View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of East Anglia digital repository Wittgenstein against ‘Positivist’ Approaches to International Relations: Replacing the Anti-Representationalist Objection Jessica Woolley PHD THESIS University of East Anglia School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies August 2015 This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution. Abstract Over the past few decades, a number of prominent scholars have attempted to apply Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the study of International Relations (IR). These applications have taken diverse forms and directions; nevertheless, many involve using Wittgenstein’s philosophy to criticise certain purportedly ‘scientific’ approaches to studying IR that have conventionally been labelled as ‘positivist’ within the discipline. One popular line of objection that is pursued in this context argues that ‘positivist’ approaches to IR are committed to a problematic representational view of language – called the ‘mirror’ or ‘picture’ view – which Wittgenstein decisively criticised in his later work. While many IR scholars and interpreters of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy would be sympathetic to the overall aim and direction of this line of argument, I contend that there are some problems with it which have the result that it does not support the conclusions that it is meant to. I therefore use the identification of these problems as the starting point for developing an alternative application of the relevant aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to IR, which can replace the anti-representationalist objection and provide a more sophisticated way to criticise ‘positivist’ IR scholars that overcomes the problems identified. 2 Acknowledgements I would like to dedicate this thesis to everyone who has helped me to get through the struggle of writing it. Especial thanks go to my supervisor, Dr Rupert Read, whose constant positivity and encouragement spurred me on; to my mother, Susan Woolley, who was always on hand with translation advice and homely anecdotes; and to my fiancé, Jamie Dollman, whose unfailing support and affection has sustained me throughout the past four years. 3 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 7 Survey of Existing Applications of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy to IR .............................. 9 Types of Application 9 Wittgenstein and the Anti-Representationalist Objection 13 CHAPTER 1 SUMMARISING THE ANTI-REPRESENTATIONALIST OBJECTION TO ‘POSITIVIST’ APPROACHES TO IR ................................................................................ 20 1.1 Concise Statements of the Anti-Representationalist Objection .......................... 20 Outline of the Anti-Representationalist Objection 25 1.2 What are the ‘Positivist’ Approaches to IR targeted by the ARO? ...................... 25 Outline of ‘Positivist’ Approaches to IR 27 1.3 What is the ‘Representational’ View of Language that Kratochwil, Pin-Fat and Fierke associate with ‘Positivist’ Approaches to IR? ................................................... 29 Outline of the Representational View of Language 35 1.4 How do Kratochwil, Pin-Fat and Fierke link the ‘Representational View of Language’ with ‘Positivist’ Approaches to IR? ............................................................ 36 Connection 1: Historical Influence 36 Connection 2: Implicit Commitment 38 Connection 3: Common Association 40 Connection 4: Similarities 40 Outline of the Connections 42 A Note on Consistency 42 1.5 What are the Criticisms that Kratochwil, Pin-Fat and Fierke Use Later Wittgenstein to make on this Basis? .......................................................................... 43 Criticism 1: The ‘Propositional’ Model is Inadequate 44 Criticism 2: Words do not refer to ‘Objects’ 48 Criticism 3: Linguistic Meaning is ‘Socially Constructed’ 54 Criticism 4: Our Perception is Shaped by Language 61 Outline of the Criticisms 64 The Applicability of the Criticisms 65 CHAPTER 2 EVALUATING THE ANTI-REPRESENTATIONALIST OBJECTION ................. 67 2.1 Strengths and Promising Features of the ARO in its Current Form ..................... 68 (i) It Highlights the Importance of Language for IR 68 4 (ii) It Foregrounds Linguistic Features that are Relevant for IR 69 (iii) It is Similar to Successful ‘Anti-Positivist’ Arguments Made in Other Disciplines 73 2.2 Problematic Aspects of the Anti-Representationalist Objection ......................... 