Kosovo Calling International Conference to Launch Position Papers on Kosovo’s Relation with EU and Regional Non-recognising Countries Kosovo Calling International Conference to Launch Position Papers on Kosovo’s Relation with EU and Regional Non-recognising Countries Content Spain 7 Slovakia 31 Romania 51 Greece 91 Cyprus 121 Serbia 137 Bosna and Hercegovina 153 Biographies 169 Published by: Kosovo Foundation for Open Society and British Council Copy: 500 2 Foreword Kosovo Calling 3 Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in these papers are those of the authors and not of the organizations who supported the project or Governments in the respective countries. 4 FOREWORD Four years after independence, Kosovo is still only recognised by less than half of the world (89 out of 193 UN members ). Arguably, the non-recognitions which matter the most come from the region, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, and - given ǯ Ǧ ϐ Ǣ Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. In order to better understand the politics and history behind these standpoints, the seven position papers in this book were commissioned from leading members of academia and civil society in each country. Each paper presents a detailed overview of the countries’ positions prior to and following Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence in 2008, and analyses if policies towards Kosovo have been affected by the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion, which issued in July 2010. Authors have also provided conclusions and recommendations on how bilateral relationships can be improved and deepened. These papers were compiled throughout 2011 and although there have been changes in the internal politics of some of the countries since then, the analysis presented retains value for all those seeking to understand the obstacles standing in the way of Kosovo forging a closer and more constructive relationship with each country. Furthermore, it is in Kosovo’s long-term interest to develop new channels and tools of communication with all EU members and their respective publics - including those that are presently not recognising the new reality - not only to eventually obtain recognitions, but also to build a solid base for strong bonds between Kosovo and all EU members, which a pre-condition for Kosovo’s successful integration in the European Union. We sincerely hope that opinion makers, elected representatives, civil society, media, and ultimately those in charge of state affairs will take a moment to read this book and understand that Kosovo’s European perspective and regional integration cannot become a true reality unless new approaches are developed with each of these countries. A new dynamic in Kosovo’s relationship with these countries would strengthen Kosovo’s EU integration prospects and amplify its voice on the regional and international stage, to the ϐ Ǥ Kosovo Calling 5 6 Spain Kosovo Calling 7 8 Spain Spain’s Position on Kosovo By Jordi Vaquer i Fanés, Director of CIDOB, Barcelona Centre for International Studies October 2011 ϐ ǯ independence. The government’s position is not devoid of controversy in Spain, but it is supported by the two political parties which command an overwhelming majority in Parliament, which are the same two with any options to be in power after the forthcoming November 20 (2011), election. This paper analyses the roots of the Spanish non-recognition stance and its evolution since February 2008. The main conclusion is that there currently are no domestic roots for a change in the non- recognising position, but that the pro-recognition argument can be made stronger and that the Spanish position can evolve towards less belligerent and more helpful practices. Spain and Kosovo, Spain in Kosovo before independence Spain was never a major player in the Balkan scenario. The relations between Spain and Yugoslavia had been relatively cordial since the end of Franco, and indeed some Spanish politicians were tempted to follow the Yugoslav non-alignment movement, like Malta and Cyprus did at the time. These good relations, however, remained mostly at the diplomatic level, and Spain chose to focus on its integration in the Euro- Atlantic organisations (the European Communities and NATO). When the situation in Yugoslavia started to deteriorate, Spain was a newcomer to EU politics, and its main priority in EU external relations was to balance the sudden focus on the East with at least some commitment to the southern Mediterranean. From the start of the Yugoslav crisis, Spain was reluctant to break European unity, and therefore accepted solutions against its political instincts, such as the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Spain participated in all European initiatives and it saw its involvement in the Balkans as proof of its status as an important European player. When the Kosovo war started in 1998, Spain had become an important contributor to international