1330_A1-A8.qxd 9/20/07 9:11 AM Page 1 310-567/B428-S/11007 Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976 Greece 1. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1 Washington, March 30, 1973. SUBJECT Letter to Prime Minister Papadopoulos As US assistance recipients improve their economic condition, it has been our practice to shift them gradually from grant military as- sistance to foreign military sales credits. You may recall that Iran took this step shortly after your visit in May last year. Several other coun- tries were considered to make this transition in FY 1974. Greece was one of them. When the Greek government learned of this, they decided to do the same thing that Iran did last spring—take themselves off the grant list. They judged that the amount of money had become quite small and that their being on the recipient list subjected them to con- tinued Congressional criticism. They preferred to initiate the termina- tion of grant military assistance. Greece will receive $65 million in mil- itary sales credits in FY 1974. Prime Minister Papadopoulos wrote you a letter [Tab B]2 explain- ing Greece’s step. There was some misunderstanding at the Greek end of what was involved, so there has had to be continuing technical dis- cussion over the practical elements of terminating grant assistance so that the Greeks would not do themselves out of some aid that was in the pipeline. However, those discussions need not affect your reply. At Tab A is a suggested reply to the Prime Minister treating this transition in a low key way and expressing appreciation for Greece’s contribution to NATO. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 754, Pres- idential Correspondence File, Greece (Papadopoulos). Secret. Sent for action. 2 Dated January 11; attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original. 1 1330_A1-A8.qxd 9/20/07 9:11 AM Page 2 310-567/B428-S/11007 2 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXX Recommendation: That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Pa- padopoulos at Tab A. [Text cleared with Mr. Gergen.]3 3 Nixon signed the letter on April 26; attached but not printed. 2. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1 Athens, April 21, 1973, 1115Z. 2400. Subj: Greek Prime Minister Confronts Serious Problems. Summary: Greek regime in recent months has been unable to deal decisively and in timely fashion with variety serious problems, e.g., universities and student unrest, detention of seven lawyers without charges, arrest of Professor Tsatsos of Bonn University, etc. At same time while Admiral Norton, Chief of British Defense Staff’s visit was exploited for needed positive publicity, escalation of violence in Cyprus and squabbling within Greek Orthodox Church have cast additional doubts on competence of GOG leadership. Rising level of internal pub- lic criticism of GOG coupled with heightened complaints from Greek military rounds out dreary picture for Prime Minister Papadopoulos. Question arises as to viability of Prime Minister vis-à-vis his colleagues within regime. Remains to be seen whether PM can or will exert strong leadership based on full implementation of 1968 Constitution. End summary. 1. Prime Minister must be increasingly aware he faces problem of developing sufficient forward progress on the political side to elimi- nate charges of stagnation and lack of direction. Early concrete steps to implement the 1968 Constitution could get him off the hook. For ex- ample, such concrete steps would involve the establishment of consti- tutional court and putting into effect draft electoral law allowing for organization of political parties, as well as fixing of a date for elections, at some distance in the future, however. Recent developments in in- ternal situation are putting him under greater presure for action. 2. Events in recent months have not improved image of GOG. Number of unresolved problems has increased, causing embarrass- 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE. Se- cret; Exdis. 1330_A1-A8.qxd 9/20/07 9:11 AM Page 3 310-567/B428-S/11007 Greece 3 ment and highlighting regime inability to take decisions in timely fash- ion. For example, despite fact it has been clear for some time that ar- chaic university administration and growing student dissatisfaction were likely to present problem, regime failed to come to grips with is- sues posed. When recent student difficulties erupted into confronta- tion that required resort to drastic measures to bring situation under control GOG reacted rashly, particularly in its resort to draft and in means police used in restoring order. Criticism produced by this affair in Greece and abroad added new element of uneasiness and tension in political environment. 