APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE DOCUMENTS Figure 1.1. Arrest warrant (Haftbefehl) for Georg von Sauberzweig, signed by Morgen. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde 129 130 Appendix 1 Figure 1.2. Judgment against Sauberzweig. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde Appendix 1 131 Figure 1.3. Hitler’s rejection of Sauberzweig’s appeal. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde 132 Appendix 1 Figure 1.4. Confi rmation of Sauberzweig’s execution. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv Berlin- Lichterfelde Appendix 1 133 Figure 1.5. Letter from Morgen to Maria Wachter. Estate of Konrad Morgen, courtesy of the Fritz Bauer Institut APPENDIX 2: PHOTOS Figure 2.1. Konrad Morgen 1938. Estate of Konrad Morgen, courtesy of the Fritz Bauer Institut 134 Appendix 2 135 Figure 2.2. Konrad Morgen in his SS uniform. Estate of Konrad Morgen, courtesy of the Fritz Bauer Institut 136 Appendix 2 Figure 2.3. Karl Otto Koch. Courtesy of the US National Archives Appendix 2 137 Figure 2.4. Karl and Ilse Koch with their son, at Buchwald. Corbis Images Figure 2.5. Odilo Globocnik 138 Appendix 2 Figure 2.6. Hermann Fegelein. Courtesy of Yad Vashem Figure 2.7. Ilse Koch. Courtesy of Yad Vashem Appendix 2 139 Figure 2.8. Waldemar Hoven. Courtesy of Yad Vashem Figure 2.9. Christian Wirth. Courtesy of Yad Vashem 140 Appendix 2 Figure 2.10. Jaroslawa Mirowska. Private collection NOTES Preface 1. The execution of Karl Otto Koch, former commandant of Buchenwald, is well documented. The execution of Hermann Florstedt, former commandant of Majdanek, is disputed by a member of his family (Lindner (1997)). 2. The most notable exception is the account Morgen gave at Nuremberg about how he discovered the “Final Solution.” We discuss this case in Chapter 12. 1 Introduction 1. KMF, pp. 5557–70. 2. A kapo was a prisoner functionary assigned by the SS to supervise other pris- oners or to carry out other tasks. The etymology of the term is disputed. 3. See Bein (1990). 4. Herzl (2004). 5. For a detailed study of the impact of this law see Mommsen (1966). 6. See Koellreutter (1938), p. 19; Huber (1939), pp. 55–6. 7. Best (1936), p. 126. Our translation. Quoted also by Herbert (2001), p. 164. 8. Cesarani (2004), p. 71. 9. Browning (2004), pp. 28–35. 10. Ibid., p. 26. 11. Ibid., p. 111. 12. Ibid., p. 45. 13. Ibid., p. 27. 14. Ibid., pp. 54–68. As Browning (2004) puts it, “While the Nazis never wanted openly to admit it and struggled against such a conclusion for months, it turned out that, at least temporarily, consolidating Lebensraum in the incor- porated territories and solving the Jewish question were not complementary but competing goals” (p. 43). 15. Ibid., pp. 175–8. 16. Ibid., pp. 111–68. 17. Ibid., p. 81. 18. Ibid., p. 69. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., pp. 69–70. Translation slightly modified for clarity. See also the remark of a subordinate of Hans Frank, Governor General of unincorporated 141 142 Notes to pages 8–10 Poland, to which the Jews were to be deported: “In the end one cannot sim- ply starve them to death” (ibid., p. 71). 21. Ibid., p. 102. 22. Ibid., p. 89. 23. Ibid., p. 104. 24. Ibid., p. 253. 25. Ibid., p. 110. 26. Dieckmann (2000), p. 247. Dieckmann writes, “The murder of the Jewish men was seen as a way of executing the order to ‘liquidate’ the Soviet lead- ership stratum” (p. 249). See Browning (2004), p. 259: “As in preinvasion memoranda and plans, German officials in the field hid ideological bias behind practical rationalizations, mostly by presenting anti-Jewish measures as part of a wider policy of ‘pacifying’ the occupied area.” See also p. 110: both Soviet commissars and Soviet Jews “would have to be eliminated” because “ultimately they were perceived as one.” 27. Browning (2004), p. 261. 28. Ibid., p. 353: “Bach-Zelewski claimed to have told a shaken Himmler after the latter had witnessed a relatively small execution in Minsk: ‘Look at the eyes of the men in this commando, how deeply shaken they are! These men are finished for the rest of their lives. What kind of followers are we training here? Either neurotics or savages!’” Bach-Zelewski’s postwar testimony claimed that Himmler, having seen the execution in Minsk, asked Einsatzgruppe B com- mander Arthur Nebe to consider other methods of killing (ibid., p. 354). 29. Ibid., p. 321. 30. Friedlander (1995), p. 87. The term “euthanasia” is in quotation marks because showing mercy to the victims was not in practice the regulating goal of the program. 31. Ibid., p. 62. 32. Ibid., chapter 13, “Killing Handicapped Jews.” 33. Ibid., table 5.3, p. 109. 