THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF A COMPLETE LANDMINE BAN Prepared for: Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation 11 June 2001 By: The Dupuy Institute 1497 Chainbridge Road Suite 100 McLean, VA 22101 Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 2 CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS DUPUY INSTITUTE STUDIES.................................................................. 3 AN INTRODUCTION TO LANDMINES............................................................................................................... 5 US ENGINEER ORGANIZATIONS AND ANTITANK MINE SYSTEMS.......................................................... 7 US Army Organization ......................................................................................................................................... 7 Dumb Antitank Mines .......................................................................................................................................... 7 Scatterable Antitank Mines................................................................................................................................... 7 Ground Dispensed Scatterable Antitank Mine Systems ....................................................................................... 8 Artillery Dispensed Mine Systems ....................................................................................................................... 9 Air Dispensed Mine Systems................................................................................................................................ 9 THE COMBAT VALUE OF “DUMB” ANTITANK MINES............................................................................... 11 US Tenth Army Tank Loses to Mines, Okinawa 1945....................................................................................... 12 Normandy, British Second Army Tank Losses in Operation GOODWOOD, July 1944 ................................... 13 US Army Losses to Antitank Mines in the European Theater, 1944 - 1945....................................................... 14 British Eighth Army Tank Losses to Mines in Italy, April 1945........................................................................ 15 North Africa........................................................................................................................................................ 15 Best Case Scenarios for Conventional Antitank Mine Use: Battle of Kursk and El Alamein ............................ 15 Effectiveness of Antitank Mines at Kursk .......................................................................................................... 16 Prior to the Battle................................................................................................................................................ 17 4 July................................................................................................................................................................... 17 5 July................................................................................................................................................................... 17 The SS Panzer Corps (5 July) ............................................................................................................................. 18 III Panzer Corps (5 July)..................................................................................................................................... 19 Summary (5 July) ............................................................................................................................................... 19 Calculated Losses of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and SS Panzer Corps ............................................................... 19 6 July................................................................................................................................................................... 20 XXXXVIII Panzer Corps (6 July) ...................................................................................................................... 20 The SS Panzer Corps (6 July) ............................................................................................................................. 21 The III Panzer Corps (6 July).............................................................................................................................. 21 Summary (6 July) ............................................................................................................................................... 21 7 July................................................................................................................................................................... 22 XXXXVIII Panzer Corps (7 July) ...................................................................................................................... 22 Subsequent Days................................................................................................................................................. 23 German use of Mines.......................................................................................................................................... 23 Summary of German Tanks Lost to Mines at Kursk .......................................................................................... 23 Battle of Second El Alamein............................................................................................................................... 25 Post World War II............................................................................................................................................... 26 Conclusions......................................................................................................................................................... 28 THE COMBAT VALUE OF SCATTERABLE ANTITANK MINES .................................................................. 29 Conclusions......................................................................................................................................................... 33 US ARMY DOCTRINE AND SUBSTITUTIONS FOR ANTITANK MINES .................................................... 34 “Dumb” Antitank Mine Doctrine........................................................................................................................ 34 Substitutions for “Dumb” Antitank Mines.......................................................................................................... 34 Scatterable Antitank Mine Doctrine ................................................................................................................... 35 Substitutions for Artillery Fired Scatterable antitank mines............................................................................... 35 Substitutions for Air Dropped Scatterable antitank mines.................................................................................. 36 Substitutions for Ground Deployed SCATMINES............................................................................................. 36 Summary............................................................................................................................................................. 37 THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF ARMS CONTROL.................................................................................................. 38 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................................... 43 RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................................................................ 45 i APPENDIX I: EXISTING US ANTITANK MINE SYSTEMS ............................................................................ 46 "Dumb" Antitank Mines ..................................................................................................................................... 46 Antitank SCATMINE Systems........................................................................................................................... 46 APPENDIX II: THE 39th PANZER REGIMENT AT KURSK ............................................................................. 47 ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In March 2001, The Dupuy Institute (TDI) was contracted by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation to prepare a historically based study on the military consequences of an antitank mine ban. So that its report would contain independent thinking, TDI analyzed selected modern campaigns showing the extent of antitank mine employment and damage resulting from it. Emphasis was placed on gauging the utility of antitank mines in campaigns that could be compared to emerging dynamic deep battlefield concepts with precision strikes followed up by rapid and decisive maneuver and on weapons employment that would minimize friendly losses. TDI’s in-depth analysis of World War II campaigns such as the British and Commonwealth offensive known as operation GOODWOOD, the southern portion of the German Kursk offensive, and Second El Alamein all point to some delaying value of antitank mines used by static defensive forces. However, determined pursuit of the attack in these examples