74 Problem 1: Ambivalence Concerning the Nature of the RVL 74 Problem 2: Ambiguity Surrounding the Most General Conception of the RVL 83 Problem 3: Ambiguities Concerning the Specific Claims Attributed to the RVL 88 Problem 4: Insufficient Justification for Appealing to ‘Ordinary Language’ 92 Problem 5: Endorsement of Universal Claims 94 Problem 6: Inconsistent Stance towards Everyday Linguistic Practices 97 Problem 7: Inadequate Treatment of Objective Realism 99 CHAPTER 3 REVISITING WITTGENSTEIN’S LATER PHILOSOPHY .............................. 103 3.1 Wittgenstein’s Target in the Opening Remarks of the PI .................................. 104 Précis of PI §§1-5 106 Interpretation of PI §§1-5 108 Preliminary Implications of PI §§1-5 for the ARO 119 Remaining Questions 122 3.2 Wittgenstein’s Use of the term ‘Picture’ in Remarks like PI §1 ......................... 123 Kuusela’s Interpretation 124 Clarifications and Additions 128 3.3 The Methodological Justification of Appeals to ‘Ordinary’ Language ............... 139 Baker and Hacker’s Interpretation 140 Kuusela’s Objection 141 A Different Approach 143 CHAPTER 4 MODIFYING THE ANTI-REPRESENTATIONALIST OBJECTION ................ 156 4.1 Recommendations .......................................................................................... 157 Suggestion 1. From ‘Anti-Representationalist’ to Anti-Bias 157 Suggestion 2. From ‘In Principle’ Objections to Specific Critical Observations 158 Suggestion 3. Broaden the Scope of Criticism 158 Suggestion 4. Qualify Critical Observations and Invite Acknowledgement 159 4.2 Reflections on the Recommendations ............................................................. 160 4.3 How the Recommendations can be Implemented ........................................... 161 Patterns of Bias in Waltz and Wendt 162 4.3 An Alternative Wittgensteinian Approach to Criticising Wendt ........................ 195 5 4.4 Potential Relevance for More Recent and Future Work in IR ........................... 207 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 212 Directions for Further Research ............................................................................... 218 BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................... 219 6 Introduction In this thesis I will critically evaluate, and attempt to replace, a particular line of argument that Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been used to make against so-called ‘positivist’ approaches to the study of International Relations (IR).1 The rough shape of this line of argument is that ‘positivist’ approaches to IR are committed to a problematic ‘representational’ view of language that was discredited by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy, and that such approaches should therefore accordingly be abandoned. I will call this line of argument the ‘anti-representationalist objection’ (or ‘ARO’ for short). The relevant line of argument is found principally in the work of Friedrich Kratochwil (Kratochwil, 1989; 2001; 2009), Veronique Pin-Fat (Pin-Fat, 1997; 2010) and Karin Fierke (Fierke, 2002; 2003; 2010a), who are arguably the most prolific and sustained appliers of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to IR. The ARO is an apparently promising line of argument towards which many scholars and interpreters of Wittgenstein’s philosophy would be sympathetic. However, as I will explain, there are some problems and gaps with this line of argument as it stands, which have the consequence that it does not fully support the conclusions that Kratochwil, Pin-Fat and Fierke seek to draw from it. My aim in this thesis is therefore to come to these scholars’ aid as a critical fellow traveller, to spell out clearly what the difficulties with the ARO are, and to provide an alternative way of applying the relevant aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to IR that overcomes these difficulties. I will base my modifications on a novel interpretation of relevant remarks from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, which I will develop through a close reading of the text informed by previous scholarship. By taking this approach I do not mean to suggest that a re-interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is the only way to overcome the problems faced by the ARO; nor that in order to be successful, applications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy must employ faithful interpretations of his work. My rationale is simply that in my informed opinion as an interpreter of later Wittgenstein, a more textually sensitive reading of 1 The meaning of the terms ‘positivist’ and ‘representational’ in this context will be explained in Chapter