missions in Bosnia (1000 troops) and Albania (400). Participating in the Kosovo campaign was a relatively easy decision, with all parties in Parliament voting in favour, with the exception of the radical left (23 out of 350 seats). It is important to bear in mind that, at that time, two Spaniards occupied key Kosovo Calling 9 positions: Javier Solana was the NATO Secretary-General and Felipe González had ͳͻͻͺ ǦǦϐ ǡ ϐ Ǥ particularly sensitive to the issue, although in Spain it tends to reject international missions, in particular those led by NATO. Spain’s position was, by and large, dictated by its Europeanism and its involvement in international institutions. Participation in the bombing campaign was modest but unequivocal: Spain not only allowed the use of its soil, strategically placed between the United States and the operations theatre, but contributed with war ships and planes, some of which (eight F-18) took part in the bombings. In the aftermath, Spain contributed a battalion to KFOR ǡͳͲǡǦ ȋϐ in size for most of the period). A Spaniard, Lieutenant General Juan Ortuño, became the head of KFOR in 2000. A total of 22.000 Spanish soldiers served in Kosovo (and nine lost their lives there) during that time: Kosovo has been a forming experience for a large part of the Spanish military. Humanitarian assistance complemented Spain’s military role. A total of 1.010 tonnes of food aid, more than 10.000 cases of sanitary assistance, and 120 rapid impact projects (road and electrical lines repairs, water pipes, conditioning of schools) were carried out in those 10 years in western Kosovo. The total cost of Spain’s involvement in Kosovo is estimated by Spain’s Ministry of Defence to be at 843 million euro.1 Spain’s extensive military presence and its humanitarian assistance did not translate ϐǤ ǡ remained very limited even before independence. In 2006, Spain accounted for 1% of all of Kosovo’s imports, and its share of Kosovo’s exports was even smaller. The picture was not much better in terms of investment.2 In Spanish society, by and large, the actors with some knowledge and interest in Kosovo were the few journalists who had covered the war (and kept alive the image of those times), very few analysts, some humanitarian aid workers, and those with links to the international missions. Spain had a continuous military presence in Kosovo since 1999, but it was not even a member of the Contact Group and during all the Balkan crises Spain was a follower, rather than a leader, in the European Union. Its military involvement grew in relative importance as other countries, including Russia and the United States, progressively pulled out of the region. However, even though it had between 600 and 800 soldiers in Kosovo for 10 years, the Spanish government chose not to have a diplomatic presence in Pristina, unlike not only the countries that would later support its independence 1 ϐ ǡhttp://www.defensa.gob.es/areasTematicas/ misiones/historico/misiones/mision_01.html 2 See Fonfría Mesa, Antonio ‘Viabilidad económica del futuro de Kosovo’ in Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa nº2 Futuro de Kosovo. Implicaciones para España, Madrid: CESEDEN. 10 Spain (UK, US, France, Germany), but also some that would not (Greece, Russia). Relations with the Kosovar authorities, therefore, took place mostly through the international missions present there, rather than directly, even before independence. The genesis of the Spanish position against Kosovo’s independence Despite giving some indications in private that they opposed an independent Kosovo3, Spanish leaders and diplomats by and large refrained from making public statements in that direction, even when other EU members like Cyprus and Romania were doing Ǥϐ unilateral declarations of independence, but that it would contribute to a common Euro-Atlantic and, in particular, a common EU position or, in the words of Foreign Minister Moratinos, “wait and look for the unity of the European Union and the respect for international legality”4. Its quiet opposition to unilateral independence did not shield Spain from the major diplomatic blunder that represented President Vladimir Putin’s declarations in Moscow, stating that the EU applied double standards, as it considered the recognition of a unilateral independence of Kosovo while in Spain “people do not want to live under the same state”.5 The following day, Spain’s Vice President María Teresa Fernández de la Vega replied that the situation in Kosovo “is in no way comparable to that of Spain”,6 a sentence which became ubiquitous in ϐ ǡǤ ǯ ϐ of independence when, before entering the meeting of EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Miguel Ángel Moratinos announced that Spain would not recognise Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, because it did not respect international law. At the meeting Spain tabled a draft resolution which, in the end, was the one adopted by the 27 member states by unanimity.