Prosecuting al Baghdadi How the United States Should Put the Leader of the Islamic State on Trial for His Crimes Nicholas Ryan Turza Prepared for use by Captain Jamie Sands, USN Counterterrorism and Operations Director for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), US Department of Defense MPP Candidate T h e Sanford School of P u b l i c P o l i c y Duke University Juris Doctor Candidate University of North Carolina School of Law 4 / 1 7 / 2 0 1 5 Prosecuting al Baghdadi How the Pentagon Should Put the Leader of the Islamic State on Trial for His Crimes Prepared for use by Captain Jamiefor the Sands, USN Counterterrorism and Operations Director Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), US Department of Defense Authored by Nicholas Turza Master of Public Policy Candidate The Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University Juris Doctor Candidate University of NorthAdvised Carolina by School of Law Tim Nichols, Executive Director of Duke University’s Counterterrorism and Public Policy Fellowship Program, Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security April 17, 2015 Disclaimer: The author prepared this paper in completion of the requirements for his Master’s Project, a major assignment for the Master of Public Policy Program at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. The research, analysis, and policy alternatives and recommendations contained in this paper are the work of the student who authored the document, and do not represent the official or unofficial views of the Sanford School of Public Policy or of Duke University. Without the specific permission of its author, this paper may not be used or cited for any purpose other than to inform the client organization about the subject matter. 1 Table of Contents Executive Summary ...............................................................................................................................4 I. Introduction of the Problem ...........................................................................................................7 II. Background of The Islamic State and its Leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi......................9 A. The Islamic State and Its Crimes.............................................................................................9 B. Al-Baghdadi and His Crimes .................................................................................................. 12 III. The Value of Capture / Prosecution Strategies ................................................................. 14 A. Background of Scholarship on Decapitation Strategies.............................................. 14 B. Independent Statistical Analysis in Support of Capture Strategies ........................ 16 IV. Legal Issues Relevant to Any Prosecution Strategy ......................................................... 17 A. The Irrelevance of Iraqi or Syrian Sovereignty to COA Analysis ............................. 17 B. Federal Law of Military Detention and Military Commissions................................. 19 V. Courses of Action of Possible Prosecution ............................................................................ 24 A. COA #1: Prosecution by an International Tribunal ...................................................... 24 a. Background .............................................................................................................................. 25 b. Method....................................................................................................................................... 28 c. Analysis of Challenges .......................................................................................................... 32 B. COA #2: Prosecution by a United States Attorney ........................................................ 38 a. Background .............................................................................................................................. 38 b. Method....................................................................................................................................... 40 c. Analysis of Challenges.......................................................................................................... 47 C. COA #3: Prosecution by An Allied Arab Government .................................................. 58 a. Background and Method..................................................................................................... 60 b. Analysis of Challenges.......................................................................................................... 64 VI. Comparative Analysis .................................................................................................................. 70 A. Criteria............................................................................................................................................ 70 B. Analysis of Each COA by each Criterion ............................................................................ 70 a. COA #1: Prosecution by an International Tribunal .................................................. 70 b. COA #2: Prosecution by a United States Attorney.................................................... 73 c. COA #3: Prosecution by an Allied Arab Government............................................... 76 D. Analysis Matrix ........................................................................................................................... 80 2 Appendix A: Independent Data Analysis .................................................................................... 81 I. Data................................................................................................................................................... 81 a. Data Overview......................................................................................................................... 81 b. Missing and Duplicative Data............................................................................................ 82 II. Significant Variables ................................................................................................................. 82 a. Dependent Variables ............................................................................................................ 82 b. Independent (Treatment) Variables .............................................................................. 82 c. Control Variables.................................................................................................................... 84 II. Model Overview.......................................................................................................................... 85 III. Findings and Analysis............................................................................................................. 87 a. Results........................................................................................................................................ 87 b. Sensitivity Analysis ............................................................................................................... 88 c. Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 88 Appendix B: Independent Data Analysis, Tables..................................................................... 90 Appendix C: Why ISIL is Not a Sovereign State in International Law ............................. 92 A. Criteria of Statehood in International Law ...................................................................... 92 B. Lack of Recognition ................................................................................................................... 96 Appendix D: A Brief Overview of the USG and the ICC.......................................................... 98 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Client Problem: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”) is a growing international terror threat. It has seized territory, and it challenges the fragile governmentsPolicy Question of Iraq: and Syria. It threatens US core values and global interests. How should the United States Government (“USG”) prosecute theOverallISIL leaderRecommendation, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadis: (“ABAB”), if it captures him? 1) The USG should consider the empirically proven benefits of capturing terrorist leaders rather killing than them . Both the scholarship discussed in Part III and the independent statistical analysis discussed in Appendix A shows the empiricism behind the benefits. The empirical evidence suggests decapitation hastens the demise of terror groups, but that “capture” decapitation strategies do so more than “kill” strategies. The intuitive rationale is that capture yields intelligence from interrogation and 2) Theprosecu USGtion should rendersonly a strategicopt for a communicationscapture / prosecuteimpact strategy of the ruleonce of it law. has sufficient admissible evidence to secure a conviction . This calculation must be made for whichever court policymakers intend to try him. Different courts have different rules of evidence and pose different practical and procedural hurdles to bringing evidence before a judge and jury. If the USG can link ABAB to ISIL’s crimes only through classified documents and source- protected witnesses, then prosecutors may not have sufficient evidence to convict without that information. This dilemma is more problematic the more