EVOLVING CUBAN-CARICOM RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS H. MICHAEL ERISMAN Political Science Department Indiana State University Terre Haute, Indiana Prepared for presentation at the 1994 Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association held in Merida, Mexico (May 23-28, 1994) EVOLVING CUBAN-CARICOM RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS A fascinating and in many respects a somewhat peculiar courtship is currently underway in the Caribbean between the English-speaking countries who collectively comprise the CARICOM (Caribbean Community) association' and revolutionary Cuba. Historically, despite their close geographic proximity, these two parties have for the most part displayed little inclination to establish truly close, cooperative ties. Instead, they have generally been content to maintain what diplomats cryptically call "correct" relations (which translated into policy usually means little more than extending formal recognition and perhaps exchanging ambassadors) while pursuing basically distinct and unrelated hemispheric agendas. Havana's attention has (with a few exceptions that are noted later) been riveted primarily on the mainland Hispanic nations and on its triangular relationship, with the two Cold War superpowers while CARICOM's members have focused mainly on questions related to the achievement of higher levels of intra-community integration and to North/South developmental programs (e.g., with the European Community via the LomO Accords and with Washington via the CBI--Caribbean Basin Initiative). Recently, however, a startling transformation of attitudes and policies has occurred that has shattered this tradition of mutual indifference. On their part, the Cubans have become ardent CARICOM suitors, dispatching extremely high-level delegations throughout the region to explore the prospects for greater collaboration with their Anglophone neighbors at both the governmental and private sector levels. The keystone of this campaign has been Havana's efforts to establish an institutionalized relationship with CARICOM which would involve at a minimum close economic/developmental cooperation and ideally would lead to eventual Cuban membership in the organization or some equivalent thereof. 'The thirteen members of CARICOM, with their dates of independence from Great Britain in parentheses, are: Jamaica (1962), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Barbados (1966), Guyana (1966), The Bahamas (1973), Grenada (1974), Dominica (1978), St. Lucia (1979), St. Vincent and the Grenadines ((1979), Antigua and Barbuda (1981), Belize (1981), St. Kitts-Nevis (1983), and Montserrat (the only non-independent member of the organization). 2 The incentive for such initiatives is, of course, well-known. For many years, the island's basic developmental needs were essentially guaranteed due to its special Soviet bloc ties involving preferential trade agreements and access to substantial amounts of assistance. One novel (and highly lucrative) aid program allowed Cuba to buy large amounts of Soviet oil on highly favorable terms (i.e., low prices with payment in rubles) and then sell whatever was left after its domestic demands had been met on the open market. This arrangement generated large amounts of hard currency that Havana then used to underwrite its purchase of Western goods and services (especially from the European Community and even from subsidiaries of U.S. corporations operating in third countries). Such collaboration generated a ripple effect that spilled over into other issue areas. In particular, it served to lessen Havana's vulnerability to the economic warfare that Washington was waging against the Revolution while simultaneously enhancing the Fidelistas' capabilities to pursue an extremely audacious foreign policy. The 1970s were an especially active period for such globalism as Cuba made a generally successful bid to establish its credentials as a leader among the Third World nations, was heavily involved in winning two wars in Africa (Angola and Ethiopia), and launched ambitious military/developmental aid programs. This equation changed radically as the socialist bloc and the benefits that the island reaped from its existence disappeared. No longer was Havana able to operate as it once did on international scene, implementing a complex strategy of capitalizing upon its Soviet/Eastern European ties to help stabilize its economy and thereby putting itself in a better position to play a vigorous proactive role in world affairs. Indeed, as opposed to functioning as a major influence-wielder on the international scene, it must now concentrate on minimizing its potential vulnerability to hostile external forces (particularly those centered in Washington and Miami). Consequently Cuba is now trying to diversify its international relations, particularly the economic dimension thereof, as much as possible. It is within this overall context that its courtship of CARICOM has occurred. More remarkable than these overtures themselves has been the CARICOM response. Previously the cultural/ideological differences that distinguished the English-speaking Caribbean from Cuba combined with concern about U.S. vindictiveness would likely have served to thwart any serious engagement. But clearly the phenomenon of a new international political order that has attracted so much attention at the global level has also arrived in the Caribbean, one of its most dramatic manifestations being the willingness of the CARICOM countries to embrace Havana's integration efforts despite Washington's threats of retaliation. Can this novel experiment in South/South collaboration be sustained and perhaps even acquire added momentum? In an attempt 3 to provide at least a preliminary answer, this inquiry will first survey the basic developmental dynamics involved in the Cuban/CARICOM courtship and then undertake a cost-risk/benefit analysis of the process from the perspective of both parties involved that hopefully will furnish some basis for probability projections regarding future trends in the relationship. CUBA'S EVOLVING RELATIONS WITH THE CARICOM STATES The early 1970s saw Havana launch an effort to normalize its relations across a broad spectrum of countries. In the CARICOM region, this initiative led to diplomatic ties with Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad/Tobago in 1972. The most cordial links were forged with Jamaica following Michael Manley's election as Prime Minister in 1972. Although a democratic socialist rather than a Marxist, Manley nevertheless displayed considerable admiration for the Cuban Revolution (particularly following his 1976 re-election landslide). Not only did his foreign policy take on a more radically nonaligned coloration, but he also exhibited growing interest in the Fidelista model of socio/economic development. Havana, as might be expected, responded enthusiastically, extending substantial moral and material support to what it perceived to be Kingston's progressive proclivities. Certainly during his highly successful Jamaican tour (October 16-21, 1977), Castro seized every available opportunity to stress his eagerness to extend developmental aid, promising buses for Cuban-built schools, tractors for sugar cooperatives, prefabricated housing plants for construction workers, and doctors/teachers/technicians wherever they were needed. The attention lavished on Jamaica was not idiosyncratic, but rather can be seen as symptomatic of Havana's desire to play an increasingly assertive role in the Anglophone Caribbean. Accordingly, developmental aid personnel were also dispatched to other countries such as Guyana, Suriname, and St. Lucia. Beyond the progress registered by these normalization endeavors, a major breakthrough (at least from Havana's perspective) occurred in the radicalization of the area's politics when a group of young leftists led by Maurice Bishop staged the Commonwealth Caribbean's first successful armed insurrection in Grenada in March 1979 and proceeded to begin to implement their brand of radical socialism on the small island. Although the Cubans had played no direct role in Bishop's coup, they had maintained strong fraternal relations with his New Jewel Movement over the years and moved very quickly to demonstrate their ongoing solidarity with his new government by providing arms, security advisors, and various types of developmental assistance. Ironically, just as it appeared that Cuba's increased Caribbean assertiveness was beginning to pay major dividends, the political waters suddenly became more murky as the prevailing flow 4 of the ideological tides shifted. The emergence of Bishop's regime in Grenada as well as the triumph of Nicaragua's Sandinistas in July 1979 were obviously bright spots for Havana, but elsewhere in the Caribbean moderates and indeed often strongly anti-communist conservatives scored a series of electoral victories over left-wing parties. The most important race occurred in Jamaica (October 1980) where Harvard-educated Edward Seaga won convincingly with 57.6 percent of the vote over incumbent Michael Manley. 2 Shortly thereafter, following the lead of the new Reagan administration in Washington, Kingston adopted a hardline anti-Cuban stance; diplomatic relations were severed in October 1981 and practically all Cubans were expelled from the island. The emergence of this increasingly inhospitable environment was accelerated by developments in Washington, where Ronald Reagan assumed office determined not only to pursue the containment concept much more vigorously than