34. Ibid., pp. 142ff. 35. Ibid., p. 144. 36. Ibid., p. 297. 37. These centers were preceded in operation only by Chelmno, which used gas vans of a kind that had been developed for the Einsatzgruppen and were oper- ated by an officer who had used such vans to kill the handicapped in Poland. See Friedlander (1995), p. 286; see also p. 139. 38. Ibid., pp. 297ff., 237–45. 39. Ibid., p. 300: “First, subterfuge was used to fool the victims upon arrival with the appearance of normality. In the euthanasia cen ters, physicians and nurses checking medical files made the killing center look like a regular hospital, while in the camps of Operation Reinhard, the trappings of the reception area Notes to pages 10–14 143 and the welcoming speech by a staff member made the killing center look like a labor camp. The victims were told in both places that they had to take showers for hygienic reasons, and the gas chambers were disguised as shower rooms, while the belongings of the victims were carefully collected and reg- istered to maintain the illusion of normality. [. .] Second, in both the Reich and the East, the victims were crowded into the gas chamber, and their corpses were burned immediately after they had been killed.” 40. The other exception, beside Auschwitz-Birkenau, was Majdanek. 2 The SS Man 1. Morgen narrates this episode in KMP, p. 6674. See also Morgen’s handwrit- ten letter about his surrender in F65. Morgen’s detention is confirmed by CIC Seventh Army Detention Report, SKV EWL 903/3. 2. This material is preserved in Nuremberg document NO-2366. 3. KMI 30.8.46, pp. 1–2. 4. KMB, p. 110. 5. KMI 4.9.46, pp. 2–3. 6. PKM, p. 1. 7. Koehl (1983), p. 79. 8. Kershaw (1998), p. 479. 9. Affidavit of Wilhem Felgenauer dated January 2, 1948, SKV EWL 903/3. Note, however, that Felgenauer himself avoided joining the SS. 10. Longerich (2008), pp. 265–395; see also Hambrock (2009). 11. The Teutonic Order (Deutscher Ritterorden) played a crucial role in the colonization of Eastern Prussia, parts of Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. For Himmler’s appeal to the Deutscher Ritterorden and other historical ideals, see Reinicke (2003), pp. 73–8, 93–105. 12. Buchheim (1965), p. 190. 13. See Schulte (2009); see also Smelser and Syring (2003). 14. See Kogon (2006), esp. ch. 22. 15. See Wildt (2009). 16. Schmitt (1934), p. 327. 17. See Huber (1939), pp. 30–7, 216–17. 18. See Huber (1939), pp. 30–7, 216–17. 19. KMI 30.8.46, p. 5. See also KMP, p. 6671. 20. KMI 4.9.46, pp. 2–3. Morgen says that this incident prevented him from getting employment in Frankfurt, so that he had to go to Stettin. That Morgen’s refusal to vote caused trouble with the Nazi Party is confirmed by a letter to Morgen from the local Party leader demanding that Morgen inform the Party where he had voted, because his vote could not be found in the records of the local office (letter of Fleischer to Morgen dated August 28, 1934 SKV EWL 903/3). 144 Notes to pages 14–16 21. SKV, affidavit of Wilhelm Müller, Frankfurt am Main, 28 February, 1948. 22. KMB, p. 105. 23. KMP, p. 6671 (English original). 24. Protocol of the public session of the civilian court handling denazification, June 24, 1948 (SKV, EWL 903/3, J/75/5326). 25. Morgen’s only known reaction to the Röhm putsch can be found in a short statement at his 1948 denazification trial. In response to a question about the Röhm affair, Morgen says that members of the SS were told about the “voluptuous life” of the SA leadership, as well as the fact that Röhm was a homosexual. (Homosexuality was a crime at the time.) Morgen adds, mistak- enly, that Röhm was sentenced and shot by a court martial (Standgericht). In defense of this statement, he says “that he had no reason for doubt because he heard it from people he trusted” (protocol of the public session of the civilian court handling denazification, June 24, 1948, J/75/5326, in SKV, EWL 903/3). 26. Gruchmann (1988 ), p. 303. See also Schmerbach (2008). 27. Roland Freisler, State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice and later president of the Volksgerichtshof, was actively engaged in shaping the educational pro- gram in Jüterbog. 28. HAW(3), p. 9. 29. Schmerbach quotes the recollection of one participant: “We listened calmly and patiently to the lectures and exercises. In the discussion we were cau- tious: no open dissent; in especially critical cases, frosty silence.” Schmerbach (2008), 140. 30. HAW-3, p. 136. Morgen’s comment on his evaluation in the camp Jüterbog; letter of Morgen to the Reich Minister of Justice, April 8, 1938. 31. PKM, letter dated 8.3.1938 and accompanying documents.