PEOPLE, POWER, AND THE STATE: THE EFFECT OF PATRON INTERVENTION ON UNARMED INSURRECTIONS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Zacchary R. Ritter, M.A. Washington, DC August 24, 2015 Copyright 2015 by Zacchary R. Ritter All Rights Reserved ii PEOPLE, POWER, AND THE STATE: THE EFFECT OF PATRON INTERVENTION ON UNARMED INSURRECTIONS Zacchary R. Ritter, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Andrew O. Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Unarmed insurrectionary (UI) campaigns demanding irregular regime change seem destined to failure, but such social movements surprisingly succeed more often than not. Explanations for campaign outcome tend to focus on movement skill or variation in domestic- level structural factors. Few studies shift attention to the potentially decisive role of external intervention during these domestic struggles. Despite some well-known exceptions like the Iranian Revolution, patron states have played an important role in determining the fate of several unarmed insurrections as intended. The outcome of UI campaigns rests not only on the domestic balance of forces and the decisions of key elite players, but also on the disposition of great powers and regional powers with a stake in the result. This dissertation addresses three interrelated questions to advance our understanding of the role patron states play during these domestic struggles over control for the state. First, do great powers and regional powers systematically alter the likelihood of UI campaign success? Using a novel measure for patron state intervention, quantitative analysis suggests that the probability of UI campaign success depends on how patron states react. Second, how do patron states transform latent leverage into actual influence aside from the explicit threat or actual use of military force? After reviewing all cases of patron intervention, I identify three generalizable causal mechanisms – isolate and unite, feast or famine, and decapitation – patron states employ to channel the dynamics of UI campaigns to a desirable outcome. Third, why do some external iii interventions fail? The deviant cases suggest that several factors limit the patron's ability to shape the outcome of UI campaigns. Nonetheless, domestic institutional configurations that intimately link the institutional interests of the security services to the current regime leadership and/or competing bureaucratic and business interests within the patron state that hinders the formulation of a coherent foreign policy appear most important. Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to advance the emerging research program in security studies on nonviolent resistance and irregular regime overthrow by capturing the role patron states play during UI campaigns. iv Young graduate students are often told to select a dissertation committee wisely. I could not be happier about my choice. Charles King consistently provided excellent feedback and friendly advice in a timely fashion. Daniel Nexon proved a unique mentor. His analytical sharpness helped me refine my overall theoretical framework. More profoundly, a brief conversation with Dan helped jumpstart this project during a critical phase. Without his blunt remarks about why my project makes sense, I would have continued to flounder in unproductive self-doubt. As for Andrew Bennett, there are no words – or perhaps too many – for the selfless support he gave me and this dissertation from start to finish. Finally, Robert Lieber was an invaluable mentor during the toughest years of this project. I always secretly considered him another member of my dissertation committee. My colleagues in the Government department at Georgetown also proved invaluable intellectual assets and great companions, especially Yu-Ming Liou, Fouad Pervez, Yonatan Morse, Hesham Salem, Paul Musgrave, Peter Henne, Cory Julie, and Elliott Fullmer. I am also deeply appreciative of the financial support from the Smith Richardson Foundation that enabled me to make important insights at a formative stage of this project. Lastly, my time at the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Political Science department as a visiting scholar provided an excellent intellectual environment to discuss my project and finish writing this dissertation. In particular, I would like to thank Andrew Kydd and Jon Pevehouse as well as my office mates Matthew Mitchell, Tiago Losso, and Florian Boeller. In the end, I came out on the other side of this circuitous journey because of my family, who gave me an endless reservoir of solace, inspiration, and love. Naturally, I include my partner Sharon Tang among this fold. She has been my constant anchor when so my other aspects of my life seemed so adrift. Many thanks, Zacchary R. Ritter v TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ........................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Situating the Phenomenon of Unarmed Insurrections ................................................. 4 I. Revolution, Democratization, and Unarmed Insurrections................................................... 4 II. What is an Unarmed Insurrection? .................................................................................... 10 Chapter 2: External Interventions During UI Campaigns ........................................................... 17 I. Domestic-Level Explanations for UI Campaign Outcomes .............................................. 19 II. International Dimensions to UI Campaign Outcomes ...................................................... 25 III. A Theory of Patron Intervention During UI Campaigns ................................................. 31 IV. Quantitative Analysis of Patron Intervention .................................................................. 38 Chapter 3: Typological Theory and Case Selection .................................................................... 48 I. A Typological Space for Cases of Patron Intervention ...................................................... 48 II. Theory-Building from Cases of Failed Patron Intervention .............................................. 52 III. Case Selection for Qualitative Analysis of Patron Intervention ...................................... 74 Chapter 4: Isolate and Unite I: South Korea 1979-1980 .............................................................. 80 I. The Political Environment .................................................................................................. 80 1.a. The Yushin System ................................................................................................... 80 1.b. The Opposition .......................................................................................................... 85 1.c. US-ROK Relations .................................................................................................... 87 II. Narrative of Events ............................................................................................................ 90 2.a. 08/07/79 - 10/26/79 ................................................................................................... 90 2.b. 10/27/79 - 05/28/80 ................................................................................................... 93 III. US Actions: 08/11/79 - 5/28/80 ..................................................................................... 107 IV. The US Factor in the 1979-1980 Political Transition .................................................... 118 Chapter 5: Isolate and Unite II: South Korea 1987 .................................................................... 132 I. The Political Environment ................................................................................................ 133 1.a. The Chun Regime .................................................................................................... 133 1.b. The Opposition ........................................................................................................ 140 1.c. US-ROK Relations: 05/31/80 - 02/06/87 ................................................................ 145 II. Narrative of Events .......................................................................................................... 151 2.a. 02/13/85 - 04/12/87 ................................................................................................. 151 2.b. 04/13/87 - 06/31/87 ................................................................................................. 155 III. US Actions: 02/06/87 - 06/31/87 ................................................................................... 162 IV. The US Factor in South Korea's Uprisings and Alternative Explanations .................... 170 Chapter 6: Feast or Famine: Panama 1988 ................................................................................ 187 vi I. Two Analytic Narratives on the Successful Use of "Feast or Famine" Tactics ............... 189 1.a. Cameroon 1991 ....................................................................................................... 190 1.b. Haiti 1985-1986 ...................................................................................................... 195 II. The Political Environment .............................................................................................. 202 2.a. Noriega's Regime ...................................................................................................