University of Alberta Heidegger’s Critique of the Cartesian Problem of Scepticism by Sean Daniel Hartford A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Philosophy ©Sean Daniel Hartford Spring 2010 Edmonton, Alberta Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis and, except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatsoever without the author's prior written permission. Examining Committee Dr. Marie-Eve Morin, Philosophy, University of Alberta Dr. Robert Burch, Philosophy, University of Alberta Dr. Wesley Cooper, Philosophy, University of Alberta Dr. Leo Mos, Psychology, University of Alberta Abstract: This thesis deals with Martin Heidegger’s critique of the Cartesian problem of scepticism in Being and Time. In addition to the critique itself, Heidegger’s position with regards to the sense and task of phenomenological research, as well as fundamental ontology, is discussed as a necessary underpinning of his critique. Finally, the objection to Heidegger’s critique that is raised by Charles Guignon in his book, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, (namely, that it suffers from the problem of reflexivity) is evaluated. Contents INTRODUCTION: HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF THE CARTESIAN PROBLEM OF SCEPTICISM ......... 1 CHAPTER 1: THE SENSE AND TASK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH ................................. 6 §1 THE EMERGENCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH: HUSSERL AND THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS ...... 7 §2 HUSSERL’S THREE DISCOVERIES: INTENTIONALITY, CATEGORIAL INTUITION, AND THE ONTOLOGICAL SENSE OF THE APRIORI ..................................................................................................................... 8 a) Intentionality ...................................................................................................................... 9 b) Categorial Intuition .......................................................................................................... 11 α) INTENTIONAL PRESUMING AND FULFILLMENT AS THEY RELATE TO EVIDENCE AND TRUTH ........................................................................................................... 11 β) INTUITION AND EXPRESSION .............................................................................................. 13 γ) SIMPLE AND MULTI-LEVEL ACTS .......................................................................................... 14 δ) TWO EXAMPLES OF MULTI-LEVEL ACTS: ACTS OF SYNTHESIS, AND ACTS OF IDEATION ................................................................................................................ 15 c) The Ontological Sense of the Apriori ............................................................................... 17 §3 HEIDEGGER’S CONCEPTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY ......................................................................... 19 a) The Principle of Phenomenology: To the Matters Themselves! .................................... 19 b) Phainómenon and Lógos ................................................................................................. 20 α) PHAINÓMENON ............................................................................................................... 21 β) LÓGOS ............................................................................................................................ 22 c) The Unified Meaning of Heidegger’s Two Definitions of Phenomenology .................... 22 CHAPTER 2: THE QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING, AND THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC OF DASEIN ............................................................................................................................... 24 §4: THE QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING ................................................................................ 24 a) The Ontological Difference .............................................................................................. 25 b) The Neglect of the Question of the Meaning of Being ................................................... 26 c) The Tripartite Structure of the Question of the Meaning of Being ................................. 27 §5: THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC OF DASEIN ....................................................................................... 28 a) Da-sein, or Being-there .................................................................................................... 29 b) Dasein’s Access to the Meaning of Being ........................................................................ 29 c) Meno’s Paradox ................................................................................................................ 32 d) Phenomenology, and the Existential Analytic ................................................................ 34 CHAPTER 3: THE CRITIQUE OF CARTESIAN ONTOLOGY – THE OVERCOMING OF SCEPTICISM .. 36 § 6: THE CARTESIAN ONTOLOGY: SUBSTANCE, CERTAINTY, AND DUALISM ............................................ 37 a) Descartes’ Project as an Epistemic Project and the Determination of the Subject as Absolutely Certain .................................................................................... 39 b) Res Cogitans, Res Extensa, and the Influence of the Cartesian Ontology upon the Western Philosophical Tradition .......................................................... 41 α) RES COGITANS ................................................................................................................. 42 β) RES EXTENSA ................................................................................................................... 43 γ) CARTESIAN DUALISM AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION .................................................................................................... 43 § 7: CRITIQUE OF CARTESIAN ONTOLOGY: DESCARTES’ FAILURE TO INQUIRE INTO THE BEING OF THE SUBJECT, THE MATHEMATICAL PREJUDICE IN HIS DETERMINATION OF THE WORLD, AND HOW THIS INEVITABLY LEADS TO SCEPTICISM ................................................................................................... 44 a) How Descartes’ Care About Certainty Leads to an Overlooking of the Being of the Subject ................................................................................................... 46 b) How Descartes’ Care About Certainty Leads to his Mathematical Prejudice in his Determination of the World, and How This Leads to a Covering-up of the Basic Phenomenon of Worldhood ................................................................................................. 46 c) The Necessary Link Between Cartesian Dualism and the Problem of Scepticism ......................................................................................................................... 48 § 8: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISCOVERY OF DASEIN’S BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AND THE OVERCOMING OF CARTESIAN SCEPTICISM .................................................................................................................. 50 a) Dasein ............................................................................................................................... 51 b) Being-in ............................................................................................................................ 52 c) The Worldhood of the World ........................................................................................... 54 α) DEALINGS AND CONCERN .................................................................................................. 54 β) EQUIPMENTALITY AND THE BEING OF ENTITIES AS READY-TO-HAND ........................................ 55 γ) READINESS-TO-HAND AND PRESENCE-AT-HAND .................................................................... 58 δ) WORLDHOOD AND SIGNIFICANCE ........................................................................................ 60 d) Being-in-the-world as a Unitary Ontological Structure and the Problem of Scepticism 61 e) Knowing as a Founded Mode of Being-in ........................................................................ 62 CHAPTER 4: THE PROBLEM OF REFLEXIVITY IN HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF CARTESIAN SCEPTICISM ......................................................................................................................... 64 § 9: A BRIEF LOOK AT GUIGNON’S PROBLEM OF REFLEXIVITY, AND DASEIN’S CONTEXTUALISATION IN THE WORLD ........................................................................................................................................ 65 a) Dasein’s Being-with ......................................................................................................... 68 α) DISTANTIALITY, AND THE ‘THEY’ ......................................................................................... 70 β) THE THEY-SELF ................................................................................................................. 73 γ) IDLE TALK – THE LANGUAGE OF THE ‘THEY’ ..........................................................................