The Quest for Redemption: The Story of the Northern Muslims Final Report of the Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990 nd 2 Edition Second2012 Edition st 1 Edition in November 2011 The Quest for Redemption: The Story of the Northern Muslim, Second Edition C Law and Society Trust 2011 The content or any part of this publication may be freely cited or reproduced for non- commercial purposes with due acknowledgement of this publication and its publisher. ISBN: 978-955-1302-47-4 Published by Law & Society Trust (LST) 3, Kynesy Terrace Colombo -08 Sri Lanka Tel: +94 (0) 11 268 4845 Fax: +94 (0) 11 268 6843 Email: [email protected] URL: www.lawandsocietytrust.org Printed by Karunaratne & Sons (Pvt) Ltd 67, UDA Industrial Estate Katuwana Road Homagama Sri Lanka Tel: 011 285 5520, 011 488 7227-9 Fax: 011 444 0313 Email: [email protected] Ethnicity-based genocide and pogromsIntroduction have been recurrent features through millennia of human history across the globe. Little impact has been made by either advances in knowledge and awareness in the social sciences, the media, and information technology, or in the establishment of democratic norms and international laws and covenants designed to arrest such crimes. Our own little island has been witness to such cases, of which one is the LTTE’s expulsion of over 70,000 Muslims from the Northern Province—effectively the entire Muslim population in the area—in October 1990. The nature, scale, and other features of violence vary from case to case. The expulsion of the Muslims was marked by extraordinary speed, efficiency, and utter ruthlessness, although it was bloodless. There was virtually no resistance from the Muslims, and no intervention by the State. It was the work of the same LTTE that previously had carried out a series of bloody massacres—of around 500 policemen (mostly Sinhalese but also Muslims); of Muslim worshipers in Kattankudi; and of many other Sinhalese and Muslims in different locations. In each case the design and the timing were clearly worked out to avoid or minimize resistance from the victims and interventions by the State. The LTTE, which once had Muslim activists within its ranks, had become virulently anti- Muslim and, in particular, anti-SLMC, by October 1990. The expulsion only reinforced the case for the establishment of the SLMC. The belated “confession” by LTTE spokesman Balasingham that the expulsion was a “strategic blunder” adds insult to injury. How can such an enormous crime, meticulously planned and executed, be described as a “strategic blunder”? The indifference of non-Muslim communities to this tragedy is a reflection of the ethnic compartmentalization of Sri Lankan society: to most Sinhalese and Tamils, it appears as a Muslim problem rather than a national one. Even Muslims holding influential positions in the UNP, SLFP, and other “national” parties, seem to be unable or unwilling to push hard on this issue. It is only those parties whose votes depend on the northern and eastern Muslim population, who regard it as their problem—in short, primarily the SLMC, the NUA and the ACMC. The concept of Tamil-speaking people as a single ethnic group was promoted from the 1950s by the Federal Party under the leadership of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam. This idea then had the support of many Tamils and Muslims (most notably Mashoor Moulana); however, it did not get traction and become universally accepted because it was a political initiative without any grounding in social reality. Sri Lankan Tamils, Sri Lankan Muslims, and Indian Tamils remained distinct ethnic groups, at that time, as now, with only the most politically active perceiving Tamil-speaking people as one ethnic group. This initiative yielded some electoral benefits in the East when it polled Tamil votes and Muslim votes for the Federal Party rather than for the UNP or the SLFP. This benefit was iii short-lived, however, because some of these members of Parliament crossed over to the governing party. Working together was easier in the multi-ethnic East than in the virtually mono-ethnic North. Some Muslim youth continued to work with Tamil youth until the 1970s, but this ceased to be feasible with the emergence of the LTTE as the lead militant group in the 1980s. The LTTE developed anti-Muslim (in particular anti-SLMC) sentiments early in their campaign. The LTTE’s massacre of Muslims deterred all Muslims from forming affiliations to the LTTE, thus paving the way for the expulsion of Muslims from the North in October 1990. For strategic reasons it was the northern Muslims and not the eastern Muslims who were expelled. Any attempt to expel the eastern Muslims, among whom the SLMC was already established, would have ended in failure. The SLMC was formed with the objective of taking over the national Muslim leadership from the southern