<<

Notes

1 Introduction 1. See Stolnitz (1960) and Dickie (1969) for versions of the functional view. 2. See Dickie ibid. 3. See Peirce (1931-5), vol. IV, para. 537. 4. See Wollheim (1968), and see also p. 177 of the second ed. See also Stevenson (1957) and Rudner (1950). 5. The Vatican Pieta was badly damaged by blows with a hammer in 1972. See Sagoff (1978) for comment. The Last Supper has been decaying slowly for many years due to the operation of damp and other forces. For a review of the current situation see Connaissance des Arts, no. 395, January 1985. 6. See Wolterstorff (1980). See Section 3.6 below for comment. 7. See e.g. the collection of essays in Dutton (ed.) (1983). See also my review of the volume, Currie (1985a). 8. See Frege (1884). 9. Mackie (1977) p. 15. Mackie's anti-realism about aesthetic value is discussed by McDowell (1983), who argues that Mackie's conception of an objective world is ultimately incoherent. 10. See Goodman (1968) ch. 3. See also Goodman (1978). 11. See Lewis (1984) Introduction.

2 1. See e.g. Beardsley (1958) pp. 31-2. 2. See Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946). 3. See e.g. Rudner (1972) and Kulka (1981). 4. See Sibley (1958) and (1965). I base the account that follows on Sibley'S ideas, but in emphasis and manner of exposition it differs considerably from Sibley'S own. 5. See Boyd (1980) for a useful account of these ideas. 6. See Moore (1922) p. 261 and Hare (1952) p. 145. For formulations of supervenience see Kim (1978) and Currie (1984). 7. Someone who comes close to the view of aesthetic supervenience expressed in (SI) is Mary Mothersill (1984, p. 344). She offers this definition of what it is to be an aesthetic property: (M) is an aesthetic property if and only if V x( x :J V y( y == x and y are indistinguishable» where 'indistinguishable' means 'perceptually indistinguishable'. Mothersill's definition faces a number of problems, but the failure to specify for it any modal force creates especial difficulties. In a world in which nothing has , automatically satisfies the condition of the

130 Notes 131

definition and so counts as an aesthetic property. For example, being a unicorn turns out to be an aesthetic property according to (M). 8. See Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1976) for influential accounts of possible worlds. 9. Let us formalise (52) more precisely as (52) VwVxVyVP*VA«P*wX == P*r#}::> (AwX == AwY» where P* ranges over exhaustive specifications of pictorial properties, A ranges over aesthetic properties, and 'Aua' means 'a has property A in world w'. (52) is equivalent to (52') V wV P*V A[ 3 x(P*wX and AwX} ::> Vy(P*wy ::> Ar#}]. Formulations of supervenience in the form of (52') are considered by Simon Blackburn, in his (1984) pp. 183-7, and in his (1985) (though the formulation there is slightly different). Blackburn argues that such formulations suggest a certain kind of anti-realism about the class of supervening properties. Roger Scruton, on the other hand, argues for aesthetic anti-realism on the grounds that aesthetic properties fail to supervene on any of the works other properties, and that there is no principled ground for adjudicating between attributions of conflicting aesthetic properties (see Scruton (1974) pp. 36-8). A non-empiricist supervenience thesis is discussed in Levinson (1983). (52) and (53) are distinguished, along with a number of intermediate positions, in McFetridge (1985) Appendix. Kim's 'weak' and 'strong' supervenience theses correspond to our (52) and (53) respectively, so long as all occurrences of the necessity operator are interpreted as equivalent to unrestricted possible worlds quantifiers (see Kim (1984». 10. See Frege (1892). 11. It is used in this sense by David Daiches (who is concerned with the case of literature): 'Only wide reading gives one an awareness of the possibilities of the medium and enables one to develop taste, which is simply the sum of discriminations made available by attentive reading in a large variety of literary modes' (Daiches (1969) p. 177, italics in the original). Daiches's essay is an excellent account of the ways in which aesthetic appreciation is essentially comparative, as I argue further on in this chapter. 12. Thus I seem to disagree with Philip Pettit: ' ... the characterization of a picture by reference to the sort of thing it represents . . ., unlike the judgement of particular representational value, must be expected to be pictorially supervenient' (Pettit (1983) p. 20). But Pettit may intend this claim to be taken as revisable in the light of his distinction (made later in the same essay) between primitive and rectified aesthetic judgements. 13. See e.g. Wimsatt and Beardsley again. 14. See Walton (1970). 15. This objection was suggested to me by John Watkins. 16. See Kulka ibid. 17. See Meyer (1967). 18. See Gombrich (1977) p. 29. 132 Notes

19, See e.g. Popper (1934). 20. For an account of these ideas see Worrall (1978). This idea was first developed by Imre Lakatos and Elie Zahar.

