CATCH SHARE DESIGN MANUAL VOLUME Cooperative 2 Catch Shares Sarah E. Poon, Kate Bonzon and Tonya Van Leuvan Sarah E. Poon, Kate Bonzon and Tonya Van Leuvan CATCH SHARE DESIGN MANUAL VOLUME Cooperative 2 Catch Shares Sarah E. Poon, Kate Bonzon and Tonya Van Leuvan ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Environmental Defense Fund gratefully acknowledges the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the Heising-Simons Foundation and the Walton Family Foundation for their generous support of this project. CONTRIBUTORS Ashley Apel, Christopher Costello, Erica Cunningham, Michael De Alessi, Rod Fujita, Jos Hill, Jessica Landman, Owen Liu, Karly McIlwain, Sarah McTee, Dan Ovando, Laura Rodriguez, Pam Ruiter, Dan Segan, Nicole Smith, Denise Choy Stetten, C. Kent Strauss, Hirotsugu Uchida, Daniel Whittle, Jeffrey Wielgus, James G. Workman, Jeff Young All black and white fish images in the manual have been borrowed from the Freshwater and Marine Image Bank. Any views expressed in the Design Manual are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the contributors or their organizations. Any errors are those of the authors. Copyright © 2013 Environmental Defense Fund. All rights reserved. Poon, S. E., Bonzon, K. and Van Leuvan, T. (2013). Catch Share Design Manual, Volume 2: Cooperative Catch Shares. Environmental Defense Fund. Table of Contents Introduction | 1 Step-by-Step Design: Checklist | 10 Step 1 – Define Program Goals | 12 Step 2 – Define and Quantify the Available Resource | 20 Step 3 – Define Eligible Participants | 28 Step 4 – Define the Privilege | 40 Step 5 – Assign the Privilege | 52 Step 6 – Develop Administrative Systems | 60 Step 7 – Assess Performance and Innovate | 74 Catch Shares in Action: United States Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Non-Pollock (Amendment 80) Cooperative Program | 80 Catch Shares in Action: Japanese Common Fishing Rights System | 90 Catch Shares in Action: United States Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization Program | 102 Catch Shares in Action: Spanish Galicia Goose Barnacle Cofradía System | 114 References | 124 Glossary | 128 Snapshots and Tables Snapshots 1.1 Meeting Biological Goals: Bycatch Avoidance Innovations through Cooperation | 15 3.1 Cooperation in an Individual Fishing Quota Program: The United States Pacific Coast Groundfish Limited Entry Trawl Fishery | 31 4.1 Meeting Goals through Fishing Effort Coordination | 45 6.1 Distributing Member Payments in Cooperatives with Pooled Revenue | 70 Tables A Examples of Cooperative Allocation and Harvest Management | 5 1.1 Common Methods for Achieving Economic Goals through Cooperation | 16 2.1 Examples of Cooperative Participation in Fishery Science and Monitoring | 24 6.1 Common Functions and Roles of Cooperative Members | 63 6.2 Examples of Cooperative Pooling and Payment Arrangements | 71 Introduction Fishery stakeholders are increasingly interested in catch shares as an effective approach for managing fisheries. The Catch Share Design Manual, Volume 1: A Guide for Fishermen and Managers, first published in 2010, provides the first ever step-by-step planning guide of catch share design. Drawing on experience from around the world, it highlights the flexibility of catch shares and outlines how they can be specially designed to meet the specific characteristics and goals of different fisheries. The Design Manual is not prescriptive: It is a series of questions whose answers help guide and inform the catch share design process. This volume of the Catch Share Design Manual builds on Volume 1 and provides more detailed guidance on the design of group-allocated catch shares, commonly referred to as “Cooperative catch shares.”1 These are a specific type of catch share program in which secure fishing areas or shares of the catch are allocated to one or more groups of participants. Although Cooperative catch shares currently only account for about 15% of all catch shares, there is growing interest among managers, fishermen and other stakeholders in their design and application. Worldwide, there are both quota-based and area-based Cooperatives. While this volume provides a generalized discussion of Cooperatives, it specifically focuses on quota- based programs in which secure shares of a science-based catch limit are allocated to Cooperatives or to individuals who form them. Cooperatives that are allocated a secure fishing area, commonly known as Territorial Use Rights for Fishing (TURFs), are discussed in detail in Catch Share Design Manual, Volume 3: Territorial Use Rights for Fishing. 