FOREIGN SPONSORSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF REBEL PARTIES Michael C. Marshall Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS December 2015 APPROVED: John Ishiyama, Major Professor Idean Salehyan, Committee Member Jacqueline DeMeritt, Committee Member T. David Mason, Committee Member Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, Chair of the Department of Political Science Marshall, Michael C. Foreign Sponsorship and the Development of Rebel Parties. Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), December 2015, 208 pp., 17 tables, 6 figures, references, 287 titles. This dissertation examines the emergence, survival, performance, and national impact of rebel parties following negotiated settlements. Building on a growing literature examining the environmental and organizational factors affecting insurgent-to-party transformations, this dissertation asks why some insurgent organizations thrive as political parties in post-conflict environments and others fail to make such a transformation. I propose that foreign actors play a pivotal role in the formation of what I call “protégé parties,” which are better equipped to make the transformation into political parties than other rebel groups. Further, different kinds of sponsors have varying effects on transformation. Empirical analysis supports these propositions, finding that protégé parties with authoritarian sponsorship are better equipped to develop than those backed by democracies or no one. Copyright 2015 By Michael C. Marshall ! ii! ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am eternally indebted to the following individuals and institutions for their assistance: I wish to thank my family. I would not have succeeded without your unwavering support. I am grateful to the Department of Political Science, American Political Science Review, and the Toulouse Graduate School. I could not have completed this project without your generous financial support. Lastly, I am grateful to the members of my dissertation committee: Dr. John Ishiyama, Dr. Idean Salehyan, Dr. T. David Mason, and Dr. Jacqueline DeMeritt. Each of these remarkable scholars played an instrumental role in training me to think, teach, and conduct research like a political scientist. I am eternally grateful for your guidance and patience. For George, Carmela, and Nicole. ! iii! TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………..………………………………………….....iii LIST OF TABLES…………………...…………………………………………………………viii LIST OF FIGURES…………………………….………………………………………………...ix CHAPTER 1: Variations in Rebel-to-Party Transformations……………………………….....…1 1.1 Developing Organizational Skills and Capacity 1.2 Developing Ties to Constituencies 1.3 Legitimacy or Sponsorship? 1.4 Summary of the Dissertation CHAPTER 2: Determinants of Rebel Party Development………………………………………13 2.1 Constraints 2.1.1 Institutional Constraints 2.1.2 Social Constraints 2.1.2.1 Economic Inequality 2.1.2.2 Ethnic Cleavages 2.1.2.3 Religious Cleavages 2.2 Internal Features 2.2.1 Ideational Appeals 2.2.2 Identity Appeals 2.2.3 Resource Mobilization 2.2.4 Domestic Support 2.3 Discussion CHAPTER 3: Foreign Sponsorship……………………………………………………..............31 3.1 Different types of foreign sponsors have different effects on transformation 3.1.1 Democratic Sponsors focus on electoral processes 3.1.2 Authoritarian Sponsors focus on electoral outcomes 3.2 Sponsorship and Protégé Party Persistence 3.3 Sponsorship and Protégé Party Performance 3.4 The National Impacts of Rebel Parties 3.5 Discussion ! iv! CHAPTER 4: Research Design………………………………………………………….…..….48 4.1 Using Panel Data to study Party Development and Impact 4.1.1 Emergence 4.1.2 Electoral Performance and Executive Power 4.1.3 Democratization and Consolidation 4.2 Using Duration Data to study Party Development and Impact 4.2.1 Party Persistence 4.2.2 Peace Duration 4.3 Explanatory Variables 4.3.1 Percentage of Autocratic Sponsorship 4.3.2 Mobilization Capacity 4.3.3 Party Origins 4.3.4 Party Ideology 4.3.5 Party Fragmentation 4.3.6 Incumbent Advantage 4.3.7 United Nations Peacekeeping 4.3.8 Settlement Implementation 4.3.9 Number of Rebel Parties 4.3.10 Socio-Economic Factors 4.3.11 Electoral Institutions 4.4 Quantitative Models 4.5 Case Study Selection 4.5.1 Guatemalan Civil War 1964 – 1996 4.5.2 Lebanese Civil War 1972 – 1992 and Cedar Revolution 2005 – 2008 4.6 Discussion CHAPTER 5: Rebel Party Emergence..………………………………………………………79 5.1 Analyzing Rebel Party Emergence 5.2 Rebel Party Emergence in Guatemala and Lebanon 5.2.1 Emergence after Settlement 5.2.1.1 AMAL 5.2.1.2 Hizb al-Kata’eb [after the Doha Accords] ! v! 5.2.2 Emergence after Credible Commitment 5.2.2.1 Hezbollah 5.2.2.2 Hizb al-Kata’eb [after the Taif Accords] 5.2.2.3 URNG 5.2.3 Emergence after Party Fragmentation 5.2.3.1 URNG Party Failure: FDNG, DIA, ANN, and UNE 5.2.3.2 Phalangist Party Failure: LFP, SFM, and FPM 5.3 Discussion CHAPTER 6: Rebel Party Persistence……………………………………………………….98 6.1 Analyzing Rebel Party Persistence 6.2 Party Death in Guatemala and Lebanon 6.2.1 Death by Saliency 6.2.1.1 URNG 6.2.1.2 al – Kata’eb 6.2.2 Death by Spoiler 6.2.3 Death by Shocks in Sponsorship 6.2.3.1 URNG 6.2.3.2 al–Kata’eb 6.3 Party Persistence in Lebanon and Guatemala 6.3.1 AMAL 6.3.2 UNE 6.4 Discussion CHAPTER 7: Rebel Party Performance and National Impact……...