Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Communication Dissertations Department of Communication 4-20-2007 Masks and Sartre's Imaginary: Masked Performance and the Imaging Consciousness William Keith Tims Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/communication_diss Part of the Communication Commons Recommended Citation Tims, William Keith, "Masks and Sartre's Imaginary: Masked Performance and the Imaging Consciousness." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2007. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/communication_diss/10 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Communication at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Communication Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MASKS AND SARTRE’S IMAGINARY : MASKED PERFORMANCE AND THE IMAGING CONSCIOUSNESS by W. KEITH TIMS Under the Direction of Greg Smith ABSTRACT The use of masks in performance and actor training is often linked to the imagination, but there is seldom discussion of the nature of this imaginary link. Using the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (most especially his work The Imaginary ) and the writings of modern mask theorists, this dissertation examines the relationship between masks and the imaging consciousness in both masked actors and the audiences who observe them. We discover that a mask is an analogon for an Other and that a mask authorizes games of identity which play out imaginatively in the performance milieu. In fact, generally speaking, a mask in performance is apprehended in a more imaginative way than a non-masked performance. Further than this, the mask illustrates the basic nature of the human consciousness and identity espoused by Sartre: that who we are is not a product of our psychology, but rather, the product of our imaginations and our choices. The dissertation concludes by suggesting that masks point to an alternative approach to character creation which likewise rejects psychology, and instead relies on physicality, abstraction, and ambiguity, all of which are essential to activating the imaging consciousness. INDEX WORDS: Masks, Performance, Sartre, Imaginary, Movement, Ambiguity, Aesthetics, Consciousness, Imagination, Analogon, Identity MASKS AND SARTRE’S IMAGINARY: MASKED PERFORMANCE AND THE IMAGING CONSCIOUSNESS by W. KEITH TIMS A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University 2007 Copyright by William Keith Tims 2007 MASKS AND SARTRE’S IMAGINARY: MASKED PERFORMANCE AND THE IMAGING CONSCIOUSNESS by W. KEITH TIMS Major Professor: Greg Smith Committee: Gayle Austin Thomas Flynn Shirlene Holmes Raphael Miller Angelo Restivo Electronic Version Approved Office of Graduate Studies College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University May, 2007 iv Table of Contents List of Figures v Chapter 1 – Introduction 1 Chapter 2 – Masks, Movement, and the Imagination 23 Chapter 3 – Trance and the Imaginary 56 Chapter 4 – Character Development through Masks and the Imaginary 93 Chapter 5 – The Mask and Sens 138 Chapter 6 – Masks, Audiences, and the Imaginary 185 Chapter 7 – Conclusion 231 Works Consulted/Bibliography 242 v List of Figures Page 1. LeCoq’s “Jesuit” mask (57). 139 2. A “Rangda” mask (Hartley Film Foundation). 139 3. Sunflowers, Van Gogh. 155 4. The Thinker, Rodin 156 5. Hare’s Moon Cage. 165 6. An Appel mask (111). 169 7. Another Appel mask (87). 170 8. Many Appel masks (95). 170 9. Eldredge’s “simple character mask” (86). 172 10. More “simple character” masks (86). 173 11. Benda’s “Golden Beauty” mask (72). 175 12. Benda’s “Beelzebub” mask (75). 176 1 Chapter 1 – Introduction A recurring theme in the literature surrounding masks and their use in performance is that masks are tied to the imagination. Some authors discuss how masks affect their wearers, inspiring new ways of using the body and new personae from the image of the new face. Others discuss how masks invite the audience to imagine; the performances are as much about the audience’s own ideas as those of the performers. But what does “imagination” mean in the context of performance? If masks indeed are tied to the imagination, what does this say about the nature of masks? And what do masks’ imaginary ties have to say about the nature of the imagination itself? The writings of Jean-Paul Sartre offer one perspective on the imagination in the context of performance. Sartre was an existentialist philosopher and dramatist who wrote extensively about the nature of consciousness and attempted to echo his philosophy in his plays, art critiques, and essays on the creative process. Sartre’s best known work is Being and Nothingness, in which he outlines his ideas about the nature of human consciousness. However, an earlier, less well-known work of his titled The Imaginary deals with Sartre’s conception of the imagination and its role in human