Jaak Panksepp/Jules B. Panksepp The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology nly recently have Abstract ence of any sociobiologi- Opsychologists seri- cal mechanisms that ously considered how the Modern evolutionary psychology is demonstrating, evolved in the massive various abilities of the hu- once again, that an uncritical enthusiasm for the human neocortex within man mind were created gene’s-eye point of view can easily lead to conceptual the Pleistocene Environ- during the long course of excesses that go far beyond the available evidence. ment of Evolutionary Ad- neural evolution. This ap- Seven major flaws in the evolutionary psychology aptation (EEA). There is proach, called evolution- agenda are outlined. With its enthusiasm for human yet no well-established ary psychology, has capti- inclusive-fitness issues, this variant of sociobiology empirical reason for view- vated many investigators has expressed little interest in what we already know ing any of those associa- (see WRIGHT 1994; BETZIG about the brains and behaviors of non-human ani- tion areas of the neocor- 1997; BUSS 1999; mals--facts that should be of foundational impor- tex as genetically pre-or- COSMIDES/TOOBY 2000), tance for thinking about many human abilities. To dained ‘modules’ that and it has encouraged the create a lasting understanding of ‘human nature’, we generate specific types of conceptualization of a va- must incorporate the lessons from the past half-centu- psychological strategies. riety of special-purpose ry of research on subcortical emotional and motiva- Although we have gained evolutionary solutions tional systems that all mammals share. Seven a new taste for natural (e.g., genetically in- examples of how a study of these systems can high- mental kinds (e.g., intrin- grained adaptive func- light some of the core problems of evolutionary psy- sic emotional categories) tions or ‘modules’) that chology are outlined. From this perspective, the within the human brain may exist within the hu- developmental interactions among ancient special- (BROWN 1991; BETZIG man brain. The aim of this purpose circuits and more recent general-purpose 1997), we must remember essay is to analyze the ex- brain mechanisms can generate many of the ‘modu- to be especially cautious tent to which such ap- larized’ human abilities that evolutionary psychology in ascribing discrete spe- proaches are providing has entertained. By simply accepting the remarkable cial-purpose functions to degree of neocortical plasticity within the human unsubstantiated explana- brain association areas brain, especially during development, genetically-dic- tions of human behavior that appear at birth to be tated, sociobiological ‘modules’ begin to resemble rather than clarifying real- largely general-purpose products of dubious human ambition rather than of ities of human and animal ‘computational’ devices. sound scientific reasoning. brain/minds. Many inves- Many of the apparent spe- tigators, including our- Key words cial-purpose functions in selves, feel that evolution- the higher regions of ary psychology has re- Sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, brain, modu- adult brains may only cently gone too far in its larity, emotional systems, epigenetic landscapes, in- emerge as a result of spe- epistemological agenda, clusive fitness, human nature. cific types of life experi- as it attempts to uncover ences. In contrast, there the brain ‘mechanisms’ that constitute ‘human na- are many special-purpose, genetically-dedicated cir- ture’. In our estimation, such issues cannot be re- cuits for various emotions and motivations in sub- solved without a full confrontation with the relevant cortical regions shared by all mammals. cross-species, neuro–psycho–behavioral evidence. The interactions between those specific brain op- Although we now realize that the 20th Century im- erating systems and life experiences can, presum- age of the whole brain as simply a massive general- ably, mediate the formation of an enormous diver- purpose learning machine was fundamentally incor- sity of ‘modularized’ software functions in higher rect, investigators have yet to demonstrate the exist- neocortical regions of the brain. If this view is largely Evolution and Cognition ❘ 108 ❘ 2000, Vol. 6, No. 2 The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology correct, we must proceed in a more epistemologi- ing whether its hypotheses reflect biological realities cally disciplined way than has become common or only heuristics that permit provocative statistical practice in modern evolutionary psychology. Al- predictions. though we applaud the willingness of evolutionary These considerations become especially pertinent psychologists to open up the Pandora’s box of innate when we consider