Journal of Strategic Security Volume 5 Number 1 Volume 5, No. 1: Spring 2012 Article 5 Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization and the Fallacy of “Ungoverned Spaces” David P. Oakley Kansas State University, [email protected] Patrick Proctor Kansas State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons pp. 1-14 Recommended Citation Oakley, David P. and Proctor, Patrick. "Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization and the Fallacy of “Ungoverned Spaces”." Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 1 (2012) : 1-14. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.1.1 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization and the Fallacy of “Ungoverned Spaces” Abstract October 7, 2011, marked a decade since the United States invaded Afghanistan and initiated the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). While most ten-year anniversary gifts involve aluminum, tin, or diamonds, the greatest gift U.S. policymakers can present American citizens is a reconsideration of the logic that guides America's counterterrorism strategy. Although the United States has successfully averted large-scale domestic terrorist attacks, its inability to grasp the nature of the enemy has cost it dearly in wasted resources and, more importantly, lost lives. Two of the most consistent and glaring policy flaws revolve around the concepts of filling "ungoverned spaces" and installing democracy by force. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss1/ 5 Oakley and Proctor: Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization and the Fallacy Journal of Strategic Security Volume 5 Issue 1 2012, pp. 1-14 DOI: 10.5038/1944-0472.5.1.1 Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization, and the Fallacy of "Ungoverned Spaces" David Oakley and Pat Proctor Kansas State University and Command and General Staff School Abstract October 7, 2011, marked a decade since the United States invaded Afghan- istan and initiated the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). While most ten-year anniversary gifts involve aluminum, tin, or diamonds, the great- est gift U.S. policymakers can present American citizens is a reconsidera- tion of the logic that guides America's counterterrorism strategy. Although the United States has successfully averted large-scale domestic terrorist attacks, its inability to grasp the nature of the enemy has cost it dearly in wasted resources and, more importantly, lost lives. Two of the most consistent and glaring policy flaws revolve around the concepts of filling "ungoverned spaces" and installing democracy by force. Introduction Since the publication of the 2004 National Military Strategy, ungov- erned spaces and democratization of ill-governed areas have served as the linchpins of America's counterterrorism strategy. Many policymakers and national security professionals accept as gospel the untested and even illogical ungoverned spaces/ill-governed areas concepts.1 To rationalize military actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Libya, U.S. policymak- ers have asserted that ungoverned spaces and ill-governed areas serve as terrorist safe havens that pose a significant threat to America's interests. We contend that these concepts of ungoverned spaces and ill-governed This article reflects the views and opinions of the authors and does not represent the official view of the United States Army or Department of Defense. Journal of Strategic Security (c) 2012 ISSN: 1944-0464 eISSN: 1944-0472 1 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 Journal of Strategic Security areas are dangerous red herrings that do not serve U.S. interests, and the continued pursuit of which will only deplete resources, anger foreign pop- ulations, blemish America's reputation, and make the country less secure. The purpose of this article is to reflect on the terrorist threat, elements of the strategy developed to respond to it, and implementation of the strat- egy worldwide. Although this article is not intended to serve as an exhaus- tive history of the past ten years, it will consider some of America's more significant actions abroad and their effectiveness. While we're critical of the country's counterterrorism policy in general, we believe certain aspects of its counterterrorism policy have been effective. The increased cooperation among federal and state agencies and local governments has been a welcome change. The achievements of America's intelligence com- munity and special operations forces have been extremely impressive, as have the performance and dedication of U.S. service members. Despite these accomplishments and the exceptional performance of numerous dedicated professionals, we believe the country's strategic approach over- seas is not only ill-conceived, but incapable of accomplishing its policy objectives. The impotence of American counterterrorism strategy is not due to the performance of those on the ground called on to implement it; rather, it is attributable to policymakers' failure to understand the enemy and accept the repercussions of U.S. actions or the limits of the country's power. Most policymakers seem unable to understand why other nations do not accept "American exceptionalism," or how some of them might view U.S. actions as imperialistic. They then choose actions or use rheto- ric that are not in the country's interests—in fact, are counterproductive to its counterterrorism mission. Who Are We Fighting? Perhaps the most destructive handicap with which the West has had to contend since the beginning of the War on Terrorism is its inability to understand whom it needs to fight. Westerners in general and Americans in particular do not distinguish between Salafist Wahhabists and Salafist jihadist al-Qaida. In her book Living History, then Democratic senator and presidential hopeful Hillary Rodham Clinton wrote: "Wahhabism troubles me because it is a fast-spreading form of Islamic fundamentalism that excludes women from full participa- tion in their societies, promotes religious intolerance and, in its most extreme version, as we learned with Usama bin Laden, advocates terror and violence."2 2 https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss1/5 DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.1.1</p> Oakley and Proctor: Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization and the Fallacy Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization, and the Fallacy of "Ungoverned Spaces" Nor do many prominent Americans distinguish between the political Salafist Muslim Brotherhood, the Shia Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the Salafist jihadist al-Qaida. For instance, former Republican senator and presidential hopeful Rick Santorum told a radio audience that the Muslim Brotherhood was "as dangerous to Western civ- ilization and the future of our country" as al-Qaida. He added that, while the Brotherhood didn't use violence in Egypt, "that doesn't mean that they aren't for all of the things that violent jihadists are for."3 It might surprise Americans to learn that the only people who dislike the Muslim Brotherhood more than they do is al-Qaida. Wahhabis differ from al-Qaida in two important respects. First, Wahhabism supports the sover- eignty of the Saudi king, a regime that al-Qaida considers illegitimate. Second, theologically, Wahhabists contested Usama bin Laden's authority to declare jihad, believing that it is reserved to legitimate sovereigns. When Wahhabist clerics condemned al-Qaida's September 11, 2001 attacks, Usama bin Laden retaliated by denouncing them as corrupt pup- pets of the illegitimate Saudi king.4 Likewise, al-Qaida condemns the Muslim Brotherhood for foregoing jihad and instead turning to civil polit- ical processes. Then al-Qaida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri admonished the Muslim Brothers for "luring thousands of young Muslim men into lines for elections...instead of into the line of jihad."5 The Western failure to distinguish Salafist jihadism from its less danger- ous predecessors has caused the United States to establish an unaccept- ably high bar for winning the War on Terrorism. Setting aside America's misguided insistence on engaging in interstate war to stop international terrorism, in both Afghanistan and Iraq the United States and her allies have, simply put, picked unnecessary fights. In Iraq, besides the unavoid- able fights with Ba'athists and al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), coalition forces engaged in a long, destructive battle with the Iranian-style Shia political Salafist party, the Office of the Martyr Sadr, and its armed wing, Jaysh al- Mahdi. Our insistence on marginalizing Sadr has increased his stature in Iraq and given ammunition to conservative elements inside Iran who use U.S. aggression against Shia Iraqis to bolster their own domestic support. The Taliban's entrenched support in Pashtun Afghanistan, combined with the Karzai government's weakness in large swaths of the same region, has hindered progress in that country as well. After its initial success in Afghanistan, the coalition has spent a decade