3 Art Works as Action Types 1. See Wollheim (1968) Sections 35-7. 2. See Levinson (1980a). 3. In correspondence Levinson makes it clear that the second interpret- ation was intended. 4. See Wolterstorff (1980) pt 2. 5. See Goodman (1968) p. 115. 6. See Wolterstorff ibid., pp. 61-2. 7. See Levinson ibid., p. 7. 8. See ibid., p. 20. 9. See ibid., p. 14. 10. See Frege (1884) Section 66. 11. See Anderson (1982). 12. First introduced by Putnam in his (1975). 13. There must of course be other differences between Earth and Twin Earth. They have, for instance, different spatial locations. These differences would begin to show up if we had powerful telescopes, or started to travel through the universe. But assume that we never transcend our local environment. 14. See e.g. Kim (1976). 15. For a case study in the application of a heuristic in physical theory see Zahar (1972). 16. See Jocelyn Harris's study of the influence of Richardson on Jane Austen, Harris (1980). 17. See e.g. Kennedy and Roberts (1959) and Veselowsky (1973). The Persian and Damascene astronomers were working with a geocentric system. The similarities between their systems and that of Copernicus is a matter of certain technical devices for accommodating the eccen• tricities of the planets. 18. Duchamp wrote in 1917: 'Whether Mr Mutt [the work was signed 'R. Mutt'] with his own hands made the fountain or not has no importance. He CHOSE it. He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared under the new title and point of view - created a new thought for that object' (see d'Hamoncourt and McShine (1973) p. 283). 19. The content of this section was suggested to me during correspondence with Crispin Wright. See his (1985). 20. See Kripke (1972). 21. See Lewis (1970). 22. See Lewis (1972). 23. Art work deSignators differ in this respect from designators of mental states. On the hypothesis of realisational plasticity discussed in Section 2.2, pain may designate some quite different state from the state it designates in the actual world, in another world where T (,folk Notes 133

psychology') is true. This is why I call art work designators 'quasi• rigid'. (They are still, of course, non-rigid in the proper sense.)

4 Authenticity 1. In this chapter I am variously indebted to the ideas and arguments of Meager (1958-9) p. 28; Wacker (1980); Margolis (1965) especially p. 62; Strawson (1966) p. 183; Harrison (1967-8) especially pp. 12~1; and Ralls (1972). 2. Goodman speaks of reproductions being accepted as original instances, which is not to the point. No reproduction can be the original instance of a work. The question is whether they may be accepted as instances. This may be connected with Goodman's tendency to conflate originality and genuineness. See Section 4.14 for discussion. Wollheim's view resembles Goodman's in some respects: he argues that one of the things that determines the principle of individuation for a work is the artist's theory about how works of that kind should be individuated (see Wollheim (1978) especially p. 39, and see also text to note 11 below). 3. See Wolterstorff (1980) pp. 71-3. 4. 'When we have achieved the work within us, conceived definitely and vividly a figure or statue, or found a musical motive, expression is born and is complete; there is no need for anything else .... The work of art is always internal; and what is called external is no longer a work of art' (Croce (1922) pp. 5~1). See also Collingwood (1938) p. 142. For the constitutive role of technique see Isenberg (1946). See also Section 4.19 below. 5. See Hyslop (1984) for a similar argument. I develop the case for intentional criticism in my (1985b) and (1986). 6. Amongst those who have argued for aesthetic sameness of original and correct copy on empiricist grounds are Mothersill (1961) especially pp. 422-3; Lessing (1965) especially p. 463; Kulka (1981) especially p. 338; Ralls (1972) especially p. 4. Amongst those who have argued for the aesthetic uniqueness of the original on the grounds that empiricism is false are Meyer (1967), Cormier (1974), Hoaglund (1976), Sagoff (1977, 1978) and Dutton (1979). 7. See also the interesting argument of Dutton (1979). Colin Radford says that when we discover that the painting is a fake it will 'look different' (Radford (1978) p. 74). 8. David Wiggins seems to be making this point when he talks of means as constitutive of aesthetic effect (see Wiggins (1978) p. 58). See also Levinson (1980b) p. 379. Clive Bell has a variant of this argument: 'the actual lines and colours and spaces in a work of art are caused by something in the mind of the artist which is not present in the mind of the imitator' (1914) p. 65. 9. This point was suggested to me by a discussion with Colin McGinn. But McGinn may disagree with my conclusions. 10. See Goodman (1968) p. 221 and Margolis (1983) p. 167. 11. See Wollheim (1978). 134 Notes

