Interview with Courtland Cox May 14, 1979 Camera Rolls: 6-9 Sound Rolls: 4-5 Interview gathered as part of America, They Loved You Madly, a precursor to Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years (1954-1965). Produced by Blackside, Inc. Housed at the Washington University Film and Media Archive, Henry Hampton Collection. Preferred Citation Interview with Courtland Cox, conducted by Blackside, Inc. on May 14, 1979, for Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years (1954-1965). Washington University Libraries, Film and Media Archive, Henry Hampton Collection. Note: These transcripts contain material that did not appear in the final program. Only text appearing in bold italics was used in the final version of Eyes on the Prize. 00:00:03:00 [camera roll 6] [sound roll 4] CAMERA CREW MEMBER: SPEED. [hand slate] INTERVIEWER: OK, CAN YOU TELL ME ANYTHING ABOUT THE EARLY PLANNING SESSIONS FOR THE MARCH ON WASHINGTON? WHO WAS INVOLVED AND WHAT THE POLITICS WERE. Cox: The, the early planning sessions for the March on Washington tried to incorporate a coalition type movement. The people who were most integral to that motion I would say were Bayard Rustin first, A. Philip Randolph second, then he brought along people he thought were closest to him, CORE. I think, SNCC, he thought they were an activist group and then the, the—on another circle I would include the NAACP and Urban League and then the, the Catholic church, the Protestant church, and the Jewish religion. And so, that I think Bayard's strategy was that you get A. Philip Randolph as the leader. Secondly, you get the most activist groups, CORE, and SNCC to, to be the, the driving force and then you, you bring in other forces like Urban League, NAACP, who had to move once things were in motion. CAMERA CREW MEMBER: CUT. [cut] C. Cox 1 00:01:28:00 CAMERA CREW MEMBER 1: OK THIS WILL BE THE SECOND SYNC ON THIS INTERVIEW. CAMERA CREW MEMBER 2: SPEED. [hand slate] CAMERA CREW MEMBER 2: SECOND STICKS. INTERVIEWER: CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT WHO, WHO PUT UP THE MONEY— Cox: Can I, can I ask, do you want this? INTERVIEWER: OH. [laughs] WHO PUT UP THE MONEY FOR THE, WHO PUT UP THE MONEY FOR THE MARCH ON WASHINGTON? WHO SUPPLIED THAT? Cox: I think a lot of the money came from the labor unions. Some monies came from the civil rights organizations. I know the personnel came from the civil rights, civil rights organization; they paid for the personnel. A lot of it came from liberal organizations, church groups, and that's probably where most of the money came from, the liberal labor civil rights community. 00:02:20:00 INTERVIEWER: HOW DID IT HAPPEN THAT, THAT FOLKS WANTED TO CHANGE JOHN LEWIS’ SPEECH? OR CAN YOU TELL ME THAT THEY DID AND THEN TELL ME WHY? Cox: I think the, the politic—the, the, the real question about John Lewis' speech centered on the role Kennedy wanted to play in the March on Washington and the light he wanted to be seen in at that particular point. The fact of the matter is Kennedy wanted to speak at the March on Washington and was only through the insistence of Bayard Rustin and some others that he did not speak at the March on Washington. Then the whole question came to whether Kenne— the people received came to Kennedy—whether Kennedy received the group before or after the March on Washington. Symbolically if they received him before the March then they would report to the group on what Kennedy said. If they rece—he received them after, he would—the group would be reporting to Kennedy on what went on at the March on Washington so that was a whole play on that. But I think the real question about John's speech was the whole question of how Kennedy wanted to be perceived in terms of the black community. Cause, if you remember, Kennedy came to, to, to the Presidency, Office of Presidency on a lot of votes from the black community and he wanted to be perceived as someone in front of this allowing it, wanting it, encouraging it. And John's speech was the only speech at the March on Washington that criticized the Kennedy administration for C. Cox 2 lack of civil rights enforcement, because the SNCC people were being brutalized in the South. And he stated that. And he stated that they were—he was gonna march through the South as Sherman. There was the image of violence in that. The Kennedy people didn't want that so what they did was Kennedy called up Archbishop O'Boyle [sic] who was the bishop of Washington and said to him I want John Lewis' speech changed. Archbishop O'Boyle called A. Philip Randolph and Randolph called Bayard