and further attacks on residents in Pimville on Friday May 24, there is hope that a "bridging initiative" by the former moderator Professor Johan Heyns of the Nederduitse Gereformde Kerk (NGK) and South African Council of Churches (SACC) general secretary the Reverend Frank Chikane will bring all parties to a second summit. The two men received the go-ahead from president FW de Klerk and ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela to launch a broad-based cleric initiative. Information has corne to light which may lead to a further breakthrough into the investigations surrounding the South African Police (SAP) C1 unit based at Vlakplaas. Ronald Bezuidenhout , who claims to be an ex- security police BOARD MEMBERS Prof L Ackermann, Dr Allan Boesak, Dr Alex Boraine, Rt Rev Dr Monos Buthelezi, Mrs Judy Chalmers. Dr Fronk Chlkane. Dr Max Coleman, Mr Bnan Currin, Mrs Sheena Duncan. Mr Peter Horns, Mr Enc Malob!. Br Jude Pieterse, Archbishop Desmond Tulu r •• -2- sergeant has furnished the Board's attorneys and the Vrye Weekblad with more information about this unit. Amongst other allegations Bezuidenhout claims that he knows who built and sent the walkman device which was originally aimed at former police captain Dirk Coetzee, but which ultimately killed Johannesburg attorney Bheki Mlangeni. May has also seen the first public acknowledgement by an Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) official that certain members have been responsible for attacks on train commuters travelling on the Soweto-Johannesburg line. stezi Lamula , chairperson of the IFP's Mapetla, Soweto branch said in an address to an IFP youth Brigade Rally at George Goch Stadium: "Comrades, I wish to register the organisations displeasure about the harassment of poor commuters on the trains travelling between Johannesburg and Soweto. We are aware of such members and they themselves know to well, that this is causing disturbing undertones. We have been told that when these members find that a commuter does not belong to Inkatha or speaks any other language than Zulu, they become unnecessary victims of attack - in some instances such commuters were thrown through train windows." Lamula went on to say that such actions were not offi c i a l I FP policy particularly in light of the fact that the IFP is open to 1 -3- all people regardless of colour, religion, race or creed. Lamula also promised that action would be taken against such people and that they will be dealt with "decisively" (Sunday Times Extra 26/05/1991). A warning by the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in late April that there would be an escalation of violence in the period running up to the May 9 ultimatum - the deadline the tri-partite alliance had set the government to deal with the internecine violence or face suspension of constitutional negotiations - proved valid. On April 28, only a day after the warning 10 people were killed in Soweto when mourners attending the funeral of assassinated Diepkloof mayor and IFP member Moses Khumalo attacked residents in the Meadowlands area. After protracted negotiations with both the ANC and the IFP, president FW de Klerk announced a ban on assegaais in unrest areas where curfews have been implemented. However, official exemptions can be granted to carry them at genuine cultural gatherings. This fell short of the ANC's demand that r , -4- spears be banned throughout the country. The "cultural" "traditional" weapons issue and the ANC's claim that the government has failed to stop the violence led to the ANC suspending negotiations with the government on May 18 1991. Hostels are once again in the news particularly in light of the ANC's demand that hostels be dismantled. This demand has been interpreted by many as being an open invitation for conflict. A KwaZulu cabinet minister BV Ndlovu addressing a large gathering of hostel dwellers in Natal said: "The ANC is seeking confrontation with Zulu's through its demand that the hostels be dismantled". Attorney Nicholas Haysom, one of the 13 attorneys mandated by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) to accompany police on a raid of Inkatha supporting hostels earlier this month said : "The incitement to violence is cultivated by playing not only to ethnic chauvinism but by a real sense of insecurity among hostel dwellers." It is this insecurity and fears that their homes would be demolished that led to some of the worst violence in Alexandra in March (See March 1991 report). Several surveys on the violence have been released in the past month. A survey r eleased by the c ommunity Agency for Social Enquiry (Case) said that in a total of 338 reported -5- instances of violence, responsibility was attributed to a particular organisation by the media and monitoring organisations in 146 cases. Inkatha was held responsible for 66 percent of the attributed acts of aggression. The ANC in contrast was attributed with responsibility for 6 percent of acts of aggression. The statistics cover the Reef Violence from July 22 1990 to May 1991. In 92 of the 146 actions which have been attributed to specific organisations by the media and monitoring groups, the use of particular weapons was attributed by the media to either IFP supporters or ANC supporters. Fifty-one firearms which includes AK 47's or explosives were attributed to Inkatha, two to the ANC. Twenty one traditional weapons were attributed to Inkatha three to the ANC. In 10 cases other weapons like pangas, axes petrol bombs and necklaces were attributed to Inkatha and five to the ANC. The survey has however been criticised by the executive director of the Inkatha Institute, Gavin Woods. He said that Case had a politically partisan reputation and that the "analysis was superficial and distorted. From a scientific point of view it appears that no criterion, instrument or analyst validity was carried out, therefore the inevitable level of subjectivity -6- associated with content analysis features strongly,". He said that empirical research done by the Inkatha Institute and independent observers had corroborated the claim that Inkatha supporters' status was incidental to the ethnic identity of the Zulu hostel dweller (Business Day 21/5/1991). Research by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIIR) clearly indicates as does the Case survey that knives and pangas are not the only weapons being used. "Attacks with petrol bombs and hand grenades are in fact more frequent, while firearms are top of the list. Indeed, firearms, explosives, and other incendiary devices account for 50 percent of weapons used in attacks, while knives and pangas and other sharp objects account for 18 percent". The Case survey goes one step further by attributing the use of firearms to particular actors in the conflict. The Institute analysis is based on every violent incident reported by .the police and/or in the press over the last four months. The analysis did not reveal very much information about the type of firearms most frequently used, but the Institute says "We do know that the single largest category of those which can be identified are AK47s with shotguns " -7- second. We have also counted 24 necklace murders this year. In fact, necklacing and other burning accounts for nearly 10 percent of all deaths -estimated at 10 000 since September 1984 and April 1991 - since the violence began six and a half years ago." II. STATE INSTITUTIONS: 1. South African Police (SAP) Further dramatic revelations have emerged surrounding the police anti-insurgency (Cl) unit based at Vlakplaas. This is the unit to which Dirk Coetzee and Almond Nofomela belonged and which came under close scrutiny during the Harms Commission. Ronald Bezuidenhout, allegedly an ex SAP sergeant, ~Jaims that he was a member of this unit. The Board's attorneys have interviewed Bezuidenhout. Bezuidenhout, who spent two years at Vlakplaas, has made several allegations about the unit including: -8- * When the Harms Commission was appointed plans were made at Vlakplaas to prevent the truth about their activities emerging. Actions taken included the removal of weapons from the farm, the destruction of any incriminating documentation and the warning of all potential witnesses to keep silent. * A revenge attack on Dirk Coetzee was planned on the farm. Initially a case of poisoned wine was to be sent to Coetzee but later it was decided to send an explosive device. This is believed to be the bomb which eventually killed Bheki Mlangeni. Bezuidenhout claims that the device was built by a sergeant steve Bosch who was the resident explosives expert at Vlakplaas. The Board has established through consultation with Nofomela and other sources that Bosch was indeed a member of the Vlakplaas unit and was the explosives expert for Cl. The police have denied all of Bezuidenhout's claims including his claim to being an ex-member of the force. The SAP claim that Bezuidenhout was nothing more than an informer although he did spend time at Vlakplaas. Significantly even according to the police version Bezuidenhout was at Vlakplaas during the time he says he was.