12. See Sagoff (1977). 13. See Goodman ibid., p. 196. 14. See Webster (1971) for this and other criticisms of Goodman's account of notation in music. 15. See Battin (1979-80). 16. Cummings (1968). This example was suggested to me by Elizabeth Harlow. 17. See Goodman ibid., ch. IV. 18. Intimations of this objection are to be found in Lord (1977) and Carrier (1980). 19. In the well known story by Borges (1944), Menard, having read Don Quixote at an earlier time, determines to recreate the work word by word, and partially succeeds in doing so. Borges remarks: 'To compose Don Quixote at the beginning of the seventeenth century was a reasonable, necessary and perhaps inevitable undertaking; at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is almost impossible .... In spite of these obstacles, the fragmentary Don Quixote of Menard is more subtle than that of Cervantes.' The story as Borges gives it does not quite fit what we want here, for Menard has read and to some degree recollects Don Quixote. For our purposes we must assume that he works in ignorance of Cervantes's story. For philosophical comment on this example see Danto (1981) ch. 2; Lewis (1978); and Saville (1971). 20. See Goodman (1978) p. 50. 21. See Godley (1967) and Werness (1983) for details of this fascinating story. The case continues to stimulate journalistic comment - see e.g. Levin (1983). References

Abbreviations: APQ = American Philosophical Quarterly BJA = British Journal of JAAC = Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism JP = Journal of PQ = Philosophical Quarterly PR = Philosophical Review PS = Philosophical Studies

ANDERSON, J. (1982) 'Musical Identity', JAAC, 40, pp. 285-9l. BAffiN, M. P. (1979-80) 'Exact Replication in the Visual Arts', JAAC, 38, pp. 153--8. BEARDSLEY, M. (1958) Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Harcourt Brace & World). BEARDSLEY, M. (1983) 'Notes on Forgery', in Dutton (ed.) (1983). BELL, C. (1914) Art (London: Chatto & Windus). BINKLEY, T. (1977) 'Piece: Contra-Aesthetics', JAAC, 35, pp. 265-77. BLACKBURN, S. (1984) Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press). BLACKBURN, S. (1985) 'Supervenience Revisited', in I. Hacking (ed.) Essays in Analysis (Cambridge University Press). BORGES, J. L. (1944) 'Pierre Menard: Author of the QUixote', in Ficciones (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sur; English trans., New York: New Directions, 1964). BOYD, R. (1980) 'Materialism without ', in N. Block (ed.) Readings in (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer• sity Press). CARRIER, D. (1980) 'Paintings, Conceptual Art and Persons', PS, 37, pp. 187-95. COLLINGWOOD, R. G. (1938) The Principles of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press). CORMIER, R. (1974) 'Difference and Uniqueness in Aesthetic Theory', BJA, 14, pp. 106-14. CROCE, B. (1922) Aesthetics as Science of Expression and General Linguistic, 2nd edn, trans. by Douglas Ainsley (London: Macmillan). CUMMINGS, E. E. (1968) Collected Poems, vol. 2 (London: MacGibbon & Kee). CURRIE, G. (1984) 'Individualism and Global Supervenience', British Journal for the , 35, pp. 345-58. CURRIE, G. (198Sa) Review of Dutton (ed.) (1983), PQ, 35, pp. 435-7. CURRIE, G. (1985b) 'What is Fiction?', JAAC, 43, pp. 385-92. CURRIE, G. (1986) 'Fictional Truth', PS, 50, pp. 195-212. DAICHES, D. (1969) 'Literary Evaluation', in J. P. Strelka (ed.) Problems of Literary Evaluation. Yearbook of Comparative Criticism, vol. II (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press).

