VEILIGHEID & STRATEGIE No. 116 SÉCURITÉ & STRATÉGIE November 2013 Lost in Transition? State of the Conflict, Sovereignty, and Post-2014 Prospects in Afghanistan Mr Nicolas Gosset Researcher at the Centre for Security and Defence Studies Royal Higher Institute Royal for Defence Cover picture: “Searching for the Right Way, Somewhere on the Kabul-Kandahar Highway” No known copyright restriction. An electronic version of this document is available and can be downloaded from our website www.rhid.be The comments, views and opinions contended in this text are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Royal Higher Institute for Defence, the Ministry of Defence or the Belgian government authorities alike. Any question, commentary or remark related to this document can be sent to the following address: Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies Royal Higher Institute for Defence Renaissance Avenue, 30 1000 Brussels Or by e-mail to: [email protected] ISSN: 0770-9005 Lost in Transition? State of the Conflict, Sovereignty, and Post-2014 Prospects in Afghanistan Mr Nicolas Gosset Researcher at the Centre for Security and Defence Studies Royal Higher Institute for Defence Centre for Security and Defence Studies Renaissance Avenue 30 1000 Brussels This volume is dedicated to all those servicemen, men and women, who for more than ten years have given their all, and sometimes their life, to the project of helping the Afghans to build up their country in the adverse conditions of war. It is for them and for the young Afghans, the men and women, the future generation of leaders who are struggling to obtain an education, get a job, and often to provide economic support for their families. They are the ones who have to be empowered and supported to enable them to make the best future for their country, move it toward lasting peace, and bring about justice and prosperity. Table of Contents Table of Contents .......................................................................................... i Table of Figures ........................................................................................... iii List of Maps .................................................................................................. v List of Tables ............................................................................................... vii List of Acronyms ......................................................................................... ix Executive Summary ..................................................................................... 1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 3 1. Assessing a Long Decade of War: Strategy, Military Operations and Security Policies, 2001-2014 ............................................................... 15 a. Roots of the Current Conflict ............................................................... 17 b. The Post-09/11 Invasion of Afghanistan and the “Global War on Terror”: Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan ................................... 22 c. Perception of “Victory” Followed by Setback and Deterioration: Iraq as a Fatal Distraction and the Growing Taliban-led Insurgency ............ 28 d. The Obama Administration’s “Surge” (2009-2011) ............................. 44 e. The Race toward “Transition”: Finally a Strategy? .............................. 58 f. Partial Conclusion................................................................................. 77 2. Multilateral State-building in Afghanistan and its Limits: Building up Capacities for What Security? ............................................. 83 a. From Imperialism to Peace-building and Stabilisation as State- building: Doctrines in Afghan Context ......................................................... 86 b. Internationalised State-building in Afghanistan: Highlighting the Limits? ............................................................................... 93 (1) Legitimacy, post-Taliban Governance, and “Liberal Peace” .... 107 i (a) The Bonn Framework 2001-2005 .......................................... 108 (b) The Outcome of the Bonn Process ........................................ 109 i. Post-2001 Institution-building, Weak Government, and Oligarchic Power .................................................................. 113 ii. The Missing Link between ‘Capacity’ and ‘Legitimacy’: Corruption, Marginalization and the Governance Vacuum . 119 iii. Renouncing Liberal Peace? .................................................. 126 (2) Coercion and Security: Taking SSR on a Quantum Leap ........ 129 (a) The Afghan National Army (ANA) ....................................... 133 (b) The Afghan National Police (ANP) ....................................... 145 (c) Supplements to the National Police Forces: The Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Other Local Forces .................................. 151 (d) The Private Security Companies Dilemma ............................ 155 (3) Public Finance, Assistance, and Donor Dependence ......... 162 (a) On the Governance of Aid ..................................................... 173 (b) Counter-insurgency and the “Militarisation of Aid” ............. 175 (c) On the Effectiveness/Human Impact of Aid .......................... 179 c. Partial Conclusion............................................................................... 188 Conclusion and Recommendations ......................................................... 191 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 193 Recommendations ............................................................................. 199 Bibliography ............................................................................................. 205 ii Table of Figures Figure 1: Number of insurgent-initiated attacks (left), and attacks targeting non-combatants (right) in peak month: 2005-2007 ........................ 40 Figure 2: Average monthly insurgent-initiated attacks on ISAF and Coalition forces, Afghan civilians and the Afghan National Security forces (ANSF), January 2006 - December 2010 ........................................... 46 Figure 3: Number of US Army and ISAF (non US) Troops in Afghanistan ................................................................................................... 50 Figure 4: Increasing Civilian Fatalities ......................................................... 53 Figure 5: Increasing Military Fatalities ......................................................... 54 Figure 6: Attacks by Afghan Security Forces against Allied Troops ............ 69 Figure 7: Average monthly insurgent-initiated attacks on ISAF and Coalition forces, Afghan civilians and the ANSF, countrywide, 2008 - 2013 (as of April 2013) ...................................................................... 71 Figure 8: Assessed targets of insurgent attacks (Q.1 2013) .......................... 72 Figure 9: Insurgent-initiated attack volumes, per region, at Q.1 2013 vs. Q.1 2012 ................................................................................................... 72 Figure 10: Time line of selected events and US troops levels in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 ................................................................................ 78 Figure 11: Other foreign (non-US) troops deployed in Afghanistan (OEF-A and ISAF), as of February 2013 ...................................................... 79 Figure 12: Troops committed to NATO-led ISAF, by country, as of February 2013 ........................................................................................... 79 Figure 13: Afghanistan’s Rank in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ............................................................. 122 Figure 14: Judges in Kandahar Province ..................................................... 124 Figure 15: Assessment level of Afghan National Army’s kandaks (battalions) ................................................................................................... 141 Figure 16: Afghan Army Units partnered with NATO units....................... 141 Figure 17: Assessment level of Afghan National Police Units ................... 147 Figure 18: ANA and ANP Personnel Fatalities, January 2007 - 2012 ........ 148 Figure 19: Attrition rates among selected ANSF ........................................ 149 iii Figure 20: Afghan Local Police Growth ..................................................... 154 Figure 21: Number of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan, 2007 through 2011 ...................................................................................... 156 Figure 22: Number of Private US Defence Department Contractors in Afghanistan, 2007 through 2012 ............................................................. 157 Figure 23: ASSF disbursements for ANA (left) and ANP (right) by sub-activity groups (FY2005, 30 September 2012) ............................... 161 Figure 24 (right): ANSF appropriated funds, by fiscal year (US alone) ..... 161 Figure 25 (below): Projected US and other donor support for ANSF ......... 161 Figure 26: International aid, security and military expenditure to Afghanistan (as of January 2011) ................................................................ 163 Figure 27: Partial Costs of US-led OEF and NATO-led ISAF (2001-2009) ................................................................................................