Muslims. M.H.M. Ashraff, who began his career in the Federal Party, as did Mashoor Moulana as well as thousands of other Muslims, maintained his links with the Federal Party and, in particular, with Chelvanayakam, for a long time. These links weakened in the course of time, and the death of Chelvanayakam in the late 1970s put an end to the concept of Tamil-speaking people as one ethnic group. However, the leaders of the SLMC and NUA were concerned to retain a relationship with the Tamil leadership. Following the end of the war, as well as the defeat and elimination of the LTTE in 2009, northern Muslims were presented with the real possibility of going back to their villages. As this report reaches completion, many Muslim families have gone back to their original villages while others wait to return. Return and resettlement are beset by a number of challenges. The state policy framework on IDPs remains weak and has effectively discriminated against northern Muslim returnees. There is inadequate support from the state as well as from other stakeholders to facilitate the return of northern Muslims to their villages. While there have been some positive development in 2011, much more needs to be done. Northern Muslims have lived in anticipation of an official government inquiry into the expulsion; the Citizens’ Commission, of which we are members, was established in the absence of such an official commission. This report is the culmination of a 2-year-long process, initiated by the Law and Society Trust, to produce an authoritative document on the expulsion, the two decades of displacement, and the experience of resettlement. We endorse this report in our capacity as independent and impartial persons representing different segments of civil society outside the northern Muslim community. This report used a multi-faceted methodology, including substantial primary and secondary research. The research was complemented by several visits we made to different locations to meet northern Muslim communities and to hear first-hand accounts of their experiences. We also planned to place the problems of the northern Muslims within the larger socio-political context of Sri Lanka, while linking up with different groups working on similar issues around the country. As expressed by Dr. Farzana Haniffa, the coordinator of this project, iv Some of the issues that the northern Muslims faced while displaced were common to most Sri Lankan citizens affected by the conflict. For instance, the fact that the ration amount was not increased in two decades affected not just the Muslim IDPs but other IDPs as well. Additionally the language difficulties faced by northern Muslims while accessing health care facilities or when visiting government offices are those faced by Tamil-speaking people all over the country. Muslims, to date, have paid insufficient attention to articulating their issues as concerns common to the country as a whole (Chapter 11 of Commission Report, and Commission Newsletter of July 2010). During our visits we were able to attentively listen to the concerns of northern Muslims while also highlighting certain common issues of concern that cut across communities. Chapter 3 of the report outlines the social and political context of the displacement and highlights the following: 1. The specificity of Muslim politics in Sri Lanka. 2. Muslims’ shared language and difficult politics with the Tamil minority in the country. 3. Muslims’ marginalization within the discourse of the ethnic conflict. 4. Muslims’ recent assertions of religious exclusivity. The conclusions and the recommendations are spelt out in the final chapter. While the report highlights the key issues to be addressed, the following critically important factors need to be kept in mind in providing relief to those displaced: 1. 21 years is a long time, and the young among the displaced population may find it hard to leave their present homes and neighbourhoodsto “return” to the homes and neighbourhoods of their parents. While every inducement needs to be provided to encourage return, unavoidably, many families may become divided on this issue, with most of the older members returning and some of the younger members remaining in their new neighbourhoods. 2. The physical, economic, and other spaces vacated by those expelled 21 years ago may have been partly filled by others. These new occupants need to be induced or pressured to vacate. This needs to be done as tactfully and painlessly as possible to minimize the conflict between future Tamil and Muslim neighbours. 3. The sudden influx of an empty-handed population in its thousands, especially into the Puttalam region, would have been a drain on the resources of the region and reduced the standard of living of the original population. Some means must be found to supplement the local resources to compensate for the loss.