135 136 References

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RALLS, A. (1972) 'The Uniqueness and Reproducibility of a Work of Art: a Critique of Goodman's Theory', PQ, 22, pp. 1-18. RUDNER, R. (1950) 'The Ontological Status of the Aesthetic Object', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 10, pp. 38~. RUDNER, R. (1972) 'On Seeing what We shall See', in R. Rudner and I. Scheffler (eds) Logic and Art (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill). SAGOFF, M. (1977) 'The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries', JAAe, 35, pp. 169- SO, repro in Dutton (ed.) (1983). SAGOFF, M. (1978) 'On Restoring and Reproducing Art', JP, 75, pp. 453- 70. SAVILLE, A. (1971) 'Nelson Goodman's "Languages of Art": a Study', BJA, 11, pp. 3-27. SCRUTON, R. (1974) Art and Imagination (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). SIBLEY, F. (1959) 'Aesthetic Concepts', PR, 68, pp. 421-50. SIBLEY, F. (1965) 'Aesthetic and non-Aesthetic', PR, 74, pp. 135-59. STALNAKER, R. (1976) 'Possible Worlds', Nous, 10, pp. 65-75. STEVENSON, C. L. (1957) 'On What is a Poem?" ',PR, 66, pp. 330-77. STOLNITZ, J. (1960) Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art Criticism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin). STRAWSON, P. F. (1966) 'Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art', The Oxford Review, no. 3, repro in Freedom and Resentment and other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974). VESELOWSKY, I. N. (1973) 'Copernicus and Nasi aI-Din al Tusi', Journal of the History of Astronomy, 4, pp. 12S--30. WACKER, J. (1960) 'Particular Works of Art', Mind, 69, pp. 223-33. WALTON, K. (1970) 'Categories of Art', PR, 79, pp. 334-67. WEBSTER, W. (1971) 'Music is not a "Notational System" " JAAC, 29, pp.489-97. WERNESS, H. (1983) 'Han van Meegerenfecit', in Dutton (ed.) (1983). WIGGINS, D. (1978) 'Reply to Richard Wollheim', Ratio, 20, pp. 52-68. WIMSATT, W. and BEARDSLEY, M. (1946) 'The Intentional Fallacy', Sewanee Review, 45, repro in W. Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon (University of Kentucky Press, 1954). WOLLHEIM, R. (1968) Art and its Objects, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 1980). WOLLHEIM, R. (1978) 'Are the Criteria of Identity that hold for a Work of Art in the different Arts Aesthetically Relevant?', Ratio, 20, pp. 29-48. WOLTERSTORFF, N. (1980) Worlds and Works of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press). WORRALL, J. (1978) 'The Ways in which the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes improves on Popper's Methodology', in G. Anderson and G. Radnitsky (eds) Progress and in Science (Dordrecht: Reidel). WRIGHT, C. J. G. (1985) Review of Blackburn (1984), Mind, 94, pp. 310- 19. ZAHAR, E. G. (1972) 'Why did Einstein's Research Programme Supersede Lorentz's?', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24, pp. 95-123 and 223-62. Index

Occurrences of names in the references are not included in the index. Only significant occurrences of names used for illustrative purposes (e.g. 'Beethoven', 'Pamela') are included in the index.

action theory 1, 66, 75; see also passim; explained 8; and events IMH 9; satisfies constraints action types 3-4,7,62; and forgery 66,70-1 and reproduction 107; works Austen, J. 4,5,93 as x, 7-8, 66-71 authenticity: explained 5-6,9-10; aesthetic judgements: and the and the IMH 9, Ch. 4 passim artist's achievement 41-3; autographidallographic: relative to communities 38--9; explained 14-15; rejected and science 44-5 124-5 aesthetic properties: and art• historical properties 40-1; Battin, E. P. 134 empiricist test for 25; and Bauhaus 104 historical uniqueness 102-4; Baxandall, M. xi and identity 28; inessential to Beardsley, M.: and intentional the work 48--9; and fallacy 18, 92, 130, 131; and intransitivity 11; and pictorial supervenience 22 properties 19-20; plasticity Beethoven, L. van 50-2, 5~0, 62- of 19-20; relativised 31, 38 3,99 aesthetic training 112-15 Bell, C. 133 alphabet, none in painting 116 Binkley, T. 18 Anderson, J. 60-1,132 Blackburn, s. 131 antiques 103 Borges, J. L. 134 appreciation of works: and artist's Boyd, R. 130 achievement 65,68; does Brahms, J. 50 theory square with about? 76; and historical canvas: defined 46; inviolable propositions 94 89-91; not the work 78 architecture 104-5 Carrier, D. 134 artist's performance: and copies of categories of art 28--34 the work 97-8, 101; and Cervantes, M. de 122-3, 134 correction of instances 90-1; Cezanne, P. 36 as integral to work 42; in character differentiation 113-14 music 94 Collingwood, R. G. 91, 133 astronomy: discovery in 114; Constable, J. 41 history of 72, 132 constraints on theory 64-6,70-1 ATH (action type hypothesis): and Copernicus, N. 72-3 art-historical roles 82; and copy" relation 122-3 copies 79; defended see Ch. 3 Cormier, R. 133