3. Difficulties arising from GOG fumbling on student problem were compounded by untimely arrest of seven lawyers who were pub- licly identified as legitimate defense counselors for detained students, even though there is little doubt they engaged in other activities con- sidered subversive. GOG refusal to receive representatives of Interna- tional Commission of Jurists and American Bar Association, while it may have been justified on narrow legal basis considered from inter- nal standpoint, was poor public relations abroad since it lost GOG op- portunity to put its version of facts on record. 4. Similarly inept move was GOG arrest of Greek Professor Tsat- sos of Bonn University. His arrest, for which no reason yet given pub- licly but Embassy understands involves his extensive contacts with op- position elements here and abroad, came just at time that GOG discussing and arranging date for visit of German Foreign Minister Scheel to Athens, as well as shortly before SPD Party Congress at which GOG must have been aware FRG Chancellor Brandt would face hos- tile critics of regime. As result product of SPD Congress was perhaps sharper in its anti-regime focus than might otherwise have been the case, and a considerable cloud has been cast upon prospective Scheel visit this calendar year. 5. On other hand Prime Minister was able to extract maximum publicity value from visit of Admiral Norton, Chief of British Defense Staff by insuring Norton received red carpet treatment and providing full press and TV coverage, including prominent front page pictures of Norton, British Ambassador and himself. To some extent, however, question in House of Commons on desirability of such visits inasmuch as they implied support for GOG, undercut PM, particularly after HMG response made plain visit was military in character and not intended to have political implications. 6. To add to PM’s woes, public image of Greek Orthodox Church under GOG-chosen head Archbishop Ieronymos is in deplorable state. Continuing ecclesiastical problems, including profferred resignation of Archbishop, must have produced considerable uneasiness among Greek public generally. 1330_A1-A8.qxd 9/20/07 9:11 AM Page 4 310-567/B428-S/11007 4 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXX 7. Escalating violence in Cyprus, most of which turns upon dif- ferences between pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas Greek Cypriots, also casts unfavorable light upon GOG leadership. Here again image of regime and govt have seriously depreciated. Greek inability to unify Greek Cypriot elements, given its announced claim to lead the Hel- lenistic world, could adversely affect overriding objective of maintain- ing strong and friendly Greek-Turkish relationship. Athens regime seems to realize critical character of problem it faces in Cyprus but has so far demonstrated inability to master developments on island rather than be mastered by them. 8. While grounds of revival of Vice President Agnew’s Drake Uni- versity statement over past weekend remains somewhat obscure, it seems clear that it was surfaced for government’s purposes. It balanced critical resolutions of SPD Congress, and it also served to remind Greek public that GOG has important friends in U.S., irrespective of hostility shown by certain European political leaders. 9. On economic side, GOG has also demonstrated considerable in- eptitude in face of inflation, meat shortage problem, pressure for in- creased wages, and inability to initiate key economic development proj- ects involving foreign investments. 10. Government has either deliberately or by inadvertence per- mitted development of considerably higher level of direct criticisms within country as evidenced by such publications as “political the- mata” and regular Greek press which have taxed GOG for its failure to cope with wide variety of current problems. Coupled with public- ity regarding seven detained lawyers and university problems, these criticisms take on added psychological significance since they con- tribute to creation of atmosphere in which opposition groups within Greek society are feeling somewhat freer about revealing their own opinion about current situation. Rising level of such critical comment could compel PM to face choice between new and genuine clamp-down and present “shadow of martial law” posture that permits “tolerable” level of dissent, reviving this area of intra-regime friction. 11. The problems above have not been lost on the military who in- dividually have increased their complaint level. This apparently has allowed Chief of Military Police, Col. Dimitrios Ioannidis, who often opts for a much harder line, an increased voice in governmental mat- ters through adroit exploitation of officer complaints. It is difficult to come to grips with the existence or exact size of dissident conspirato- rial groups in the Army who may have plans to seize upon this op- portunity to move against the Prime Minister. Such a move if carried out by the military with a view toward extricating the Army from gov- ernment would probably receive a large majority of support both in the military and the population.