DISCLAIMER This study represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) or the Department of the Air Force . This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release . This document is the property of the United States government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the commander, CADRE, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. ISBN 1-58566-000-0 ii Library ofCongress Cataloging in Publication Data Mets, David R. Land-Based Air Power in ThirdWorld Crises . "July 1986." Includes index. 1. Air power. 2. Developing countries-Strategic aspects . 3. Military history, Modern-20th century . 1. Title. UG630.M378 1986 358.4'03 86-7896 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Jl2 -memoZ1y. Of CCa 2taiuz. -Novnan -fzo -mattz CU4:-Sogq 1954-1981 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK CONTENTS Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . xi ABOUT THE AUTHOR . xiii PREFACE. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . xvii 1 POLITICAL OBJECTIVES ANDMILITARY POWER: SOME RELATIONSHIPS . 1 Crisis Defined . .. 2 Categories and Characteristics of Military Force . 2 Land-Based Air Power Capabilities. 3 Options in Selecting Land-Based Air Power. 5 Notes . .. .. 9 2 THE THIRD WORLD ANDTHEUNITED STATES: PROBLEMS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND OUTLOOKS . .. 11 Problems and Assumptions . .. .. 12 Blind Alleys . .. .. .. .. 13 Crises and Violence . .. .. 16 Interdependence . .. .. .. .. .. 16 Diffusing Advanced Arms to Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) . .. .. 20 Utility of Military Power . .. .. 27 Notes . .. .. .. .. .. 31 3 THEMAYAGUEZ INCIDENT: SIMPLE CRISIS . 35 Scenario. .. .. .. 35 Genesis of Crisis . .. .. 37 Land-Based Air Power in the Region . .. 39 Gathering Information and Setting Objectives . .. 41 Vii Page Chapter Formulating Options . 41 Selecting the Best Option. 43 Implementation . 46 Landings at Koh Tang . 46 Retaking the Mayaguez . 49 Bombing the Mainland . 50 Land-Based Air Power and Crisis Resolution . 51 Notes . 59 4 THE BAY OF PIGS INCIDENT: INTERMEDIATE CRISIS . 65 Developing Options . 65 Doctrine and the Bay of Pigs Plan . 66 Strategy Making . 67 Order of Battle . 71 Implementation . 71 Political Impacts on the Air Plan . 73 D-1 . 73 D-day . 74 . D+ 1 . 79 D + 2 . 81 Notes . 85 5 THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: COMPLEX CRISIS . 89 Genesis of the Crisis . 89 The Arabs Attack . 96 Reversing the Tide on the Golan . 98 Superpower Information Gathering . 99 Superpower Concerns and Incipient Crisis. 99 Soviet Concerns . .- . 99 American Concerns . 100 ' Conditions for Cease-fire . .. .... 102 Growing Superpower Tensions . :. 103 . US Air Power . ... .. : . 105 The Crossing to "Africa .. ... 108 Kosygin's Emergency Mission to-Cairo . .: : .. ... 109 Cease-fire . : .. 110 World Crisis . : . 113 Notes . 117 6 CRISES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA .. ... .. .. ... 121 The Congo Crisis, 1960-63 . 121 Dragon Rouge: The Stanleyville Crisis, 1964 . ... 125 Shaba I, 1977 . :. ... 130 Viii Page _Chapter Shaba II, 1978 . 133 Notes . 137 7 CONCLUSIONS: LIMITATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF AIR POWER IN THIRD WORLD CRISES . 139 Characteristics and Capabilities . 139 Utility and Limitations . ..