russian analytical russian analytical digest 51/08 digest analysis The North Caucasus after the Georgia-Russia Conflict By Stacy Closson, Berlin Abstract Russia’s military action against Georgia and its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia may have strengthened calls for independence by groups within some of the North Caucasus repub- lics and further undermined the stability of an already troubled region. Most importantly, the fighting in Georgia has activated the trade flows of arms and fighters between the North and South Caucasus, increas- ing the potential for conflict in both places. Since the war, Russia has faced levels of violence on its own ter- ritory not seen since the last Chechen war. North-South Caucasus Ties During the Georgian war, some North Caucasian re- Prime Minister Vladimir Putin argued that Russia’s publics sent military aid and fighters into Abkhazia August military action in Georgia was aimed in part and South Ossetia ultimately establishing themselves at quelling instability in the Russian republics of the as semi-autonomous actors in the broader Caucasian North Caucasus in a mid-September meeting with theatre of conflict, posing a potential threat to Russian the Valdai Discussion Club – a collection of academ- interests in the future. ics from around the world. He stated that, “certain non- governmental organizations in certain republics” had Fighters and Arms “raised the question of separation from Russia under A major challenge facing Russia is how the ties formed the pretext of the lack of protection given to South among groups in the North and South Caucasus as a Ossetia.” That is, the Russian military incursion into result of the August conflict will affect regional stability. Georgia was necessary, in part, to quell calls for inde- There is a direct historical correlation between height- pendence from some of the seven North Caucasus re- ened activities in the North and South Caucasus and an publics. Putin did not mention from which republics increase in transfers of fighters and weapons across the these calls emanated: Adygea, Dagestan, Ingushetia, region. During the Chechen wars of the 1990s, there Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, North was a lucrative trade of arms across the region and Ossetia-Alania, or Chechnya. Georgians played an active intermediary role between Russian officials provide different measures of the se- Russian and Chechen businessmen. Dmitry Butrin, riousness of the situation in the North Caucasus. Putin’s Chief of the Economic Policy Desk at Kommersant, spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, confirmed that despite reported that the recent conflict between Russia and the government’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Georgia will once again fuel a breeding ground for lu- Ossetia, Russia stood behind the principle of territori- crative sales of military weaponry by the security ser- al integrity. He said that while there were some separat- vices that dominate North and South Ossetia. Just in ists and extremists in the North Caucasus, their activ- the past two months, large weapons caches, as well as ities were not significant and suggested that their calls an anti-air missile defense system of foreign origin, have for independence did not warrant consideration. At the been discovered by Russian forces in Chechnya. same time, the commander of Russia’s Interior Troops, Prior to the August conflict, informal trade had General Nikolai Rogozin, reported that up to 500 mil- weakened as a result of periodic disruptions to the itants were currently active in the North Caucasus and north-south corridor across the Georgian border since Russia had 30,000 troops stationed in the region. These 2004. The disruptions came in part because of the re- forces conducted over 2,000 operations and killed 50 form efforts of the Saakashvili government to strength- militants in 2007, and even more in 2008. en border and customs regimes, and the closure of infor- The aftermath of the Georgia-Russia conflict and mal trading markets on the de facto Georgia/Ossetian- the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as in- Abkhazian borders. It was also due to Russian sanctions dependent states present a major challenge for ensur- imposed in 2005 on goods and travel from Georgia. ing stability across the Caucasus. Most important is Moreover, in spring 2008 after the Russian govern- the extent to which relations between the North and ment officially lifted a 1996 embargo on Abkhazia and South Caucasus will affect the levels of militarization. South Ossetia and provided development assistance, 2 russian analytical russian analytical digest 51/08 digest including repairing a railroad connection from Russia Groups of fighters from the other republics, on through Abkhazia, economic relations in these regions the other hand, were united with their governments was re-oriented north. in supporting Russia and the Ossetians. The Adygea This south-north trade began to reverse direction and Cherkess formed groups of fighters and, alongside in the lead