Notes 1 Introduction 1. See Stolnitz (1960) and Dickie (1969) for versions of the functional view. 2. See Dickie ibid. 3. See Peirce (1931-5), vol. IV, para. 537. 4. See Wollheim (1968), and see also p. 177 of the second ed. See also Stevenson (1957) and Rudner (1950). 5. The Vatican Pieta was badly damaged by blows with a hammer in 1972. See Sagoff (1978) for comment. The Last Supper has been decaying slowly for many years due to the operation of damp and other forces. For a review of the current situation see Connaissance des Arts, no. 395, January 1985. 6. See Wolterstorff (1980). See Section 3.6 below for comment. 7. See e.g. the collection of essays in Dutton (ed.) (1983). See also my review of the volume, Currie (1985a). 8. See Frege (1884). 9. Mackie (1977) p. 15. Mackie's anti-realism about aesthetic value is discussed by McDowell (1983), who argues that Mackie's conception of an objective world is ultimately incoherent. 10. See Goodman (1968) ch. 3. See also Goodman (1978). 11. See Lewis (1984) Introduction. 2 Empiricism 1. See e.g. Beardsley (1958) pp. 31-2. 2. See Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946). 3. See e.g. Rudner (1972) and Kulka (1981). 4. See Sibley (1958) and (1965). I base the account that follows on Sibley'S ideas, but in emphasis and manner of exposition it differs considerably from Sibley'S own. 5. See Boyd (1980) for a useful account of these ideas. 6. See Moore (1922) p. 261 and Hare (1952) p. 145. For formulations of supervenience see Kim (1978) and Currie (1984). 7. Someone who comes close to the view of aesthetic supervenience expressed in (SI) is Mary Mothersill (1984, p. 344). She offers this definition of what it is to be an aesthetic property: (M) </> is an aesthetic property if and only if V x( </>x :J V y( </>y == x and y are indistinguishable» where 'indistinguishable' means 'perceptually indistinguishable'. Mothersill's definition faces a number of problems, but the failure to specify for it any modal force creates especial difficulties. In a world in which nothing has </>, </> automatically satisfies the condition of the 130 Notes 131 definition and so counts as an aesthetic property. For example, being a unicorn turns out to be an aesthetic property according to (M). 8. See Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1976) for influential accounts of possible worlds. 9. Let us formalise (52) more precisely as (52) VwVxVyVP*VA«P*wX == P*r#}::> (AwX == AwY» where P* ranges over exhaustive specifications of pictorial properties, A ranges over aesthetic properties, and 'Aua' means 'a has property A in world w'. (52) is equivalent to (52') V wV P*V A[ 3 x(P*wX and AwX} ::> Vy(P*wy ::> Ar#}]. Formulations of supervenience in the form of (52') are considered by Simon Blackburn, in his (1984) pp. 183-7, and in his (1985) (though the formulation there is slightly different). Blackburn argues that such formulations suggest a certain kind of anti-realism about the class of supervening properties. Roger Scruton, on the other hand, argues for aesthetic anti-realism on the grounds that aesthetic properties fail to supervene on any of the works other properties, and that there is no principled ground for adjudicating between attributions of conflicting aesthetic properties (see Scruton (1974) pp. 36-8). A non-empiricist supervenience thesis is discussed in Levinson (1983). (52) and (53) are distinguished, along with a number of intermediate positions, in McFetridge (1985) Appendix. Kim's 'weak' and 'strong' supervenience theses correspond to our (52) and (53) respectively, so long as all occurrences of the necessity operator are interpreted as equivalent to unrestricted possible worlds quantifiers (see Kim (1984». 10. See Frege (1892). 11. It is used in this sense by David Daiches (who is concerned with the case of literature): 'Only wide reading gives one an awareness of the possibilities of the medium and enables one to develop taste, which is simply the sum of discriminations made available by attentive reading in a large variety of literary modes' (Daiches (1969) p. 177, italics in the original). Daiches's essay is an excellent account of the ways in which aesthetic appreciation is essentially comparative, as I argue further on in this chapter. 12. Thus I seem to disagree with Philip Pettit: ' ... the characterization of a picture by reference to the sort of thing it represents . ., unlike the judgement of particular representational value, must be expected to be pictorially supervenient' (Pettit (1983) p. 20). But Pettit may intend this claim to be taken as revisable in the light of his distinction (made later in the same essay) between primitive and rectified aesthetic judgements. 13. See e.g. Wimsatt and Beardsley again. 