UNIDIR SPACE DOSSIER 4 October 2019 — Space Dossier 4 EYES ON THE SKY RETHINKING VERIFICATION IN SPACE 1 EYES ON THE SKY RETHINKING VERIFICATION IN SPACE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is grateful for the comments and feedback provided by John Borrie, Renata Dwan, Moriba Jah, Larry MacFaul, Paul Meyer and others. Support from UNIDIR’s core funders provides the foundation for all the Institute’s activities. In 2019, dedicated funding for UNIDIR’s space security activities was received from the Governments of Australia, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, The Holy See, New Zealand, the Russian Federation and Sweden. The author would also like to thank Anatina Weidmann for her support. ABOUT UNIDIR UNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessary reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors. www.unidir.org © UNIDIR 2019 2 UNIDIR SPACE DOSSIER 4 Table of Contents Key Findings 1 1. Introduction 3 2. Context 5 3. The verification challenge 7 4. Setting criteria for verification 11 5. Detecting space activites 13 6. Identification and threat assessments 21 7. What to expect? 25 8. What to do with this technology? 27 9. Conclusion 33 List of Tables & Figures Figure 1 - GEO Satellite 8 Figure 2 - Astriagraph 19 Table 1 - Summary of scope options 32 3 EYES ON THE SKY RETHINKING VERIFICATION IN SPACE ABOUT THE AUTHOR DANIEL PORRAS is the Space Security Fellow at UNIDIR. He focuses on political/legal issues surrounding space security and the progressive development of sustainable norms of behaviour for space. He conducts research on the emergence of new technologies and approaches to strategic stability in space. He holds an LLM in International Economics Law from Georgetown University Law Center, a Juris Doctorate from the California Western School of Law and a bachelor’s degree in political science from Baylor University. ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS AGI Analytical Graphics Inc. ASAT anti-satellite GEO geosynchronous orbit LEO low Earth orbit LIDAR light detection and ranging PAROS Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space SSA space situational awareness SSN US Space Surveillance Network 4 UNIDIR SPACE DOSSIER 4 Key Findings One of the main challenges to the By combining new sensors and development of international le- computing methodologies, it is 1gally binding instruments for space 3 possible today to effectively veri- security is “effective verification” of fy at least some types of activities re- compliance. For an agreement to be ef- lated to space security. Measures such fectively verifiable, it must be possible as prohibiting the testing of anti-sat- to detect a “militarily meaningful” vio- ellite technology or rules of behaviour lation in time to deny the benefits of a for on-orbit service vehicles, while lim- violation. While there are many factors ited in scope, can be effectively ver- inhibiting the negotiation of measures ified. These might be incorporated to address space security threats among into a larger space traffic management States, one of the obstacles frequently framework, which could be effectively cited is a lack of technological means verified with existing space situational to overcome the physical challenges to awareness technology. conducting verification in space. Developments in space situation- al awareness technology are en- 2 abling a clearer and more detailed picture of space activities, particularly in the geosynchronous orbit. In compar- ison to 10 years ago, today there are more sensors, improved sensors and greater computing power. 1 EYES ON THE SKY RETHINKING VERIFICATION IN SPACE 2 UNIDIR SPACE DOSSIER 4 © NASA/Bill Ingalls 1 Introduction ecent developments in space to what that agreement should be or Rsecurity indicate that future conflicts whether compliance is even verifiable.1 will increasingly feature the targeting of satellites and their related networks for In this context, advances in certain intentional disruption and destruction. space technologies, particularly in The effects of such attacks could be space situational awareness (SSA), may considerable, impacting both military provide a technical basis for verification and civilian activities around the world. that States can use to consider legal and In view of this, United Nations Member policy options for future agreements on States are exploring possible multilateral space security. By understanding the political and legal measures and extent and limitations of SSA, States arrangements intended to strengthen might be able to focus on those space stability and security in space. security challenges that are verifiable, and which could be the subject of Within these discussions, the issue successful international negotiations. of verification of any arrangement is a divisive issue. While there is broad agreement among the international community on the need to strengthen the governance framework for space activities, there is little consensus as 1 See Report of the Conference on Disarmament Subsidiary Body 3: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, CD/WP.611, 3 September 2018, pp. 2–3, 5. 3 EYES ON THE SKY RETHINKING VERIFICATION IN SPACE 4 UNIDIR SPACE DOSSIER 4 © ESA/Victor R. Ruiz 2 Context arallel trends are driving an increase warning, targeting and delivery systems Pin threats to space security. First, for both nuclear and some advanced space is increasingly important for conventional weapons. States’ reliance nearly all aspects of modern human on military space systems will continue activities, especially military activities.2 to increase in coming years. Conventional forces rely heavily on military and commercial satellites for Second, new technological devel- telecommunications, data transmission opments are enabling ‘counterspace and reconnaissance.3 Satellites play a capabilities’, namely the ability to fundamental role in command, control, deny an adversary the use of their communication and intelligence space systems through disruption systems.4 Satellites are also key for early- or destruction. Some technologies 2 See “Competing in Space”, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, December 2018, p. 1, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF. See also “2016 White Paper on Chinese Space Activities”, Information Office of the State Council of China, 27 December 2016, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm. See also “Space Strategy for Europe”, communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2016) 705 final, 26 October 2016, file:///C:/Users/PORRAS/Downloads/COM_2016_705_F1_COMMUNICATION_ FROM_COMMISSION_TO_INST_EN_V12_P1_864471.PDF. 3 “Shared Risks: An Examination of Universal Space Security Challenges”, UNIDIR, briefing paper for the Disarmament Commission, p. 7, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/shared-risks-an-examina- tion-of-universal-space-security-challenges-en-775.pdf. 4 James Acton, Tong Zhao and Li Bin, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Entanglement”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 September 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/09/12/re- ducing-risks-of-nuclear-entanglement-pub-77236. 5 EYES ON THE SKY RETHINKING VERIFICATION IN SPACE can cause temporary disruptions to specific space objects, like jamming a telecommunication satellite or blinding DEBRIS CAN REMAIN a remote-sensing satellite.5 Others, such as direct-ascent kinetic anti- IN ORBIT FOR satellite (ASAT) missiles, can physically MANY YEARS AND destroy a space object, leaving behind space debris.6 This debris can remain POSES A THREAT in orbit for many years and poses a OF COLLISION WITH threat of collision with other objects in the same orbit. Thus, counterspace OTHER OBJECTS IN capabilities—which several States are actively pursuing7 —can have serious THE SAME ORBIT. consequences for third parties, such as civil or commercial operators. With ever United Nations Member States decreasing barriers to entry into space, undertook several efforts throughout even non-State actors may be able to 2018 and 2019 to clarify or reinforce interfere with national space objects the existing regime for space activities. soon. However, due to the technical and political complexity of space security When one considers these trends in issues, including verification, these combination with current geopolitical efforts have thus far had limited success.8 rivalries among states such as China, India, the Russian Federation and the United States, it suggests that space systems are at greater risk from intentional direct and collateral harm than ever before. For this reason, 5 Rajeswari Pilai Rajagopalan, “Electronic