………………….…118 7.1 Analysis of Rebel Party Performance 7.2 Analysis of National Impacts of Rebel Party Performance 7.3 Discussion CHAPTER 8: Rethinking Sponsorship and Rebel Party Inclusion……………………….138 8.1 Exporting Democracy through Revolutionary Vehicles 8.1.1 MODEL and ULIMO 8.1.2 UNITA and FDN 8.1.3 Policy Prescription ! vi! 8.2 Foreign Sponsorship and the Development of Rebel Linkage Institutions 8.2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions 8.2.2 Interest Group Transformation 8.3 Dissertation Summary and Results TABLE OF APPENDICES………………………………………………………………150 A.1 Rebel Organizations and Parties A.2 Dyadic Robustness Checks using Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) A.3 Robustness Checks using Marshall and Jaggers (2014) A.3.1 Sponsor Institutionalization as a Difference Variable A.3.2 Difference-in-Differencing A.3.3 Mean Differencing A.3.4 Sponsor Regime Type A.3.5 Sponsor Democratization A.4 Schoenfeld Proportional Hazard Assumption Tests BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………188 ! vii! LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1: Administrative Norms by Sponsor Regime Type………………………………….43 Table 5.1: Logistic Panel Analyses of Rebel Party Emergence……………………………….81 Table 6.1: Survival Analyses of Rebel Party Persistence…………………………………….101 Table 7.1 Analyses of Rebel Party Performance in Post-Conflict Elections…………………121 Table 7.2 Executive Power and Foreign Sponsorship by Legislative Share………………….125 Table 7.3 Analyzing National Impacts of Rebel Inclusion: Democratization & Consolidation………………………………………………………………………………….132 Table A.1 List of Rebel Organizations and Parties by State…………………………………..152 Table A.2.1 Robustness Analysis of Emergence using GWF Data…………………………...158 Table A.2.2 Robustness Analyses of Persistence using GWF Data…………………………..159 Table A.2.3 Robustness Analyses of Performance using GWF Data…………………………160 Table A.3.1 Robustness Analysis of Emergence using ∆!"#$%&'( Data……………………...166 Table A.3.2 Robustness Analysis of Persistence using ∆!"#$%&'( Data……………………...172 Table A.3.3 Robustness Analysis of Legislative Performance using ∆!"#$%&'( Data………...176 Table A.3.4 Robustness Analysis of Executive Performance using ∆!"#$%&'( Data………….179 Table A.3.5 Robustness Analysis of Presidential Performance using ∆!"#$%&'( Data………..183 Table A.4.1 Schoenfeld Proportional Hazard Tests: Peace Duration…………………………..192 Table A.4.2 Schoenfeld Proportional Hazard Tests: Party Lifespan…………………………...192 ! viii! LIST OF FIGURES Figure 4.1 Frequency of Negotiated Settlements and Party Formations Over Time……………52 Figure 4.2 Cox-Snell Residual Tests of Party Lifespans………………………………………..55 Figure 4.3 Smoothed and Nelson-Aalen Hazard Estimation: Party Persistence………………..56 Figure 4.4 Smoothed and Nelson-Aalen Hazard Estimation: Peace Duration………………….58 Figure 6.1 Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimation for Party Persistence…………………………..102 Figure A.4 The Impact of Autocratic Protégé Parties by Legislative Representation…………184 ! ix! CHAPTER 1 VARIATIONS IN REBEL-TO-PARTY TRANSFORMATION FOLLOWING NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT In August of 2003, the Second Liberian Civil War came to an end after seven years of insurrection by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), and the Movement for Democracy and Equality in Liberia (MODEL). As a result of the Accra Peace Accords in 2003, LURD and MODEL were each given six permanent seats in the cabinet. This should have supplied significant incentives to transform these organizations into political parties supportive of the movements’ leaders who now held political office. On the one hand, MODEL and ULIMO chose to form political organizations in 20041 and ran candidates in the election of 2005. On the other hand, the LURD leadership chose not to form a separate label and run candidates—rather, members of the LURD leadership joined the rival Unity Party (UP) and the Progressive Democrat Party (PRODEM).2 Aside from the LURD, four other rebel organizations that participated in the second war did not choose to become political parties. The Second Liberian Civil War raises an interesting puzzle regarding rebel-to-party transformations. Why do some insurgent organizations choose to form a party and run candidates for election, whereas other groups do not, despite being signatories of the peace settlement, and 1MODEL officially reorganized and changed its party name in 2004 to the Congress for Democratic Change. It has 2 LURD is largely considered a defunct organization despite the incentives given to it in the Accra Peace Accords. Though the leadership became members of the Unity Party (dominant party) most of the LURD either became organized crime in Westpoint or dissolved back into the bush. 1 being allotted similar political opportunities by that settlement?3 As many scholars have noted, the transformation of armed groups into political parties is critical for peace and democracy (Manning 2004; 2007; Carothers 2006; Allison 2006; Reilly and Nordlund 2008).