UNIVERSITY OF READING What is the Virtuous Emotional Response to our Wrongdoing? PhD Department of Philosophy George Mason September 2015 Abstract Though we are inclined to think those who have acted wrongly should feel bad, we also worry that feeling bad may be futile: that it may only make things worse. I argue that we ought to feel bad not as a way to secure good outcomes, but because feeling bad is part of what it is to be respectful and to value our ethical standing. Employing Aristotle's method of appearances, I provide an account which can explain our confident judgements and resolve cases we find puzzling. In Part One I consider our initial intuitions and puzzles, and explain my method and assumptions. In Part Two I analyse the emotions of guilt, shame, regret and remorse, arguing that each of these emotions are appropriate in different circumstances. In Part Three, I use this analysis to explain the clear cases and resolve the problem cases. Declaration I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged. Page 1 of 140 I am grateful to everyone who has helped me improve this thesis, but especially to my supervisors, David Owens, David Oderberg, and Bart Streumer; my examiners, John Gardner and Max De-Gaynesford; my good friends Owen Scarr and Emily Baxter; and to my colleagues on the University of Reading PhD program. This thesis is dedicated to Julie and Alan, my parents, who could never have been more supportive. Page 2 of 140 Contents Part One: Introduction Chapter 1: The question, and how to answer it 1.1 The Question 1.1.1 The easy answer 7 1.1.2 Problem cases 8 1.2 How I will answer the question 8 Chapter 2: Assumptions 2.1 Two types of assumptions 10 2.2 Necessary assumptions 2.2.1 Cognitivism about emotions 10 2.2.2 Aristotle's method of appearances, or reflective equilibrium 13 2.2.3 Only as much precision as is warranted by the subject matter 14 2.2.4 Summary 15 2.3 Informative assumptions 2.3.1 Particular considered judgements 16 2.3.2 Objectivity 16 2.3.3 Morality, ethics and prudence 16 2.3.4 Emotions are ethically important 17 2.3.5 Mental health 18 Chapter 3: Emotions 3.1 Terminology for the appraisal of emotions 19 3.2 Different types of felt affect 3.2.1 Good and bad feelings 20 3.2.2 Strong and weak feelings 24 3.3 Occurrent and dispositional emotions 25 3.4 Arguments that I will be avoiding 26 3.5 Arguments from valuing 27 Chapter 4: When does the past matter? 4.1 Mattering 4.1.1 Mattering and reasons 28 4.2 Alternatives to the Eudaimonia Principle 4.2.1 The past doesn't matter 29 4.2.2 The past is like the present 29 Page 3 of 140 4.2.3 Gardner's Continuity Thesis 30 4.2.4 Gradually fading importance 32 4.3 The Eudaimonia Principle 4.3.1 Eudaimonia 33 4.3.2 Affecting Eudaimonia 34 4.4 Defending the Eudaimonia Principle 4.4.1 A direct effect on eudaimonia is sufficient for the past to matter 36 4.4.2 Affecting what we need for eudaimonia and whether we have it is sufficient for the past to matter 37 4.4.3 Affecting what is virtuous in the present is sufficient for the past to matter 38 4.4.4 Some effect on eudaimonia is necessary for the past to matter 39 4.5 Objections and replies 4.5.1 Is it true that affecting what is virtuous is sufficient to matter to how we ought to feel? 41 4.5.2 Triviality 43 Part Two: Why feel bad? Chapter 5: Guilt 5.1 What is guilt 5.1.1 The Straightforward Account 45 5.1.2 Greenspan's Identificatory Account 47 5.1.3 Velleman's Normative Vulnerability Account 50 5.1.4 Revising the Straightforward Account 52 5.1.5 Defending the Revised Straightforward Account 55 5.2 Why feel guilty? 5.2.1 Harman's analysis of guilt 58 5.2.2 Harman's arguments against guilt 58 5.3 When is it appropriate to feel guilty? 5.3.1 The appropriateness of different types of guilt 66 5.3.2 Seriousness and appropriateness 68 5.3.3 Unfitting guilt can be appropriate 69 5.3.4 Summary 72 Chapter 6: Shame 6.1 What is shame 6.1.1 Taylor and Williams: shame and self-evaluation 73 6.1.2 Velleman: shame and self-presentation 76 6.1.3 My account of shame 78 Page 4 of 140 6.2 Why feel shame? 