14. See Walton (1970). 15. This objection was suggested to me by John Watkins. 16. See Kulka ibid. 17. See Meyer (1967). 18. See Gombrich (1977) p. 29. 132 Notes 19, See e.g. Popper (1934). 20. For an account of these ideas see Worrall (1978). This idea was first developed by Imre Lakatos and Elie Zahar. 3 Art Works as Action Types 1. See Wollheim (1968) Sections 35-7. 2. See Levinson (1980a). 3. In correspondence Levinson makes it clear that the second interpret- ation was intended. 4. See Wolterstorff (1980) pt 2. 5. See Goodman (1968) p. 115. 6. See Wolterstorff ibid., pp. 61-2. 7. See Levinson ibid., p. 7. 8. See ibid., p. 20. 9. See ibid., p. 14. 10. See Frege (1884) Section 66. 11. See Anderson (1982). 12. First introduced by Putnam in his (1975). 13. There must of course be other differences between Earth and Twin Earth. They have, for instance, different spatial locations. These differences would begin to show up if we had powerful telescopes, or started to travel through the universe. But assume that we never transcend our local environment. 14. See e.g. Kim (1976). 15. For a case study in the application of a heuristic in physical theory see Zahar (1972). 16. See Jocelyn Harris's study of the influence of Richardson on Jane Austen, Harris (1980). 17. See e.g. Kennedy and Roberts (1959) and Veselowsky (1973). The Persian and Damascene astronomers were working with a geocentric system. The similarities between their systems and that of Copernicus is a matter of certain technical devices for accommodating the eccen­ tricities of the planets. 18. Duchamp wrote in 1917: 'Whether Mr Mutt [the work was signed 'R. Mutt'] with his own hands made the fountain or not has no importance. He CHOSE it. He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared under the new title and point of view - created a new thought for that object' (see d'Hamoncourt and McShine (1973) p. 283). 19. The content of this section was suggested to me during correspondence with Crispin Wright. See his (1985). 20. See Kripke (1972). 21. See Lewis (1970). 22. See Lewis (1972). 23. Art work deSignators differ in this respect from designators of mental states. On the hypothesis of realisational plasticity discussed in Section 2.2, pain may designate some quite different state from the state it designates in the actual world, in another world where T (,folk Notes 133 psychology') is true. This is why I call art work designators 'quasi­ rigid'. (They are still, of course, non-rigid in the proper sense.) 4 Authenticity 1. In this chapter I am variously indebted to the ideas and arguments of Meager (1958-9) p. 28; Wacker (1980); Margolis (1965) especially p. 62; Strawson (1966) p. 183; Harrison (1967-8) especially pp. 12~1; and Ralls (1972). 2. Goodman speaks of reproductions being accepted as original instances, which is not to the point. No reproduction can be the original instance of a work. The question is whether they may be accepted as instances. This may be connected with Goodman's tendency to conflate originality and genuineness. See Section 4.14 for discussion. Wollheim's view resembles Goodman's in some respects: he argues that one of the things that determines the principle of individuation for a work is the artist's theory about how works of that kind should be individuated (see Wollheim (1978) especially p. 39, and see also text to note 11 below). 3. See Wolterstorff (1980) pp. 71-3. 4. 'When we have achieved the work within us, conceived definitely and vividly a figure or statue, or found a musical motive, expression is born and is complete; there is no need for anything else .... The work of art is always internal; and what is called external is no longer a work of art' (Croce (1922) pp. 5~1). See also Collingwood (1938) p. 142. For the constitutive role of technique see Isenberg (1946). See also Section 4.19 below. 5. See Hyslop (1984) for a similar argument. I develop the case for intentional criticism in my (1985b) and (1986). 6. Amongst those who have argued for aesthetic sameness of original and correct copy on empiricist grounds are Mothersill (1961) especially pp. 422-3; Lessing (1965) especially p. 463; Kulka (1981) especially p. 338; Ralls (1972) especially p. 4. Amongst those who have argued for the aesthetic uniqueness of the original on the grounds that empiricism is false are Meyer (1967), Cormier (1974), Hoaglund (1976), Sagoff (1977, 1978) and Dutton (1979). 7. See also the interesting argument of Dutton (1979). Colin Radford says that when we discover that the painting is a fake it will 'look different' (Radford (1978) p. 74). 8. David Wiggins seems to be making this point when he talks of means as constitutive of aesthetic effect (see Wiggins (1978) p.