139 140 Index

counterfactual dependence 9~ genuineness 116 101,121-2 Giotto 3!HJ creation of works 56-7, 75 Godley, J. (Lord Kilbracken) 134 criticism and intersubjectivity 119- Gombrich, E. H.: Art andfllusion 20 30; on paintings as Croce, B. 91, 133 experiments 41, 131 cubism 35 Goodman, N.: on aesthetic cummings,e.e. 91,113,134 features 88; on aesthetic Currie, G. 131, 133 training 112-13, 114-15; on architecture 104; on Daiches, D. 131 autographidallographic 14- Danto, A. 134 15, 124-5; on classifying definitions 1-2,77; Lewis on 81 instances 86, 133; on correct de re/de dicto 84 instances 54-5; on forgery d'Harnoncourt, A. 132 115-17; on looking 109-15; on Dickie, G. 2, 130 notation 113-14; on differential explanation 9!HJ structure 48, 53; on value and dualism: and empiricism 28, 46-7; multiplicity 10S-9 explained 6; Wollheim on 4- Gothic Novel, the 93 6; Wolterstorff on 89-91 guernicas 29 Duchamp, M. 76-7, 132 Dutton, D. 130 Haldane, J. xii Hammerklavier Sonata 99 Hare, R. M. 130 electronic music 99 Harlow, E. 134 empiricism, aesthetic: argument Harris, J. 132 against 34-9; and dualism Harrison, A. 133 28, 46-7; explained 17-18; is heuristic: and the critic ~9; in false 43; and IMH 27--8, 133; forgery and reproduction and scientific empiricism 42- 106-7; objection concerning 3; and supervenience 1~25; 71-3; path of the scientist 67- the term defended 26-7; 8 Walton against 2~31 historical uniqueness of the work empiricist's account of the work: 102-4 explained 46-9; Levinson history of production of the work: against 50-3 effect on aesthetic properties event(s): Kim's theory 66-7, 69; 61; empiricist's exclusion of types and tokens 3-4, 69-70 26; heuristic role of 21; and evidential support 44-5 the IMH 92-6 Hoaglund, J. 133 Fielding, H. 93 Hyslop, A. 133 forgery: Goodman on 115-17; and the IMH 10-11; and identity: and aesthetic properties reproductions 105--8; van 28, 88; and architecture 104- Meegeren's 127--8 5; criteria for 120-4; of and Francis of Assisi, Saint 20, 35 within works 9-10 Frege, G.: on definitions 11, 130; Iktinos 104 on number 58, 132; on sense IMH (instance multiplicity 24,131 hypothesis): and empiricism Index 141

