THE POSTWAR SEA FORCES OF MARITIME JAPAN, 1945-1971. Vol I James E. Auer — >!I°D 'uoiipois — A N -»s<»°J*S = M3GNia 3SVD THE POSTWAR SEA FORCES OF MARITIME JAPAN 1945-1971. A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy by LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JAMES E. AUER, U.S. NAVY In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy July 31, 1971 T14 ' S ^^. CALIF. 9s!2 THE POSTWAR SEA FORCES OF MARITIME JAPAN 1945-1971 An Abstract of a Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy by LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JAMES E. AUER, U.S. NAVY ft In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy July 31, 1971 7 t ttBRfV NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MOtfTiSREY. CALIF. 93S40 ABSTRACT This monograph attempts a study of the history and problems of Japan's postwar naval forces drawing largely on the living participants in the activities and events making up that history, a subject area largely neglected to date. The study concludes that despite the ideals and di- rectives of the Occupation, Japan was never fully stripped of naval forces following the Second World War. More impor- tant, some people were not fully convinced of the possibil- ity and desirability of perpetual disarmament. Plans for eventual rearmament began to be formulated even before the almost complete disarmament was achieved. In fact, specific rearmament studies and plans were being made by the very persons who were exempt from Occupation purge directives in order to work in the government on disarmement. Rather than trying to effect any type of conspiracy, these persons were, instead, acting sincerely for what they thought best for their country and were at least sympathetically encour- aged throughout much of the Occupation by important 1 Japanese political figures and influential U.S. naval offi- cers . Although Article 9 of the Japanese postwar Consti- tution called for a ban on war as a sovereign right of the nation and on maintaining land, sea, and air forces, an idea that may have been originated by Japanese Prime Minister Shidehara, it was an idea that did not appear in other drafts of the new Constitution and it was opposed from the outset by some conservative politicians and former military leaders who thought it dangerous for Japan's security. General Douglas MacArthur who was responsible for the inclu- sion of the article in the Constitution, if not its author- ship, maintained that he never meant for the provision to ban armed self-defense measures; and it appears that the man immediately responsible for the drafting, General Courtney Whitney, understood the amendments to Article 9 as proposed by Dr. Ashida Hitoshi, who was advised that the Americans might interpret the changes to allow rearmament for self-defense in the future, to mean exactly that. In any event, such allowance for future armed self-defense was not explained to the Japanese Diet reviewing the Constitu- tion in 1946; and the government's official explanation, which has always maintained that regular armed forces, war potential, and the right of belligerency, a term found to have no meaning in international law, were forbidden, has led to efforts to live within the confines of Article 9 and still have armed forces only for self-defense, to main- tain special civilians in military uniforms conducting military activities, and by ever -changing, increasing estimates of what constitutes self-defense and what is not war potential to give opposition parties the opportunity to argue credibly that the entire idea of armed self- defense has from the beginning been unconstitutional. Less than one year after the new Constitution went into effect, a new organization conducting naval activities under the advice and actual participation of former naval personnel was formed with little opposition other than from a few American Occupation officials and Soviet representa- tives on various Allied postwar commissions; although the Maritime Safety Agency was called a non-military force, its activities were from the outset, though limited, military in nature. In October, 1950, when the world thought Japan had no naval forces, 46 of its ships deployed into combat, the only such action in the nation's postwar history to date Since recovering independence, the Japanese formed a National Safety Agency in 1952, incorporating a police reserve force founded after the outbreak of the Korean War because of the removal of American ground units and a naval guard unit formed within the Maritime Safety Agency. In 1954 the name of the Safety Agency was changed to the Defense Agency; the explicit mission of defending the country against external aggression was added. Also, a third unit with an air defense role was added so that the three forces re- sembled the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, which provided their Japanese counterparts with equipment and training. The National Defense Council, to be the Prime Minister's top ad- visory body on national security matters was constituted in 1956; and a year later a basic national defense policy, unchanged to the present, was adopted after Council and Cabinet approval. A very small percentage of the gross national product and a usually declining portion of the national budget, although gradually increasing in absolute amount, has been annually allotted to defense since 1952, but little more than a training capability has ever been achieved. Especially taking into account advancements made by other countries and because of the greatly increasing tempo of its commercial maritime activities, Japan may be relatively less able at present to provide for its naval defense than before. Never given the power to conscript and with postwar military activity constitutionally doubt- ful and unpopular, the ability to attract and hold young recruits has dwindled under conditions of advanced economic prosperity, including nearly full employment with attendant categorial shortages, in the postwar era. A small portion of the modest defense budget has been annually earmarked for research and development with the result that Japan's forces have so far been dependent on sometimes outmoded foreign technology or ideas of interest and benefit to domestic industry for weaponry. Adequate stockpiles of fuel and ammunition or logistic support for any type of sustained defense capability have never been accumulated or maintained so that claims of autonomous or even consid- erable defense capability seem quite weak from a military point of view. This monograph challenges many of the basic popular assumptions concerning the disarmament of Japan, the timing and causes of its rearmament, and the character of its actual postwar forces. Specific assumptions challenged include those maintaining: that sea forces were never maintained from 1945-1952; that no military organization was allowed to exist during the pre-Korean War period of demilitarization; that Japanese and American planning for rearmament came only after the outbreak of the Korean War; that rearmament was forced on the Japanese by the United States government, particularly in the person of special envoy John Foster Dulles; that Japan has really wanted to provide itself only internal security, the U.S. guaranteeing external security, an unchanged Japanese policy which has finally won out over American changing attitudes; that the Self-Defense Forces in general and the Maritime Self- Defense Force in particular do not rely on the traditions of the Imperial Forces and are in fact basically new al- though hybrid organizations; that the Self-Defense Forces are now more powerful than the prewar forces and are capable of providing for the autonomous defense of Japan; and that militarism might be returning to Japan as partially mani- fested in bigger defense spending and an emergent military- industrial complex. VITA James Edward Auer Born: St. Paul, Minnesota, July 19, 1941 Graduated: Marquette University High School, 1959 Marquette University, 1963 (A.B.) Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1969 (A.M.) 1970 (M.A.L.D.) THE POSTWAR SEA FORCES OF MARITIME JAPAN 1945-1971 A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy by LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JAMES E. AUER, U.S. NAVY In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy July 31, 1971 Copyright by LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JAMES E. AUER, U.S. NAVY 1971 To Dad ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The greatest portion of my research and writing was accomplished in a ten-month period in Tokyo during the aca- demic year 1970-71. A letter of introduction from Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, to Admiral Uchida Kazutomi, Chief of Maritime Staff, Japan Maritime Self -Defense Force, established the contacts which made this project possible. The personal and continuing in- terest of both admirals was of unquestionable assistance in arranging interviews and in learning and experiencing so many different aspects of Japan. Because of their personal prestige, I was treated as a distinguished guest at all times during my stay; to both leaders I am sincerely grateful. Other people who assisted cannot all be individually listed, but some who provided special help cannot go unmen- tioned. Seven people of extraordinary talent were of constant service and offered the kindness of friendship along with their professionalism: Mr. Taoka Shunji of the Asahi Shimbun ii was an invaluable source of information; his encyclopedic knowledge of military history was exceeded only by the hospitality shown me by his family; Mr. Raymond Y. Aka of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, the American most knowledgeable on the subject of the Japan Self -Defense Forces, arranged interviews with numer- ous political leaders, bureaucrats, and defense officials I would have been otherwise unable to meet; Captain Robert J.