Notes Introduction 1. Hobsbawm 1990, 66. 2. Diamond 1998, 322–33. 3. Fairbank 1992, 44–45. 4. Fei Xiaotong 1989, 1–2. 5. Diamond 1998, 323, original emphasis. 6. Crossley 1999; Di Cosmo 1998; Purdue 2005a; Lavely and Wong 1998, 717. 7. Richards 2003, 112–47; Lattimore 1937; Pan Chia-lin and Taeuber 1952. 8. My usage of the term “geo-body” follows Thongchai 1994. 9. B. Anderson 1991, 86. 10. Purdue 2001, 304. 11. Dreyer 2006, 279–80; Fei Xiaotong 1981, 23–25. 12. Jiang Ping 1994, 16. 13. Morris-Suzuki 1998, 4; Duara 2003; Handler 1988, 6–9. 14. Duara 1995; Duara 2003. 15. Turner 1962, 3. 16. Adelman and Aron 1999, 816. 17. M. Anderson 1996, 4, Anderson’s italics. 18. Fitzgerald 1996a: 136. 19. Ibid., 107. 20. Tsu Jing 2005. 21. R. Wong 2006, 95. 22. Chatterjee (1986) was the first to theorize colonial nationalism as a “derivative discourse” of Western Orientalism. 23. Gladney 1994, 92–95; Harrell 1995a; Schein 2000. 24. Fei Xiaotong 1989, 1. 25. Cohen 1991, 114–25; Schwarcz 1986; Tu Wei-ming 1994. 26. Harrison 2000, 240–43, 83–85; Harrison 2001. 27. Harrison 2000, 83–85; Cohen 1991, 126. 186 • Notes 28. Duara 2003, 9–40. 29. See, for example, Lattimore 1940 and 1962; Forbes 1986; Goldstein 1989; Benson 1990; Lipman 1998; Millward 1998; Purdue 2005a; Mitter 2000; Atwood 2002; Tighe 2005; Reardon-Anderson 2005; Giersch 2006; Crossley, Siu, and Sutton 2006; Gladney 1991, 1994, and 1996; Harrell 1995a and 2001; Brown 1996 and 2004; Cheung Siu-woo 1995 and 2003; Schein 2000; Kulp 2000; Bulag 2002 and 2006; Rossabi 2004. 30. L. Liu 1995, 1–42. 31. Ibid., 26. 32. Keyes 2002, 1182; Lin Yaohua 1963; Dikötter 1992, 108–10; Crossley 1990b, 19–20. 33. Morris-Suzuki 1998, 204; Duara 1995, 36n10. 34. Chatterjee 1986, vii. 35. Furth 1976; Crossley 1990b, 19. 36. Chen Liankai [1988] 1994, 27–69. 37. Chow Kai-wing 1997, 39. During the 1900s, Zhang and other revolutionaries used the terms Hanzu, Hanren, Hanzhong, and Han renzhong interchangeably to refer to their more circumscribed Sinic identity, one that explicitly excluded the Manchus. By the 1911 Revolution, Hanzu emerged as the neologism of choice, allowing for the distinction between a larger “yellow race” (huangzhong) and the Hanzu as a branch or lineage of the yellow race (see Chow Kai-wing 2001, 54–55). 38. Gladney 1991, 82–83; Chow Kai-wing 2001, 47–48, 76. 39. Zhao Gang 2006, 6; Chen Liankai [1988] 1994, 32–34; L. Liu 2004, 75–81. 40. Zhao Gang 2006, 10–14. See also the language employed in the international treaties signed between the Qing dynasty and the West that are contained in Tian Tao 1999. 41. Liang Qichao 1901, 3, as cited in L. Liu 2004, 76–77. 42. The earliest usage of Zhonghua minzu that I have been able to locate is Liang Qichao’s 1907 essay investigating the role of the Chinese minzu in history (see Liang Qichao 1907, 2). Here Liang employs the term as a synonym for the Hanzu, which nearly all turn-of-the-century Chinese intellectuals used to refer to the Sinic cultural and political community. Yet, unlike the anti-Manchuists, Liang went to great lengths in other essays to demonstrate the inclusive, racially composite nature of the Zhonghua minzu and how it fused together a number of different lineages living within the territorial confines of Qing China. In doing so, he paved the way for the term’s widespread usage among Republican-era elites and the repositioning of the Hanzu as the racial “back- bone” (gugan) of a territorially bounded yet multiethnic Zhonghua minzu (see Liang Qichao 1922, 1–34). 43. Chen Liankai [1988] 1994, 66–69; Lipman 2002, 117–18. 44. Dikötter 2002, 496. 45. B. Anderson 1991, 19. 46. Adelman and Aron 1999, 814–16. 47. Luo Zhufeng 1997, 3: 6467; Ma Ruheng and Ma Dazheng 1994, 85–101; Purdue 2005a, 409–61. Notes • 187 48. Thierry 1989, 77. 49. My translation of guozu, a term that literally means “state lineage,”as “race- state” is an attempt to articulate the widespread semantic convergence of race, nation, and state among turn-of-the-century intellectuals. Numerous scholars have pointed out how these concepts were used interchangeably among Western elites prior to the end of World War I (see Duara 1995, 22). The same was true of Chinese intellectuals who used what is today rendered in English as “race” (zhongzu), “nation” or “nationality” (minzu), and “state” (guojia) inter- changeably to refer to a group of territorially and genealogically distinct peo- ples locked in a battle for evolutionary survival with other race-states. 50. Liang Qichao 1903a, 12; Hobsbawm 1990, 31–45. 51. Liang Qichao 1903a, 11. 52. Jin Binggao 1987, 47. 53. Crossley 2005. 54. Eley and Suny 1996, 8. 55. Sun Yat-sen 1921a, 24. 56. Harrell 1996, 4. 57. Cited in Hobsbawm 1990, 12. 58. B. Anderson 1991, 204–6. Chapter 1 1. Kaldor 2004, 161–77. 2. Gellner 1983; Smith 2000; Hobsbawm 1990; Greenfeld 1992. 