Measuring the Distance: The Legacy of the Kerner Report Ri ck loessberG and John koskInen On its release in 1968, the Kerner report, with its “two societies” warning, was the subject of intense public attention. However, within a year, concerns arose that the report’s influence was limited and that its recom- mendations were not being implemented. This perception has not changed noticeably since then. Fifty years later, it is important to accurately assess the report’s legacy and whether the nation has avoided becoming two societies. It has become clear, however, that the report has been implemented more than previously thought and that it has been and continues to be influential. It has also been determined that despite prog- ress toward eliminating the disparity between blacks and whites, it has unfortunately not yet been as exten- sive as is needed. Keywords: urban policy, racial discrimination, public policy, civil rights, African American socioeconomic status, riots We know more than we understand. We un- cused the nation’s attention on race and the derstand more than we can explain. conditions of the inner city as no other govern- mental report had ever done. Newspapers led —Claude Bernard with headlines of “White Racism Blamed in It has now been fifty years since the Kerner re- Riots,” network television devoted special cov- port (the 1968 account of the National Advisory erage to the report, and the public rushed to Commission on Civil Disorders, see Kerner purchase copies of it (Lipsky and Olson 1977). Commission) sought to provide a traumatized By the end of its first month, more people had nation with answers as to why the rioting of bought copies of it than the Warren Commis- 1967 occurred. Its unequivocal conclusion, that sion report on the assassination of President discrimination—not radicals, riffraff, or a con- Kennedy during that report’s first month (Ray- spiracy—had been responsible for the rioting mont 1968). Within three months, 1.6 million and its pointed warning that America was mov- copies of the Kerner report had been sold (Lip- ing toward “two societies, one white, one sky and Olson 1977). black—separate and unequal” instantly fo- Yet, even on the report’s first anniversary, Rick Loessberg is director of planning and development for Dallas County, Texas. John Koskinen was commis- sioner of the Internal Revenue Service. © 2018 Russell Sage Foundation. Loessberg, Rick, and John Koskinen. 2018. “Measuring the Distance: The Legacy of the Kerner Report.” RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences 4(6): 99–119. DOI: 10.7758/RSF.2018.4.6.05. Please direct correspondence to: Rick Loessberg at [email protected], 411 Elm St., 3rd Floor, Dallas, TX 75202. Open Access Policy: RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences is an open access journal. This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial- NoDerivs 3.0 Unported Li- cense. 100 fIftIeth ann Iversary of the kerner report Table 1. Kerner Commission Interviewees Individual Position Year(s) Interviewed Fred Harris Commission member 2015 Victor Palmieri Deputy executive director 2015, 2017 David Chambers Special assistant to executive director 2015, 2017 John Koskinen Special assistant to deputy executive director 2015, 2017 Robert Shellow Assistant deputy director–research 2016 Dick Nathan Associate director for program research 2015, 2017 Gary Marx Consultant–research staff 2016, 2017 Jay Kriegel Assistant to commission vice chairman 2015, 2017 Peter Goldmark Assistant to commission vice chairman 2015, 2017 Herbert Gans Consultant 2017 Jack Rosenthal Special consultant 2015 Source: Author’s compilation. many of its supporters were already concerned gins of a horrendous wave of destruction and that the report’s influence was limited and that to understand the nature of race in this country its many recommendations were being ignored (a country that has become even more racially (Herbers 1969). Successive years and accounts diverse since 1968), these questions deserve to have not changed this perception noticeably be answered. Given that three-f ourths of the (Lipsky and Olson 1977; Lupo 2011; Zelizer nation’s present population was not yet born 2016). Many excellent efforts have been under- when the Kerner report was written and so may taken to determine whether the country has not understand how troubling 1967 was (NBC been successful in avoiding becoming two so- said in a documentary at the time that the na- cieties (Bernstein 1995; Shapiro, Meschede, and tion was “in the worst crisis we have known Osoro 2013; Goodman, Zhu, and Pendall 2017). since the Civil War”) or appreciate how things However, because of the complexity of this may or may not have changed, this determina- task, these efforts are frequently only able to tion is even more critical. concentrate on a particular aspect or charac- This article seeks to address these issues. To teristic, such as