39 A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO By John Young Copyright Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2015 First published in September 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organi- zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Series editor: Emile LeBrun Proofread by Donald Strachan ([email protected]) Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Rick Jones ([email protected]) Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland ISBN 978-2-940548-17-0 2 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 39 Contents Acronyms and abbreviations ....................................................................................................................................................... 5 I. Introduction and key findings ............................................................................................................................................... 6 II. Background .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 III. Political crisis to the Juba massacre ....................................................................................................................... 13 IV. Formation of the SPLM-IO military leadership ................................................................................. 17 V. SPLM-IO political leadership takes form ....................................................................................................... 21 VI. SPLM-IO strategies ......................................................................................................................................................................... 24 VII. Non-Nuer members and forces ................................................................................................................................ 30 Nuer diaspora 32 VIII. IGAD peace talks .......................................................................................................................................................................... 34 Arusha talks 37 Cessation of Hostilities agreement 40 Monitoring and Verification Mechanism 41 IX. SPLM-IO conventions ................................................................................................................................................................ 42 Nasir convention 42 Pagak I conference 43 Pagak II conference 47 X. IGAD Plus ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 50 Young A Fractious Rebellion 3 XI. IO regional relations ...................................................................................................................................................................... 53 Sudan 53 Uganda 54 Ethiopia 55 Kenya 55 XII. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 57 XIII. Postscript .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 59 Endnotes ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 66 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 67 About the author ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 69 Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 70 4 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 39 Acronyms and abbreviations ANC African National Congress AU African Union CCM Chama Cha Mapinduzi COH Cessation of Hostilities EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front EU European Union FPD Former Political Detainees GNU Government of National Unity GUN Greater Upper Nile GRSS Government of the Republic of South Sudan IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development IO SPLM-IO (see below) JEM Justice and Equality Movement MVM Monitoring and Verification Mechanism NCP National Congress Party PSC Peace and Security Council SAF Sudan Armed Forces SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SPLM/A-N Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North SPLM-IO South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces SSLA South Sudan Liberation Army SSRRA South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Force Young A Fractious Rebellion 5 I. Introduction and key findings In the wake of the killing of Nuer soldiers and civilians by elements of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in mid-December 2013, war broke out between the Salva Kiir-led Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and what became the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposi- tion (SPLM-IO) under Dr. Riek Macher. This development shocked the interna- tional community, which had only recently overseen the secession of the country from Sudan to achieve what was hoped would be a sustainable peace. Within a month of the outbreak of hostilities, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), assisted by a Troika of Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States—which had overseen the negotiations that led to South Sudan’s secession—were mediating the latest conflict. Both the GRSS and the SPLM-IO repeatedly voiced their support for the peace process and signed a Cessation of Hostilities (COH) agreement, but it was largely ignored, the monitoring and verification process largely fell by the wayside, and the war continued relentlessly. Some two million people were displaced and tens of thousands killed, mostly in the largely Nuer inhabited areas of Greater Upper Nile (GUN). By early 2015 it was clear that the efforts of IGAD mediators to reach an agreement based on power sharing among the South Sudanese political elites was failing and in March it formally collapsed. Parallel to the IGAD negotia- tions in Addis Ababa, leaders of the ruling parties of Ethiopia, South Africa, and Tanzania attempted to reconcile the three wings of the SPLM to either sup- port the IGAD initiative or, in the case of South Africa and Uganda, as the preferred means to end the conflict, although the Ethiopians largely dropped out of the initiative. While the IGAD mediators made progress, they did not bridge the gap between the GRSS and SPLM-IO, and many in the SPLM-IO opposed their organization’s continuing affiliation with the SPLM and par- ticipation in the Arusha process, as the South African-Ugandan process was labelled. In response, a new peace initiative was announced that would have an IGAD core but included five non-IGAD African countries and other inter- national organizations as observers. It was dubbed ‘IGAD Plus’. 6 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 39 Against a background of continuing war and failed peace-making, this study attempts to get beyond the public face of the organization as represented by those at the peace talks and provide analysis and background of the many dimensions of the SPLM-IO. Specifically, it considers the formation of the SPLM-IO, identifies the organization’s mode of operation and key political and military actors, and reports on its conferences at Nasir and Pagak in formu- lating its direction and maintaining a fragile unity among the fractious rebels. Key military developments through mid-2015, the main controversies within the rebel organization, relations with regional actors, and the course of the peace process are also examined. This study draws on work conducted by the author from the eve of the con- flict in2013 through mid-June 2015 in South Sudan and Addis Ababa and relies on both interviews and documents. Research was completed before the conflict between some of the SPLM-IO generals and Dr. Riek Macher led to their dis- missal and before the peace agreement was signed in August 2015. These topics could not be taken up at length in the current paper but are addressed briefly in a postscript at the end of the paper. Among the paper’s key findings: • There is no evidence that Dr. Riek Machar attempted a coup, as alleged by Salva Kiir and the GRSS. The immediate cause of the civil war was the kill- ing of Nuer in the SPLA and among the