that some evolutionary psychol- faculties within psychology once more, we fear that ogists now explicitly claim their approaches can the parochial tendencies of many current views may shed light on how the brain controls mind and be- promote needless controversies reminiscent of those havior (e.g., see TOOBY/COSMIDES 2000). To us, this that characterized the ‘sociobiology wars’ of the past seems highly unlikely. Accordingly, we offer the fol- quarter century. Although an appreciation of the lowing analysis to help direct psycho–evolutionary power of inclusive-fitness can be incredibly produc- thinking in a more balanced and productive direc- tive in addressing many issues in population genet- tion, where the available empirical riches from the ics and behavioral ecology, it cannot serve as a pre- Affective, Behavioral and Cognitive Neurosciences cise tool to dissect the nature of brain/mind can be used effectively to construct a genuine image mechanisms. How, then, might we generate credible of how the human brain/mind is actually organized. perspectives that diminish the likelihood of arous- In the first half of the paper, we take a conceptual ing incendiary political passions, such as those that approach, using the ‘TOOBY & COSMIDES tradition’ as characterized the ‘sociobiology wars’? the most prominent example of current thinking in Biologists have long accepted evolutionary per- the field. In the second half, we proceed to real brain spectives as historical scenarios for the emergence of issues that can be dissected empirically. We will not all bodily organ systems. However, biologists have attempt to summarize specific sociobiological find- also come to recognize that evolutionary viewpoints ings in this paper, and we shall assume that readers are not especially useful for most of their ongoing are reasonably familiar with the types of views that experimental investigations. Evolutionary scenarios have been espoused by evolutionary psychologists provide only marginal insights for guiding the ex- during the past decade. At the outset, we regret that perimental analyses of how biological systems actu- space constraints do not allow us to discuss all of the ally function. Scientific demonstration of the func- available evolutionary views in the detail needed for tional mechanisms within the brain still need to be a comprehensive analysis. achieved through traditional experimental ap- proaches. This poses a great dilemma for modern The Creative Excesses of evolutionary psychological perspectives, for it is much easier to postulate adaptive ‘modules’ in the Evolutionary Psychology brain/mind than to demonstrate their neuropsycho- To begin, we will briefly consider the general histor- logical nature. Such considerations lead to one over- ical threads that have led to the present revolution arching conclusion: Real neural functions across a in evolutionary thinking and then discuss several variety of species should provide definitive con- distinct ways to conceptualize the adaptive func- straints on speculation about what evolution did or tions of the brain/mind. What is currently hailed as did not create within human and animal brain/ mainstream evolutionary psychology (i.e., symbol- minds. ized most commonly by the cognitively-based tradi- A new breed of evolutionary psychologists ap- tion initiated by BARKOW/TOOBY/COSMIDES 1992) is pears to disagree with such a marginal utility view of making radical theoretical claims concerning the evolutionary scenarios. For the past dozen years they human mind, some of which are contrary to what is have been asserting, often with a tone of revolution- already known about the mammalian brain. We ary fervor, that our ability to peer into the hazy crys- believe the evidential disparity between their adap- tal ball of ‘recent’ human ancestry will help us tive theory of ‘human nature’ and current neuro- fathom the intrinsic nature—the evolutionary epis- science understanding is largely due to the separate temology—of the human brain/mind. We, as well as and remarkably non-interactive paths taken by psy- many other scholars who have long accepted evolu- chological and biological approaches to the brain/ tionary principles as being ontologically correct, are mind during the 20th century. forced to question this new and potentially virulent Once upon a time many philosophers and psy- strain of dubious neo-DARWINIAN thinking. Without chologists believed that the mind was a tabula rasa a strong linkage to neuroscientific research, evolu- upon which raw experiences were transformed into tionary psychology has no credible way of determin- knowledge through the power of associative learn- Evolution and Cognition ❘ 109 ❘ 2000, Vol. 6, No. 2 Jaak Panksepp/Jules B. Panksepp ing. That era should have dimmed forever once