Rustin and they came to us about changing it on the two points, that is, to say, they criticized the Kennedy administration for lack of enthusiasm in enforcing civil rights law and the whole question of alluding to violence, even though, it's historical violence the, the allusion was too much in 1963. So what, what Bishop O'Boyle said was he wanted a change or they were gonna withdraw from the March on Washington. We refused to change it and, in fact, told Archbishop O'Boyle that he could leave, but it wasn't, you know, that was his problem. Then Bayard, after we were adamant in not changing it, Bayard went to A. Philip Randolph and Randolph said, you know, I have waited twenty years for, for this—what was it, ‘41, ’63? OK. Twenty-two years for this March on Washington; please let us have unity at this last moment. And it was only because of that plea from Randolph in terms of the whole generational thing, the whole historical perspective that we agreed to, to make some changes, but I think the basic change in John's speech came from the Kennedys who did not want to be criticized in, in this arena. 00:05:56:00 INTERVIEWER: HOW—WHAT WERE THE—HOW—THE SPEECH WAS CHANGED IN THE MORNING. MAYBE YOU COULD JUST TELL ME THAT, THAT THE— Cox: Well, the speech, the speech, the speech was changed, the speech was changed—the people came to town I think maybe about ten o'clock the crowd started arriving. They came to us about eleven and all this took place on the top at the Lincoln Memorial where Lincoln sits looking down benevolently upon the colored. You know, that, that we were up under and where the statue is. Randolph—we were sitting—it was, there was re—there was a little typewriter we had up there and people were either sitting on the ground or a little box or a little wooden chair. So it wasn't comfortable surroundings; things were hurried. And, I guess, John and myself and so we were in our early twenties being very militant. Forman was a little older. So I think the, the key players were Bayard, A. Philip Randolph, John Lewis, James Forman, and myself. And we went back and forth in terms of how this discussion was to, to go and after Randolph made his plea then John, I mean, then Jim Forman sat on a box, put a typewriter on another box and he and I sat down and redid this speech in terms of the kinds of criticisms that the Kennedy administration had. 00:07:30:00 INTERVIEWER: WHAT—CAN YOU TELL ME ANYTHING ABOUT ANY FACTIONALISM IN SNCC IN TERMS OF FOLKS WHO WERE INTERESTED IN DIRECT ACTION AND— Cox: Well, I think, that there have always been some factionalism in SNCC. I think the, the, the factionalism centered on the question of methodology, but I think probably centered on C. Cox 3 also the question of philosophy. I think those people who were for reform and some sort of ordered and limited change probably supported much more the voter registration view because that was action that fed into a lot of agendas that people had. The first agenda would be to, to broaden the base of the Democratic Party in the South because they felt that if blacks were registered to vote, you know, they would vote Democratic. So you would have a broader base in terms of the Democratic Party. I think the other thing, the other agenda, was that if you—blacks voted in the South, then you could get rid of or cause pressure on the Dixiecrats. Remember the, you had those, the Republican-Dixiecratic coalition blocking a lot of the legislation within the, within the Congress and a lot of the most powerful people were chairpersons of the, of the, of the Congress were from the South. So, therefore, it was important that you had some political motion that could challenge them and I think you had on that the whole question of democratic rights, the right to vote and all those kinds of things. So that it was, you know, a number of agendas fed. I think then the other thrust was the direct action thrust which really said this country is wrong. It's fundamentally wrong and we have to go at the heart of segregation and you had the whole religious, philosophical question of trying to change an unjust society. An uncompromising stand. The, the preparation to go into Mississippi and Alabama into the worst places so that, so that, I think, although, although on the surface it looked like a difference in terms of method, that is, to say whether you wanted voter registration against direct ac—against direct action, I think, one ultimately fed a reformist agenda; the other I wouldn't say call it revolutionary, but it was something that, that wanted to, to, to turn things upside down.