consciousness. Coupled with Sartre’s own 2 ideas on aesthetics and performance, Sartre offers a new perspective on mask theory. By reading Sartre against existing major mask theorists one discovers new ideas about mask theory. The core assertion is this: Generally speaking, audiences and actors alike apprehend masked performances in a more imaginary way than non-masked performances. While there are many factors that influence the degree to which a particular performance can be described as “more” imaginary than another, and these factors make it admittedly difficult to directly compare one style of performance with another, there are certain elements of human imagination that Sartre defines which are called into greater play in the presence of a well-animated mask. As a result, we can observe how masks operate as objects that have connections to our imaginations and sense of identity and how these connections affect performances. In addition, masked performance can also offer a new perspective on Sartre’s concepts of the imagination in that masks illustrate the operations of consciousness. Some questions arise: What would Sartrean philosophy have to say about the role of masks in character creation? What might Sartrean concepts have to say about how audiences apprehend a masked performer compared to an unmasked performer? What are the aesthetic qualities that make a particular mask/performance more effective from a Sartrean point of view? What is the relationship between existing mask theory and Sartrean ideas of the 3 imagination? How might Sartre’s ideas of the imagination be used to construct an aesthetic for masked performance? In an attempt to answer these questions, we will employ hermeneutics as a methodology, performing a close comparative reading of Sartrean philosophy against several texts on mask acting. Sartre’s The Imaginary served as the main work in this project. Some of Sartre’s other works (e.g. Being and Nothingness, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions , “On Intentionality,” etc.) as well as other authors’ writings about Sartrean concepts of imagination, aesthetics, and consciousness are added to Imaginary to form a body of Sartrean thought. Also included are Kendall Walton’s ideas of make-believe and the writings of select Gestalt aesthetic authors. This body of work becomes the primary text against which the role of the mask in performance was read as expressed in various 20th and 21st century mask acting texts. Sartre’s Theories of the Imagination It is important at the outset to lay out Sartre’s philosophy which formed the core of the body of his thought, beginning with Sartre’s work The Imaginary, since this line of thought will be referenced throughout the dissertation. As its title suggests, The Imaginary outlines Sartre’s ideas about imaginary objects, how they are understood by consciousness, and what is the nature of consciousness itself that humans can imagine at all. Sartre opens The Imaginary by identifying two different ways that an object can be given to us: via 4 perception or imagination. Perception comes from observation: our studying over time of an object in the “real” world. Perception is necessarily incomplete. If I look at a piano, for instance, I will only see the side at which I am looking. If the lid is closed, I do not see the strings inside. Where perception is incomplete, imagining is total. It is a synthetic act that links knowledge to elements “more properly imagined” ( Imaginary 8-9). The piano in my imagination may have all sides of itself given to me, strings included, as well as sounds, memories, and emotions that I may have. The synthetic act of creating an image does not rely on knowledge alone. Intentionality is another factor. By intentionality, Sartre means that feature of consciousness by which it aims at an other-than-consciousness; in other words, that characteristic by which consciousness focuses on an object. It is the “lens” by which we view that object, and it is a lens we create ourselves. Whatever object that appears to us in the imagination we already have an intention toward it—an expectation, idea, or determination—but in a properly imaginative way. This is my piano, or that is the house where I used to live, we might say, if the piano and house are absent. Sartre cites Husserl that a consciousness is a consciousness of something ( Imaginary 11). “Consciousness and the world are given at one stroke: essentially external to consciousness, the world is nevertheless essentially relative to consciousness” (“Intentionality” 4). It is not only my knowledge of a piano that creates the imaginary piano for me, but my intention towards the imaginary piano itself. In my mind’s eye, the imaginary piano is given to me in a 5 “quasi-observation” attitude, but it teaches me nothing new. It is given to me as it is, and as I intend it to be, all at once.