Power without Inºuence Power without Jeremy Pressman Inºuence The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East Did the administra- tion of President George W. Bush inºuence the Middle East in the manner the president hoped? Did it achieve its three national security objectives of defeat- ing terrorism, actively promoting democracy, and stopping nonconventional proliferation among adversaries? The administration’s record is not encourag- ing. Each of these major policies has largely been a failure. Evaluating President Bush’s record in the region is crucial for three reasons. First, Bush administration ofªcials and some scholars continue to defend and advocate for some or all of this administration’s policies.1 An assessment not only has historical import but also may bear on the future direction of U.S. for- eign policy. If these policies did or did not work, it is better to know sooner rather than later. Second, adjustments to U.S. foreign policy depend on under- standing why these policies did or did not work. Were they well designed and effectively implemented? If not, what mistakes did the administration make? In this article I argue that the failings were largely due to an overemphasis on Jeremy Pressman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut. The author would like to thank Timothy Crawford, Scott Lasensky, Keir Lieber, James Walsh, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments. He would also like to thank the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University for research support. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2006 American Political Science Association annual conference, the Program on International Security Policy Workshop at the University of Chicago, and the University of Haifa. 1. For examples, see George W. Bush, “President Bush Attends Saban Forum 2008,” Washing- ton, D.C., December 5, 2008; George W. Bush, Highlights of Accomplishments and Results: The Admin- istration of President George W. Bush, 2001–2009 (Washington, D.C.: White House, December 2008); Dick Cheney, “Transcript: Chris Wallace and Vice President Dick Cheney,” Fox News Sunday, December 21, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/ 21/AR2008122100868_pf.html; Dan Eggen, “Bush Says His Post-9/11 Actions Prevented Further Terrorism,” Washington Post, December 18, 2008; Condoleezza Rice, interview by Robert McMahon, “Rice Defends Regime Change in Iraq, Stresses Diplomacy Elsewhere,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 19, 2008; Kimberley A. Strassel, “Bush on His Record,” Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2008; David Frum, “Think Again: Bush’s Legacy,” Foreign Policy, No. 168 (September/October 2008), pp. 32–38; Michael Gerson, “A Framework for Success in Iraq,” Wash- ington Post, November 21, 2008; Robert Kagan, “The September 12 Paradigm,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5 (September/October 2008), pp. 25–39; Edward Luttwak, “A Truman for Our Times,” Prospect, No. 149 (August 2008), http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id ϩ10309; and Timothy J. Lynch and Robert S. Singh, After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also Fred Barnes, Rebel-in-Chief: Inside the Bold and Controversial Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Crown Forum, 2006), espe- cially p. 201. International Security, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Spring 2009), pp. 149–179 © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 149 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.149 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 33:4 150 military force, insufªcient reliance on diplomacy, an unwillingness to learn and adapt, and contradictions among different policies. Third, regardless of whether a great power such as the United States can remain unchallenged for years to come—the question around which much writing has focused recently—scholars still need to assess whether that state’s power advantage has been translated into increased inºuence.2 The capabilities of a hegemon or other pole may be unchallenged, but that does not obviate the need for studying whether the hegemon inºuences other actors in the desired direction. Yet most of the attention on U.S. unipolarity has focused on the staying power of the United States and whether countries are balancing against it, not on whether the United States is achieving its policy objectives. With the end of the Cold War, scholars began to debate how long U.S. unipolarity would last, with some predicting inevitable balancing against the United States and a rapid end to unipolarity and others foreseeing a long period of U.S. dominance.3 Some scholars have begun to question whether an alternative form of opposition, soft balancing, has developed against U.S. dominance.4 Throughout these debates, scholars have disagreed about 2. By “inºuence,” I mean “power as control over actors.” Citing Dahl, Jeffrey Hart deªnes control over actors as “the ability of A to get B to do something which he would otherwise not do.” If the United States is A, are the Bs doing what they would not otherwise do, such as democratizing, ending terror attacks, and abandoning WMD proliferation? See Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,” International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 1976), pp. 289–305, at p. 291. Both David A. Baldwin and Joseph S. Nye Jr. prefer to call this power rather than inºuence or control, but I think this lumps together two related but distinct ele- ments. See Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 161–194; and Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 3. Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Se- curity, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–51; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evalu- ating Theories,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913–917. In “Evaluating Theories,” Waltz wrote that China and Japan were starting to balance against the United States (p. 916). In 2006, Layne conceded that his initial prediction was wrong and stated that unipolarity will end before 2030. See Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 7–41, at p. 8 n. 2. For contrasting viewpoints, see William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5–41; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 20–33; and Paul W. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist The- ory,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 108–148. 4. Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7–45; T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Secu- rity, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46–71; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 72–108; Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,” Inter- national Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 109–139; and Barry R. Posen, “European Union Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.149 by guest on 27 September 2021 Power without Inºuence 151 whether the United States has benign or malign intentions and whether the character of U.S. intentions or the nature of U.S. policy choices, or both, can af- fect the likelihood of challenges to American primacy.5 This article argues that the Bush administration’s eight-year record in the Middle East suggests that capabilities do not easily translate into inºuence. On the most immediate threat to the United States—terrorism—the situation has worsened. To Bush’s credit, al-Qaida has not replicated its September 11, 2001, attacks on U.S. soil. But its top leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri, remain at large. Al-Qaida has inspired anti-American militants worldwide, and the core organization remains intact. Iraq served as a new training ground and recruitment tool for jihadists; Iraq of the 2000s may some- day be seen as Afghanistan of the 1980s. Although the group al-Qaida in Iraq has become weaker, its role in Iraq represents a great symbolic success, espe- cially given the small numbers of ªghters it has had in the country. Through violence, al-Qaida in Iraq succeeded in fanning the ºames of sectarian warfare. The “global war on terror” is the organizing conºict of U.S. foreign policy to- day, and thus even partial failure must be considered an indictment of Bush’s policy and a warning for the future. After expending signiªcant resources, the United States has made little progress on promoting democracy in the region. The few positive changes are directly correlated with the introduction of U.S. soldiers in Iraq, and even there democratic progress has been very limited; democratization by force is not a replicable model beyond Iraq because it has proven so costly. There has been no measurable improvement in democratic performance in large re- gional powers such as Egypt, Iran, or Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, a number of Bush’s policies and U.S.