Chapter 9 The Reinvention of the Soldier-Emperor under Heraclius Theresia Raum 1 Introduction In 611, the Sasanian Persians continued their longstanding attack on the East- ern Roman Empire and led an army into Asia Minor. Under the command of General Shahin, they captured the city of Caesarea, the most important mili- tary base in Cappadocia. They managed to occupy the city for several months until they were surrounded by the Roman troops of general Priscus, the com- mander of the expeditionary forces in Asia Minor. The besiegers were now besieged and soon found themselves in a predicament as they suffered from a lack of food and fodder. In the summer of 612, the Persians managed to escape the encirclement. The Romans, briefly confident of victory, were outwitted and beaten.1 The events in Caesarea resulted in great frustration among the Roman population; in particular, the Emperor Heraclius, who had recently gained the throne, must have felt resentment towards Priscus and blamed him for the fail- ure. The Emperor’s resentment towards the general, however, may have had a personal dimension. According to the Chronicler Nikephoros, earlier in 612, he had left Constantinople and joined Priscus in Caesarea to discuss the military situation in person. Priscus had then showed more than simple reluctance. He first pretended to be ill, and even upon receiving Heraclius, he said directly to the latter’s face that an emperor should not go to war, but stay in his palace and delegate military matters to his staff.2 This anecdote is reported by Nikephoros’ short history written at the end of the 8th century. Although it might be an anachronism, there is no reason to distrust Nikephoros. According to Cyril Mango, the chronicler was here relying, 1 Nikephoros, Patriarch of Constantinople, Short History, text, translation, and commentary by Cyril Mango (Dumbarton Oaks, 1990), Ch. 2; Theophanis Chronographia, ed. C. de Boor, vol. 1. (Leipzig, 1883), a.m. 6103, p. 299; The Armenian History attributed to Sebeos, trans. with notes by R.W. Thomson, comm. by James Howard-Johnston, with Tim Greenwood (Liverpool, 1999), Ch. 34, p. 66. 2 “ὁ δὲ οἷα ἐπιτωθάζων οὐκ ἐξὸν βασιλεῖ ἔφασκε καταλιμπάνειν βασίλεια καὶ ταῖς πόρρω ἐπιχωριάζειν δυνάμεσιν” (Nikephoros, Short History, Ch. 2). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:�0.��63/9789004395749_0�0 <UN> 134 Raum in his turn, on a mid-7th-century Constantinopolitan chronicle, whose author is likely to have had the anecdote first-hand.3 Now, this is a tale of sheer audac- ity! Priscus dared to criticize the emperor and managed to have him return to Constantinople, without having achieved anything – a humiliation in front of both the army and the urban elites, which may have seriously damaged Her- aclius’ authority had he not resolved to dismiss Priscus shortly after.4 Yet, it is clear that the general’s accusations did little more than echo the common opinion of his time. For centuries no Roman emperor had left the capital city of Constantino- ple to campaign in person, the last being Theodosius i at the end of the 4th century.5 To be more precise, Emperor Maurice had tried to break with this tradition and personally led a campaign around 590, which he, however, aban- doned before any contact with the enemy due to strong adversities.6 Hera- clius’ break with tradition and personal engagement in battle in his campaigns against Persia is regularly commented upon in modern manuals and scholarly assessments of that emperor’s military achievements.7 His decision to leave the capital for military purposes, however, offers more than a glimpse of his personality, but had wide-ranging implications for Eastern Roman emperor- ship. In fact, it ended a system of capital-based rulership, which had bound emperors, since Arcadius, to influential stakeholders in Constantinople.8 At the same time, it reintroduced a practice that had been common for emperors in the 3rd century and was continued again by Heraclius’ successors. Being thus regarded as a turning point at the end of Late Antiquity, Heraclius’ reinven- tion of the soldier-emperor should receive a more comprehensive explanation 3 Nikephoros, Short History, pp. 12–5. 4 Priscus was tonsured and confined in the monastery of the Chora, where he soon died. See Nikephoros, Short History, Ch. 2; Chronicon Paschale, ed. L. Dindorf, vol. 1 (Bonn, 1832), p. 703. 5 See Mischa Meier, “Der christliche Kaiser zieht (nicht) in den Krieg. ‘Religionskriege’ in der Spätantike?” in Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens, ed. A. Holzem (Paderborn, 2009), pp. 254–78; Warren Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society (Stanford, CA, 1997), p. 289. 6 For an detailed account of that campaign see Theophylacti Simocattae Historiae, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1887), v 16, 1-vi 3,8. 7 See Walter E. Kaegi, Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium (Cambridge, 2003), p. 68; James How- ard-Johnston, “Heraclius’ Persian Campaigns and the Revival of the Eastern Roman Empire, 622–630,” in War in History 6 (1999), pp. 1–44; Wolfram Brandes, “Herakleios und das Ende der Antike im Osten: Triumphe und Niederlagen,” in Sie schufen Europa: Historische Portraits von Konstantin bis Karl dem Großen, ed. Mischa Meier (Munich, 2007), pp. 248–58. 8 Rene Pfeilschifter, Der Kaiser und Konstantinopel: Kommunikation und Konfliktaustrag in einer spätantiken Metropole, Millennium-Studien 44 (Berlin, 2013), pp. 18–24. <UN>.