C O R P O R A T I O N Evaluating the Army’s Ability to Regenerate History and Future Options Shanthi Nataraj, M. Wade Markel, Jaime L. Hastings, Eric V. Larson, Jill E. Luoto, Christopher E. Maerzluft, Craig A. Myatt, Bruce R. Orvis, Christina Panis, Michael H. Powell, Jose R. Rodriguez, Tiffany Tsai For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1637 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9663-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. 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Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This document reports results from a research project entitled, “Developing a Strate- gic Framework for Army Regeneration.” The purpose of the project was to assess the Army’s ability to regenerate active component end strength using a variety of acces- sions, retention, and force management policies. This report presents a historical synthesis of the Army’s efforts to expand during the decade following September 11, 2001. It identifies the various policy levers the Army can use to achieve its targets and conducts an empirical analysis of the limits on the Army’s ability to expand under a variety of external conditions. It also identifies the larger policy implications of maintaining the capacity to expand as necessary. This research was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, U.S. Army, and was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Personnel, Training, and Health Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD156908. iii Contents Preface ................................................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...................................................................................vii Summary .............................................................................................. ix Acknowledgements ..................................................................................xv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 Background ............................................................................................. 1 Purpose .................................................................................................. 2 How the Report Is Organized ........................................................................ 3 CHAPTER TWO Efforts to Expand the Army ......................................................................... 5 Research Approach and Sources ...................................................................... 5 Expanding Capacity ................................................................................... 6 October 2001–December 2003: 9/11 Attacks to First End Strength Increase ................. 7 January 2004–December 2006: First End Strength Increase to the Start of the Grow the Army Initiative .......................................................................11 January 2007–December 2010: Duration of the Grow the Army Initiative ...................18 From January 2011 Forward: Drawing Down ................................................... 23 Beyond Soldiers: Using Contractors to Augment Operational Capacity ...................... 23 Summary and Conclusion ...........................................................................25 CHAPTER THREE Regeneration Scenarios .............................................................................29 Estimating Required Operational Capacity ...................................................... 30 Conclusion .............................................................................................32 v vi Evaluating the Army’s Ability to Regenerate: History and Future Options CHAPTER FOUR Conceptual Framework and Policy Options for Regeneration ..............................33 Policy Options for Regeneration ....................................................................35 Summary ...............................................................................................51 CHAPTER FIVE Modeling Results ....................................................................................53 920K Scenario .........................................................................................53 980K Scenario .........................................................................................63 CHAPTER SIX Conclusions and Implications for Preparation .................................................69 Major Findings ........................................................................................70 Recommendations ................................................................................... 77 Conclusion .............................................................................................81 APPENDIXES A. Additional Modeling Results ..................................................................83 B. Sensitivity of Results with Regeneration Wedges ..........................................89 Abbreviations .........................................................................................95 References ............................................................................................ 97 Figures and Tables Figures 2.1. Enlistment Incentives and Average Incentive Amounts .............................. 9 2.2. Army Reserve Component Members on Active Duty from September 2001 to June 2009 in Support of Operations Noble Eagle, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom .................................................................13 4.1. Conceptual Model of Active Component Regeneration ............................33 4.2. Conceptual Timeline of Active Component Regeneration ........................ 34 4.3. Average Continuation Rates for Each of Five Scenarios, by YOS ................. 50 5.1. 920K Scenario: Estimated Enlisted Shortfall Using Different Policy Levers .... 54 5.2. 920K Scenario: Estimated Enlisted Shortfall Under Different Conditions .......55 5.3. 920K Scenario: Estimated Enlisted Shortfall Under Different Conditions, Greater Enlistment Eligibility ......................................................... 56 5.4. Immediate Demand .....................................................................61 5.5. Gradual Buildup from Base Level of Demand .......................................62 5.6. 980K Scenario: Estimated Enlisted Shortfall Using Different Policy Levers .... 64 5.7. 980K Scenario: Estimated Enlisted Shortfall Under Different Conditions ...... 64 5.8. 980K Scenario: Estimated Enlisted Shortfall Under Different Conditions, Greater Enlistment Eligibility ..........................................................65 A.1. 920K Scenario: Estimated Enlisted Shortfall Under Different Conditions ...... 84 A.2. 980K Scenario: Estimated Enlisted Shortfall Under Different Conditions .......85 Tables S.1. Army End Strength Options Under Consideration ................................. ix 2.1. Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2007–2013 ..... 24 3.1. Army End Strength Options Considered ............................................ 30 3.2. Estimating Additional Regular Army Strength Needed to Generate Capacity Equivalent to 547K Regular Army Force ..................................31 vii viii Evaluating the Army’s Ability to Regenerate: History and Future Options 4.1. Accession Scenarios and Inputs ........................................................39 4.2. Example of Regeneration Results for 450K, Average Recruiting Conditions, 5,821 OPRA Foxhole Recruiters, and Lesser Enlistment Eligibility Policies .....41 4.3. Summary of Conditions and Assumptions Considered for Modeling Accessions, Retention, and Force Mix ................................................52 5.1. 920K Scenario: Estimated NCO Experience .........................................58 5.2. 920K Scenario: Estimated Incremental Costs of Recruiting and Retention ......59 5.3. 920K Scenario: Estimated MOB:Dwell Ratio Assuming Immediate Increase in Demand .....................................................................61 5.4. 920K Scenario: Estimated MOB:Dwell Ratio Assuming Linear Increase in Demand ................................................................................63