1 Volume 1 generally refers to Cooperatives as group-allocated catch shares. In this volume, the term “Cooperative” is used because it is a familiar and accepted term in many fisheries. The guidance inVolume 1 will help you determine whether a Cooperative is the most appropriate type of catch share for your fishery, including whether to allocate quota-based and/or area-based privileges. Throughout these documents, “Cooperative” is capitalized when referring to a group that has been allocated and manages a secure, exclusive share of the catch or area of a fishery, as in a Cooperative catch share program. When not capitalized, “cooperative” refers to an organized group that has not been allocated secure fishing privileges, but may coordinate other activities, such as marketing. 1 This volume is intended to help you—whether you are a manager, a fisherman, a scientist or another interested party—design successful Cooperative catch share programs. It should be used in conjunction with Volume 1 of the Catch Share Design Manual, as well as additional research, analysis and consultation of experts in order to design the most appropriate catch share program for your fishery. It follows the same seven-step design approach, but expands upon the decisions that are unique to Cooperative catch shares. It also includes four in-depth Catch Shares in Action reports, starting on page 79, that highlight real-life examples of Cooperative catch shares and design decisions in action: • United States Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Non-Pollock (Amendment 80) Cooperative Program • Japanese Common Fishing Rights System • United States Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization Program • Spanish Galicia Goose Barnacle Cofradía System The reports provide a snapshot of the diversity of Cooperative catch shares, including both area-based and quota-based approaches, and different ways in which quota are allocated to and managed by Cooperatives. Before you begin designing a Cooperative catch share program, you should assess the existing state and context of the fishery. Most fisheries already have a management structure in place with established regulations, institutions, participants and stakeholders. Years or decades of fishing and management influence the current state of the fishery, and these traditions should be taken into account when considering, designing and implementing a catch share approach. Assessing your fishery—from the ecological, economic and sociopolitical perspective— can help drive appropriate and effective design. It will help you identify current strengths to be leveraged, as well as challenges that can be addressed during the design process. See Volume 1 for a more extensive discussion of actions to take before designing your catch share program. 2 WHAT IS A COOPERATIVE CATCH SHARE? A Cooperative catch share is a specific type of catch share in Cooperatives can achieve a number of additional benefits, which one or more groups of participants (organized into including: Cooperatives) are allocated a secure portion of the catch • Fulfillment of management responsibilities, such as or a secure fishing area and, in exchange, accept certain monitoring and enforcement of fishery regulations fishery management responsibilities. The primary function (Deacon, 2012; Ovando et al., 2013) of a Cooperative is to coordinate members’ fishing activities • Enhanced stewardship (including bycatch reduction) to ensure compliance with their collective quota and to through cooperation (Ovando et al., 2013) maximize benefits—both in the near term (e.g., optimizing economic return) and in the long-term (e.g., ensuring • Reduced risk of fishery closure and financial losses healthy fish stocks for future fishing opportunities). from overharvesting (Holland and Jannot, 2012) • Opportunities for efficient spatial distribution of In this volume, the term “Cooperative” is used broadly to fishing effort (Schlager, 1994) refer to any organized group of fishermen that has been allocated secure areas or shares (such as a harvesting • Increased market power (Deacon, 2012) cooperative, association, fishermen organization, sector, • Avoidance of gear conflicts (Schlager, 1994) producer organization, guild, union or community), • Social and economic rewards for communities whether or not the Cooperative has legal or formal (Tindall, 2012) recognition. Cooperatives are generally comprised of The way Cooperatives are organized and the functions fishermen (often from the same community) who share they perform vary depending on the social, economic and commonalities, such as the same target species, fishing area political contexts in which they operate, as well as their or gear type. A key characteristic of successful Cooperatives capacity and maturity as organizations. A well-functioning is that members share common goals. Cooperative aligns the incentives of its members with Hundreds of Cooperatives participate in catch share the long-term welfare of the group, thereby preventing fisheries around