up to the August conflict, when the infor- Chechens, participated in removing the Abkhaz gov- mal arms transfers increased in proportion to the move- ernment-in-exile from the Kodori gorge. They also tem- ment of “volunteers” from the north into Georgia. The porarily patrolled Georgian villages in the Gali region Black Sea Press in May 2008 reported warnings from of Abkhazia. A unit of Cossack volunteers was pres- South Ossetia’s de facto President Eduard Kokoity that ent in Sukhumi during the war and pledged their sol- an alliance with the North Caucasus was needed to idarity with the Abkhaz should Georgia try to invade. prevent genocide against his people. Georgian televi- Another Cossack unit was apparently fighting around sion showed that the Confederation of the Peoples of Gori, Georgia. Likewise, the North Ossetians stood the North Caucasus was preparing to support Abkhazia by their brethren in South Ossetia, providing shelter in the case of a conflict with Georgia. In the first week for refugees and even soldiers to fight alongside the of May, 700 soldiers were re-deployed from Khankala Russians. North Ossetia continued to act as the de fac- military base in Chechnya to Abkhazia. Units from the to fourth actor in the South Ossetian conflict, along North Caucasus were already serving as peacekeepers in with Russia, Georgia, and the South Ossetians, as a the Gali region of eastern Abkhazia. Then in June the member of the Joint Control Commission, responsible Russian news agency Regnum reported that Russian for conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations in Cossacks from Karachaevo-Cherkessia were preparing the South. At the same time, the North Ossetians had to serve on the border between Abkhazia and Georgia. trained the South’s military and provided leadership There were even accusations in the Georgian press that and arms in the lead up to the conflict. it was the Chechens who were responsible for a series The Dagestan government was the only republic of attacks in Abkhazia during July, supposedly as part to remain neutral, pre-occupied with violent clashes of a provocation to Georgian military action. on its territory and border problems with Azerbaijan. During the August conflict, the North Caucasus For some Dagestanis, it was disturbing that the Vostok groups divided their sympathies based on co-ethnic battalion fighting in and around Tskhinvali and Gori ties, relations with Georgia, and degree of allegiance was headed by a wanted man who allegedly had killed towards Russia. The populations also sometimes dif- their Dagestani kin in a Chechen village in June 2005. fered from their leadership. For example, the Chechens Dagestan is viewed as the most troubled area in the and Ingush sympathized with Georgia, but their leaders North Caucasus at the moment. It serves as a major came out very publicly against Saakashvili’s “invasion” transit route for drugs and weapons from Central Asia of South Ossetia. The Chechen rebel leader Umarov through the North Caucasus and westward to the Black criticized Russia and appealed to the Caucasus peoples Sea. This corridor became even more lucrative after not to get involved in the conflict. Nevertheless, as with Afghanistan increased heroin production and demand the war in Abkhazia in the early 1990s, several thou- for weapons grew in the Caucasus. The Dagestani-Azeri sand Chechen troops served as border guards along the border has been the scene of regular incursions with Abkhaz and Ossetian border. Chechens also helped the both sides accusing the other of inciting violence. The Abkhaz to clear out the Georgian-government-backed Lezgin Sadval movement, which aspires to its own terri- Abkhaz government-in-exile from the Kodori gorge in torial autonomy on land that is now partly in Dagestan upper Abkhazia. Chechens from the Vostok battalion and partly in Azerbaijan, comprises a combined popu- fought in South Ossetia, reportedly both propelling lation more than twice that of the Abkhaz in Abkhazia. the Georgians out of Tskhinvali, as well as saving many Since August, Azeri and Russian security forces have Georgian civilians from revenge attacks by Ossetians been conducting counter insurgency operations in the and Russians. There were unconfirmed reports that border region against alleged Dagestani militants. Chechens may have fought with the Georgians, related to more unconfirmed reports that Chechen rebels were Russia’s Unresolved Conflict: Prigorodniy still seeking safe haven in Georgia’s northern Pankisi Region gorge. In an interview, Chechen President Kadyrov ad- The increase in the flow or arms and fighters across the mitted that he was not in command of the over 17,000 region could increase the chances of conflict between volunteers eager to fight in Georgia. Ossetia and Ingushetia. Up until last month, the South 3 russian analytical russian analytical digest 51/08 digest Ossetian leadership had persistently stated that it want- Three months later, Putin removed Zyazikov and re- ed accession to the Russian Federation through unifi- placed him with Army Colonel Yunus-Bek Yevkurov.