3. Hobsbawm 1990, 66. 4. Ibid., 137, 66n37. 5. Gellner 1983, 16, 108, 109n1, 141. 6. B. Anderson 1991, 113. 7. B. Anderson 2001, 31. 8. Chatterjee 2000, 940. 9. Purdue 1998a, 285. Also see Purdue 2005b, 183–86. 10. Crossley 1990b, 1–34. See also Fairbank and Teng 1954; and Levenson 1964–65 (with recent criticism of the “impact/response” model of sinology in Cohen 1984; and Farquhar and Hevia 1993). 11. Fiskesjö 2006, 19. 12. Fairbank 1968. 13. Levenson 1964–65. 14. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1979, 24. 15. Ibid., 25. 16. Ibid. The culturalism-to-nationalism thesis remains influential, albeit in a qualified fashion, with James Townsend (1996) and Zhao Suisheng (2004, 40–44) recently rearticulating its significance. 17. Lattimore 1932; Lattimore 1937. 188 • Notes 18. Eberhard 1982; Fletcher 1995; Franke and Twitchett 1994; Rossabi 1975 and 1988; Wakeman 1985; Barfield 1989. 19. Chen Yinke 1977; Xiang Da 1979. 20. Harrell 1995a; Millward 1996. Also see Millward 1998; Di Cosmo 2002; Di Cosmo and Wyatt 2003; Mair 2005; Crossley, Siu, and Sutton 2006; Giersch 2006. 21. Langlois 1981, 15; Also see Serruys 1987, 137–90. 22. Elliott 2001, 5–6; Crossley 1990a; Rhoads 2000. 23. Crossley 1990b, 2. See also Brown 2004, 30–34. 24. Gladney 1991; Elliott 2006, 32–35; and Duara 1995, 49–54. On ethnicity as a boundary process, see Barth 1969. 25. Levenson 1964–65, 96. 26. Duara 1995, 8. 27. Ibid., 57. 28. Duara 1995, 60. Also see Dow Tsung-I 1982; Dikötter 1992; Huang Guangxue 1995, 51–92; Q. Wang 1999; Ebrey 1996; Poo Mu-chou 2005. 29. Yang Lien-sheng 1968, 26. 30. Legge 1961, 355. The exclusivist representation in the Zuo commentary is closely associated with the unique form of environmental determinism that grew out of the proto-Sinic yin-yang, and five-element epistemologies of the Zhou period (see Henderson 1984). This system of “correlative thought” that came to underpin imperial Confucianism during the Han dynasty linked celestial phenomena, climatic conditions, human physiognomy, and nature in a cosmology that situated differences in regional qi (psycho-physical energy) that produced distinct xing (nature). While in the inclusivist narrative of political community, one’s xing was transformable, the exclusivist tradition argued that the differences in nature and lifestyle associated with different cli- matic zones created an unbridgeable chasm between the frontier and the har- monious qi of the central plains. As the Book of Rites (Liji) states, “The Chinese and the barbarians of the five directions all have their own xing which cannot be transposed (tuiyi)” (Liu Dianjue and Chen Fangzheng 1992, 34). 31. Cited in Yang Lien-sheng 1968, 28. See also Yu Ying-shih 1967; Barfield 1989; Di Cosmo 2002. 32. Cited in Pusey 1983, 322. 33. Cited in Huan Kuan 1931, 77. 34. Ebrey 1996, 26. 35. We must resist the temptation, however, to read modern taxonomies of race backward into premodern markers of difference (see Dikötter 1992, 3; Dikötter 2002, 497). While the imperial tradition of ethnocentrism con- tributed to the modern discourse of race, these markers operated within a sep- arate episteme in which qi (psycho-physical energies) differed from xue (blood), and zulei (kinship) was distinct from zhongzu (race). 36. See the writings of Emile Durkheim, Edmund Leach, and Fredrik Barth; on the rich genealogy of “ethnicity” as an analytical concept, see S. Jones 1997. 37. Cited in Gladney 1996, 471. Notes • 189 38. Duara 1996, 49-54. For a discussion of the various elements of this Sinic cul- tural complex, see Ng-Quinn 1993, 53–61; Watson 1993, 80–103; Ho Ping- Ti 1976, 547–54; Ebrey 1996; R. Wong 2006, 93–4; Harrison 2001, 10–25. Fitzgerald refers to imperial China’s “proto-nation” as “the wedding of internal differentiation with formal unity.” He goes onto to explain: “That is, it con- sisted of a series of distinct vertical communities within large regional blocs which were integrated internally by ties of customs and commerce, which were associated with one another through common ritual practices and a common textual tradition, and which were bound to the state through the working of the imperial bureaucracy and the placement of imperial garrisons” (Fitzgerald 1994, 27). 39. Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski 1985; Watson and Rawski 1988; Watson 1993; Tu Wei-ming 1994. 40. R. Wong, Huters, and Yu 1997; Sutton 2007; and other contributors to the January 2007 special issue of Modern China. 41. Melissa Brown’s recent article is an important exception. However, I believe she underestimates the role of culture in identity formation, treating Han, or Chinese identity, more broadly as a type of false consciousness forcefully imposed by state elites for coldly calculated political and economic gain.