wealth inequality (De La Cruz do so, the authors have taken their direct per- et al. 2018), rather than provide an overall as- sonal knowledge and combined it with recent sessment. This matter is further complicated interviews with other Kerner Commission par- when some areas (such as the incidence of pov- ticipants (see table 1). They have also extensively erty) show noticeable improvement and others reviewed the status of many of the report’s rec- (such as the ratio of black unemployment to ommendations, researched what happened to white unemployment) virtually no change. other presidential reports from the same era, Fifty years is a point at which we often assess and examined the many ways a government re- the significance of a career, a movie, or a mar- port can be influential. Because statistics do not riage. What then is the legacy of the Kerner and cannot tell the entire story—we sometimes report? To what extent has it been influential forget that data represent actual people—they or implemented? To what extent have we made have supplemented this research with inter- progress since 1968? And what do the people views of African Americans from across the who were responsible for writing the report be- country to see how they view America and how lieve? that view compares with what they (or their par- For a report that sought to explain the ori- ents) may have held fifty years ago.1 1. Twenty African Americans were interviewed for this article with the assurance that their identities would re- main confidential. They were all friends of the authors or friends of friends. Most the authors have known well for at least ten years, and most are bankers, lawyers, accountants, engineers, and administrators. They have lived rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences measurInG the d Istance 101 What emerges from this effort is a view that One of the most important decisions that may surprise some—a report that is more in- led to the development of such a report was the fluential that what has been commonly early decision by David Ginsburg, the commis- thought—and an increased understanding of sioner’s executive director, that the commis- what has transpired for black Americans over sion be given every paragraph of every draft the past five decades. section, that these would be read aloud, and that the commission would not move onto the t he Kerner COmmissiOn’s next section until agreement was reached or deCisiOn- maKing process the section had been sent back for revisions. Public opinion polls presently disclose that the This brilliant brick-b y- brick strategy allowed nation is now as politically divided as it has the commission to focus on the matter at hand, been at any time since 1968, and therefore it is enabled the report to become the commission’s especially important to look into how a report rather than the staff’s, and eliminated the need dealing with a matter as sensitive as race could to have a final vote on the entire report (Loess- be unanimous and so bold. It is even more sig- berg 2017). nificant given that at the time little indicated Previous accounts of the commission’s work that this would occur. According to Tom Wicker, and recent interviews with commission partic- the eleven-member Kerner Commission had ipants indicate that the major disagreements “seemed an unpromising group” when first ap- that arose among commission members were pointed, and the conclusions of previous riot not over what was the cause of the rioting, but panel reports had generally been considered on semantics and what should be done to pre- underwhelming (Kerner Report 1968; Platt 1971; vent future rioting. Commission members Fred Lupo 2011). The complexity of the task before Harris, John Lindsay, Roy Wilkins, and Otto the commission also did not lead one to believe Kerner were usually supportive of more ambi- that the outcome of this group would be any tious proposals; fellow members I. W. Abel, Wil- different, John Kenneth Galbraith remarking liam McCulloch, Katharine Peden, and Charles that, instead of appointing a commission on Thornton were typically more concerned about rioting and calling for a national day of prayer their costs or political realities. The commis- as President Lyndon Johnson had done, “it sion’s remaining members—Herbert Jenkins, might have been more constructive to establish James Corman, and Edward Brooke—moved a commission on prayer and declare a national between the two primary groups depending on day of rioting” (Rosenthal 1969). Yet, through the issue. With many key matters decided on a combination of urgency, commitment, re- six-- to fiv e votes, the respect that commission spect, and skillful management, the commis- members showed one another allowed them sion overcame these obstacles and produced a to proceed under what was a very short sched- surprisingly forceful and comprehensive re- ule and to subsequently adopt a unanimous port.