Tactical and Technological Innovation in Terrorist Campaigns

Tactical and Technological Innovation in Terrorist Campaigns

This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Tactical and technological innovation in terrorist campaigns Dolnik, Adam 2006 Dolnik, A. (2006). Tactical and technological innovation in terrorist campaigns. Doctoral thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/14420 https://doi.org/10.32657/10356/14420 Nanyang Technological University Downloaded on 01 Oct 2021 10:16:09 SGT ATTENTION: The Singapore Copyright Act applies to the use of this document. Nanyang Technological University Library Tactical and Technological Innovation in Terrorist Campaigns Adam Dolnik Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Thesis submitted to the Nanyang Technological University in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Strategic Studies) 2006 1 ATTENTION: The Singapore Copyright Act applies to the use of this document. Nanyang Technological University Library ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, my thanks go to Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, who has guided me through this effort and who stood up for me when I needed it most. I would also like to thank all of my mentors of past and present: Jason Pate, Dr. Alex Schmid, Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Dr. Amin Tarzi, Dr. Amy Sands, Dr. Stephen Garrett, Dr. Gerard Chaliand, William Monning J.D., Dr. James Wirtz, Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna, Dr. Richard Pilch, Dr. Gavin Cameron, Dr. Jonathan Tucker, Doug MacKinnon, Eric Croddy, Kimberly McCloud, Dr. Raymond Zilinskas, Dr. William Potter, Dr. Anna Vassilieva, Dr. Ibrahim al Marashi, Sundeep Nayak, Dr. Hamidullah Tarzi and others. Special thanks to Chong Yee Ming, hands down the world’s best librarian. I would also like to thank all researchers who have contributed to the terrorism field – without your work there would be no accumulation of knowledge, and nothing for me to build on. Deep thanks go to investigators Mark Tuly, Keith Weston, Jeff Penrose and Neeraj Kumar, and to the many hostages, journalists, victims, family members and witnesses who were kind enough to share their insights with me. My thanks also go to friends and fellow travelers from Afghanistan and the Northern Caucasus Petr Lebeda, Adela Kubickova, Elena Pavlova and Kelly Mc Evers. I’m also especially thankful to Ismail for risking his life while getting me in and out of Chechnya alive. I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents Vladislav and Jana for their life long support, and to my wife Katerina for her undying patience and encouragement. 2 ATTENTION: The Singapore Copyright Act applies to the use of this document. Nanyang Technological University Library CONTENTS Acknowledgements 2 Summary 4 Introduction 5 Chapter One Definitions and Methodology 8 Terrorism 8 Innovation 9 Methodology 12 Variables explained 20 PART I 34 Chapter Two Terrorist Tactics and Technologies 34 Primitive Assaults 34 Firearms 37 Stand-off weaponry 40 Hostage incidents 43 Sabotage 49 Bombings 53 Suicide bombings 60 CBRN agents 66 Nontraditional tactics 68 Analysis 71 The case of aviation terrorism 76 Conclusion 80 PART II 83 Chapter Three Aum Shinrikyo 83 History of operational progression 84 Analysis 94 Conclusion 112 Chapter Four Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 114 Command (PFLP-GC) History of operational progression 114 Analysis 126 Conclusion 144 Chapter Five Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage 146 Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RAS) History of operational progression 146 Analysis 157 Conclusion 178 Chapter Six Revolutionary Organization November 17 (17N) 179 History of operational progression 180 Analysis 187 Conclusion 204 PART III 205 Chapter Seven Toward a theory of terrorist innovation 205 Conclusion 240 After word Implications for the future 244 Bibliography 249 3 ATTENTION: The Singapore Copyright Act applies to the use of this document. Nanyang Technological University Library SUMMARY This thesis explores the subject of tactical and technological innovation in terrorist campaigns. The key question concerns the global historical trends in terrorist innovation, as well as the critical factors that are responsible for the differences in innovative practices among individual terrorist organizations. The principal method used is based on the model of structured, focused comparison developed by Alexander George. The final product then is a historical explanation of the trends in terrorist innovation, which besides contributing to theory development also has a policy relevant value by identifying the distinct characteristics of especially innovative terrorist organizations. The question of these factors is highly important, as a terrorist organization’s willingness and ability to innovate is one of the key components necessary for achieving a mass- destruction CBRN capability. Our ability to identify signature characteristics of innovation-prone terrorist organizations is thus a critical element in predictive threat assessment of future terrorist violence. The first part of the thesis focuses on general trends in terrorism, providing an overview of what tactics and technologies have been used by terrorists thus far. The aim of this section is to set the stage for further study by identifying the key points at which innovation occurred, followed by an attempt to explain the reasons behind its occurrence at those particular moments. The second part then consists of a comparative analysis of several case studies, the goal of which is take a more in depth look at the level of innovation demonstrated by various terrorist organizations in order to identify the factors that were responsible for the differences in the outcomes among these individual cases. For this purpose, ten variables hypothesized to be the key drivers behind terrorist innovations are tested in each case, in an attempt to identify the level of correlation of these variables with the level of innovativeness demonstrated by the respective groups. The final part then provides an analytical comparison of the findings, leading to the inductive construction of a comprehensive theory of terrorist innovation, which seeks to explain the circumstances and characteristics that determine a group’s involvement in tactical or technological innovation. Some of the thesis’ key findings include the observation that the main advances in terrorist methods have included incremental innovation, in the sense that terrorist have arguably improved in using the traditional tactics and technologies already available to them, as opposed to creating new means of attack per se. Another finding is that whether a group will be innovative or not will depend on a combination of factors, most importantly on the presence of expressive fascination with a sophisticated weapon or technology, or the process of innovation itself. Without the presence of this expressive component, groups forced to change their strategy, adapt to countermeasures, or prevail in competition with other groups can be expected to react by modifying their modus operandi, broadening their target categories, or intensifying their attacks, but not necessarily by engaging in radical innovation. Overall, the presence of the non-rational component such as the expressive emphasis to innovation, overly high ambitions in the operational realm, and ideological or expressive attachment to a particular type of weapon or technology serves as the strongest and most universal pre-indicator of the propensity of a terrorist group to innovate. 4 ATTENTION: The Singapore Copyright Act applies to the use of this document. Nanyang Technological University Library INTRODUCTION: Over the course of the past several years, the possibility of the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by terrorist groups has become a topic of an extensive academic and public debate. This debate has thus far largely oscillated around two main components: the capability to acquire and successfully weaponize CBRN agents, and the motivation to produce mass-fatalities. At the level of capability, terrorists have traditionally not been deemed to be able to overcome the significant hurdles involved in CBRN acquisition and weaponization. However, the breakup of the Soviet Union has according to many authors eroded many of these constraints. Not only has the questionable security of former state-level CBRN programs made it easier for terrorists to gain an access to lethal agents, the know-how necessary for successful weaponization of these agents has also allegedly become more available to terrorists, mainly trough the “brain drain” caused by the high level of unemployment among ex-Soviet scientists, as well as the proliferation of communication technologies such as the internet. Overall, the capability constraints associated with CBRN terrorism are generally regarded as gradually eroding. Besides the ability to acquire and weaponize successfully lethal agents, “superterrorists” must also possess the motivation to inflict indiscriminate mass casualties. But despite the fact that terrorism does typically involve killing and destruction, most traditional terrorists have practiced a level of restraint on their activities. Traditionally, terrorists have not necessarily been interested in killing a lot of people, but rather in inflicting only the minimum amount of damage necessary in order to gain publicity and spread fear, but also to attract sympathy and support. An act of mass killing would likely hinder such support rather than attract it, especially if it were to be achieved by

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