IMH - continued Margolis, J. 133 27--8, 92-6; explained 8; and Martians, their artistic talents 36- forgery 10--11; grounds for 9 accepting 88; and inviolability Meager, R. 133 of the canvas 90--1; possible Menard, Pierre 122-3, 134 amendment to lOfr7; Meyer, L. 40--1, 131, 133 revisionary? 86-8; unrefuted Michelangelo 4 43; and visual arts 78-9 mind and body 20, 132-3 instances of works: correct and Mondrian, P. 30 incorrect 53-5, 89; criteria for Moore, G. E. 20, 130 120-4; defined 5; vagueness Mothersill, M. 130, 133 of 123--4 movies 97 intentional fallacy x, 91-2, 133 multiple arts: explained 8; see also intentions, artist's 2, 91-2 IMH Isenberg, A. 133 Musgrave, A. xii, 90 musical works: means of Kallikrates 104 performing 49--50; their Keating, T. 10 structure 48 Kennedy, E. 132 Kim, J.: on events 66,69, 132; on Napoleon Bonaparte, his boots supervenience 130--1 102,105 Kripke, S. 80, 132 kinds 10, 55-6, 89 Kulka, T. 130,131, 133 notation system 113-14 Lacy, A. xii Lakatos, I. 132 Oddie, G. xii, 117 Leonardo da Vinci 4 ontology: and appreciation 11-12; Lessing, A. 133 and epistemology x Levin, B. 134 Levinson, J.: his account of works paintings Ch. 4 passim; as a 57-61; ambiguity in his thesis category of art 28; as 51-3, 132; on creation of experiments 41-2, 45; their works 56, 61; on musical structure 78 works 49--53; his objection Palmer, S. 10 71-3; on performance means Pamela and Shamela 93--4 49--50, 99, 133 Parthenon,The 1~5 Lewis, D. xii, 15, 81, 114, 130, 131, pattern of the work: and 134 empiricism 47; explained 19 Lewitt, S. 126 Peirce, C. S. 3, 130 Liszt, F. 50 performance means 49--50,99 looking: Goodman on 109--15; Pettit, P. 131 intransitive 117-19; and photography 100 tolerance 119; vague 109--11 physical relation to work, artist's Lord, C. 134 96-101 Picasso, P. 29, 34-5 McDowell, J. 130 pictorial properties: and aesthetic Mcfetridge, I. 131 properties 20; explained 19; McGinn, C. xii, 133 Goodman on 116 Mackie, J. L. 12,130 Popper, K. R. 42, 132 142 Index

possible worlds: explained 22, 131; structure of the work: as constituent physically 23, 111; and of work 70; as essential 48, properties of works 48-9,51- 65--6, 82-4; pure and applied 2; and theories 81-2 49-50 Prall, D. 17 supervenience: doubts about 79- prints and casts 14-15, 124 80; explained 20; strong 23- Putnam, H. 62, 132 5, 27, 131; weak 22, 130

Tannahill, J. xii, 90 Radford, C. 133 taste 21, 24-5, 131 Ralls, A. 133 tempo 110 Ramsey sentence 81 Tichy, P. xii, 118 Rauschenberg, R. 76 Twin Earth 9,62-3, 71-2, 73-4, 78- referential properties 73-4 9, 128, 132 Rembrandt 116 types and tokens: a confusion representational properties 25--6, concerning 75--6; explained 131 3; of situations 61-2; as reproductions of works: aesthetic structure 48; Wollheim on 4- status of 43, 128, 133; and 5 appreciation 98; and forgery 105-8; molecule-for-molecule 110-11; as representations van Meegeren, H. 10, 127-8, 134 107-8; and technology 87 Vermeer, J. 127-8 Richardson, S. 93 Veselowsky, I. N. 132 rigid designation 80; quasi- 83, visual art Ch. 4 passim; essentially 132-3 embodied 126-7 Roberts, V. 132 Rudner, R. 130 Wacker, J. 133 Walton, K.: on categories of art 28-34, 131; on criteria of Sagoff, M.: on aesthetic and non• category membership 35--6; aesthetic 103, 134; and disagreement with 39-40,79; empiricism 93, 133; and and IMH 43; on performance forgery 105-8 means 99; revision of Saville, A. 134 empiricism inadequate 41; Scruton, R. 131 sympathy for empiricism 34 Sibley, F. 19-21, 25, 130 Webster, W. 134 singular arts: explained 8; and Ward, D. xii, 117 intransitivity 118; painting Watkins, J. xii, 131 and sculpture as 78; see also Watling, J. xii IMH Werness, H. 134 spelling: aesthetically relevant 113; Wiggins, D. 133 as criterion of textual identity Wilson, B. xii 112 Wimsatt, W. 18, 92, 130, 131 Stalnaker, R. 131 Wollheim, R.: on artist's theory of Stevenson, C. L. 130 work identity 104, 133; on Stolnitz, J. 130 structure 48, 53; his theory Strawson, P. F. 133 4-6 Index 143

Wolterstorff, N.: argument for structures 57-61; as norm dualism 89-91, 133; and kinds 55--6, 89; as structure correct instances 53; and 46-9 creation of works 57; his Worrall, J. 132 theory of works 10, 55--6, 132 Wright, C. xii, 132 works of art: as action types x,7, 66-71, 75; as created 56-7, 61- 4; as ideas 91, 135; as indicated Zahar, E. G. 132