6.2.1 Shame and valuing 82 6.2.2 Shame and self-respect 83 6.2.3 Ambition and acceptance 84 6.2.4 Guilt 87 6.2.5 Regret 89 6.3 When is it appropriate to feel shame? 6.3.1 Fittingness and appropriateness 91 6.3.2 Seriousness and appropriateness 92 6.3.3 Control and appropriateness 92 6.3.4 Summary 95 Chapter 7: Regret 7.1 What is regret 7.1.1 Regret as a broad emotion 96 7.1.2 Agent-regret 97 7.2 Why feel regret? 7.2.1 A fortiori arguments for regret 99 7.2.2 Bittner's argument against regret 100 7.2.3 Gardner: The Continuity Thesis as an argument for regret 101 7.2.4 The Eudaimonia Principle and regret 102 7.2.5 Summary 104 7.3 When is it appropriate to feel regret? 7.3.1 An effect on our eudaimonia is necessary for appropriate regret 105 7.3.2 An effect on our eudaimonia is not sufficient for appropriate regret 107 7.3.3 Summary 108 Chapter 8: Remorse 8.1 What is remorse 8.1.1 My stipulative approach to remorse 110 8.1.2 My analysis of remorse 110 8.1.3 Remorse and guilt 113 8.1.4 Remorse and regret 114 8.1.5 Remorse and shame 114 8.2 Why feel remorse? 8.2.1 Remorse shows respect and concern for victims 115 8.2.2 Unemotional reactions are disrespectful to victims 116 8.2.3 Alternatives to remorse can be disrespectful to victims 117 Page 5 of 140 8.3 When is it appropriate to feel remorse? 8.3.1 Remorse and suffering 119 8.3.2 Summary 122 Part Three: Problem cases Chapter 9: The easy answer revisited 9.1 Overview of Part Two 9.1.1 Four emotional responses to wrongdoing 123 9.1.2 Why feel bad? 124 9.2 Easy cases explained 125 Chapter 10: Problem cases 10.1 The out-of-character killing 129 10.1.1 Guilt, shame, regret and remorse in Smith's case 130 10.1.2 Advantages of my account of Smith's case 131 10.2.3 Objections to my account of Smith's case 132 10.2 Cases involving luck 10.2.1 My account applied to moral luck cases 135 10.2.2 Resolving the puzzles of moral luck cases 137 10.3 Conclusion 138 Bibliography 139 Page 6 of 140 Part One: Introduction Chapter 1: The question, and how to answer it 1.1 The Question The question of this thesis is 'What is the virtuous emotional response to wrongdoing?' I have in mind one's own wrongdoing, not the wrongdoing of others. I am therefore interested in emotions like guilt or regret, rather than emotions like resentment. Aside from that I understand wrongdoing broadly: I am interested in wrongs both serious and slight, self-regarding and other-regarding, vicious and accidental. I shall often consider specific examples of wrongdoing, as the virtuous response is often affected by the details of the particular case; still, I will also draw general conclusions. 1.1.1 The Easy Answer So how should you feel after you've done something wrong? That's easy: you should feel bad. Everybody knows this. There are two problems with this easy answer. First, it is light on detail. There are lots of ways to feel bad, so which are appropriate? How bad should we feel? Should we feel bad forever, and, if not, when should we stop? Second, it is not so obviously true as we might at first suppose. Considering the first problem, we may note that the question was very light on detail too. If we add details to the question, it isn't so hard to add in some plausible details to the easy answer. Some principle of proportionality seems to apply: the worse what you did was, the worse you should feel afterwards, and the longer you should feel bad for. What exactly you did also suggests which emotions you should feel. For instance, regret appears more appropriate after an accident or if you only hurt yourself, whereas if you hurt somebody else, especially deliberately, guilt or shame is more appropriate. It also seems that our emotional response ought to be linked to action, otherwise we appear self-indulgent or insincere. Our guilt should motivate us to apologise and try to make amends, for example. This suggests requirements we should meet before we stop feeling bad: we ought to have apologised, received forgiveness, made amends, reformed and so on. Page 7 of 140 The more detail we add to the easy answer, the more the second problem looms: it may not be true that everybody knows it.